SAZONOV, SERGHEI DMITRIEVICH Russian statesman, was born in the province of Ryazan, July 29, 1866, the son of a landed proprietor, and educated at the Alexandrovsky Lyceum, St. Petersburg (Leningrad), a high school for the sons of noblemen destined mainly for the civil service. Having occupied various diplomatic posts in Rome and served six years in the Russian Embassy in London he was pro moted, in 1906, to be Minister-Resident at the Vatican, where his engaging manners, frankness and taste for ecclesiastical affairs enabled him to make great headway. In 1909 he entered the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as coadjutor to Izvolsky, whom he succeeded as Minister in 191 o—an appointment ascribed to the influence of his brother-in-law, Stolypin.
Sazonov's line of action was definitely traced for him by the European situation on the one hand and by the limitation of his role to that of confidential secretary to the Emperor on the other. His chief functions were to parry Austria's fitful thrusts at Serbia, to curb Serbia's explosive impatience, buoying her up with hopes of a vast legacy to fall due on the death of the Em peror Francis Joseph, and to bespeak the help of England, Italy, Rumania (to whom he also held out hopes of a legacy) and Bul garia in the coming struggle. These tasks exceeded his powers, and his abortive Near-Eastern policy did not prevent Russia's ruinous collapse during the World War. Yet if his work was not to prove permanent he carried it out with considerable skill, and defended himself ably in his memoirs against the charge that he was seeking to precipitate a World War; although he ad mitted knowledge of the fact that Hartwig, in Belgrade, was work ing against his avowed aims. Meanwhile, Sazonov genuinely worked for present peace, to gain time for Stolypin's far-reaching domestic reforms and to allow Russia to consolidate her insecure domestic and military situation.
The arrangements come to during the Tsar's visit to Potsdam (Nov. 4-5 191o) and the Kaiser's return visit to Wolfsgarten (Nov. I I) respecting the Baghdad railway, North Persia and the maintenance of Turkey, eased the strain, but failed to dispel the atmosphere of mistrust. Sazonov was suspected of a lack of straightforwardness by the Kaiser. Russia's diplomatic repre sentatives abroad were largely to blame for this, and in particular the rashness or awkwardness of ambassador Charykov in Con stantinople, who secretly proposed to guarantee that city to Tur key and protect her from all attacks by the Balkan States in re turn for the freedom of the Straits. Other covert moves also lent
colour to the charges of underhand dealing. For example, on the conclusion of the Balkan Alliance of 1912, Sazonov decided to seek Germany's help in overawing the Balkan States and thus preserving peace. He accordingly arranged an interview between the Tsar and the Kaiser at Baltischport on July 4-5 1912, which was followed by a three days' exchange of views between the German Chancellor and the members of the Russian Govt. in St. Petersburg. Yet he concealed from Germany the existence of the Balkan Alliance which had been communicated to him. Sazonov next repaired to London, Paris and Berlin and the Great Powers authorised him and Berchtold to announce their determination to uphold the status quo, so that if the Balkan States broke the peace their victory would be fruitless. The veto was successfully ignored by the Balkan Powers, and a European crisis was the result. Sazonov, on this occasion, behaved with moderation. He kept a tight hand on Serbia, obliged her to content herself with a railway harbour on the Albanian coast, a railway connection and the secret assurance that her "promised land" lay within the dual monarchy.
He was next employed in drafting, in collaboration with Beth mann Hollweg, a scheme of reforms for Armenia (Nov. 5, 1913). Immediately afterwards, a fresh conflict with Germany arose over the despatch of General Liman von Sanders to Con stantinople. Sazonov gave vent to his dissatisfaction in unusually strong terms, but on the Kaiser ordering Liman to lay down the command of the first Turkish army corps, while retaining his other functions, Nicholas II. let the matter drop. Sazonov then drafted a memorandum to the Tsar on Russia's claim to the freedom of the Straits (Nov. 1913) and three months later (Feb. 21, 1914) convened a council of political and military experts to discuss the ways and means of realising the scheme in case of a European war. But the military experts announced that in the plans of campaign no such side-problems could be included.