Here again it must be urged in reply that though psycholog ically the individual would not come to form ends apart from society, and though some ends are as such social in nature in the sense that they relate to other persons or depend upon co-opera tion for their realization, it is not their social nature that makes them morally binding, but rather their intrinsic value or worth. Common ends may have greater value as being more inclusive but the value itself may consist in something other than being included in a whole (though wholeness or completeness may be a value).
a repository for obligation in the real will. Nothing is gained by the argument that what ought to be willed really is willed by some one (God, our best self, etc.). It remains true, however, that as a matter of psychological fact institutions may be said to embody the efforts of social individuals towards mutual adjustment and the attainment of common ends. But this is a mere generality which throws no light upon the nature and value of any particular insti tution or association, or of the relations between them. The weakest side of the theory of the general will, since its formulation by Rousseau, has always been that it has tended to waver between two different conceptions which it does not succeed in bringing into an intelligible relation to one another. On the one hand the general will is identified with an ideal good, that in which all human purposes would be unified and harmonized. In this sense the general will is not a "de facto tendency," but something "essen tially logical," that is to say, something logically implied in human endeavour as that which, if fulfilled, would make it com plete and systematic. On the other hand, the general will is con ceived as something determinate and capable of expression, "a community of view as to the good of social and individual life" (Hetherington, Arist. Proc. 1917-18, p. 307), "an effective com munity of will." If now we follow the first interpretation, it is clear that our ultimate obligation is to the final good which is only inadequately interpreted by any actual institution. If we are told that the State is the "operative criticism of institutions" and our loyalty is to it, it remains to explain the nature of the principles upon which such criticism is based. Moreover, as a matter of fact, effective moral criticism is often rendered by individuals or asso ciations within the State which reach an ethical level higher than that reached by the organized machinery of the State. Again, the principles employed by such criticism are of universal applic ability and may go beyond the limits of the State. It is worthy of note in this connection that according to the theory of the real will there is no general will of humanity. If the "real" will is the ideal will can there really be no will of humanity? If we elect to stress the second interpretation of the general will as a determinate community of will, we must challenge its upholders to produce psychological evidence of such a unitary corporate will in the large States of the western world. The relation between "deter
minate levels" of the real will and the general will remains as ob scure as the relation between finite individuals and the absolute spirit in idealist metaphysics.
The issues involved in the above arguments have not been clearly brought out in recent controversy relating to the notion of the sovereign State. Instead of question ing the validity of the theories which seek to find a basis for obli gation in will political theorists have merely sought to replace the unitary will of the State by a plurality of separate wills (Guild Socialism, and kindred movements), amongst which that of the State was prima inter pares. Insoluble problems of functional demarcation were thus created and the need of a co-ordinating body had to be admitted, which dangerously resembled the unitary State which these theorists had set out to attack. It has proved difficult to work out the respective spheres of authority of the separate functional wills, and it has had to be admitted that in some sense the State does penetrate into all associations. It is now coming to be recognized that the failure of these efforts was due to the fact that the problem to which they sought to supply an answer' was badly formulated. The question is not whether there is one will or many, but whether political obligation is not essentially secondary in character, deriving its authority not from the fiat of any personal will but rather from the moral law, which is above all human organizations whatever. It is true that the moral law has to be interpreted by organs set up by society, but social institutions have authority only to the extent to which they in fact promote the social good, and they must be judged by what they do. It is idle to maintain that the State qua State is always good and that the general will cannot err. The content of such will must be scrutinized and evaluated in the course of its actual expression. It follows that ultimately the in dividual conscience is the final arbiter. The problem before the individual is not, however, that of reconciling clashing wills or of putting his "own good" against that of others. No really satis factory theory of obligation can be built on the basis that in serving others I am really serving my own interest. Such a notion of the common good assumes a harmony between competing in terests which in a complex world is not warranted by facts, and cannot in any event account for genuine self-sacrifice. The ulti mate principle seems to be that the good is binding and should be promoted wherever and by whomsoever it may be achieved, and that in this respect the individual agent counts for no more and no less than any other similar agent similarly situated. For the ambiguous category of the common good it is better to sub stitute the notion of just distribution of goods, and the problem is in every case to determine the conditions which would secure the justest distribution of goods among all those affected, or more generally to formulate a system of rights and obligations based upon principles of justice.