Such principles must be based upon the idea of equality. By this is not meant the view, often ascribed to egalitarians by their opponents, that all men either are equal in capacity or endowment, or that all should be treated alike, but rather that all persons have similar claims in so far as they are similar, and that only such dif ferences should be taken into account as are relevant to the values or goods involved. Equality, in short, is a principle of proportion, as Aristotle long ago pointed out. It is not based upon a denial of differences but upon an evaluation of the relevance of such differences as do exist to the system of rights and duties.
We are confronted here with the difficulty that our notion of the good life is still very indeterminate. In mitigation it must, however, be remembered, that social philosophy is concerned not with the detail of the good life but only with those general condi tions of such a life as can be promoted by organized society. Rights are claims to such conditions for the realization of the good as can be secured by social organization. The delicacy and subtlety of organized effort varies from association to association and, in the case of the State, it is clear that its action is relatively mechanical and confined to measures which can be carried out in a relatively uniform manner. This limitation, arising from the character of the means or mechanisms at the disposal of the State, and the further difficulty due to the absence of agreed scales of values, rather than any a priori theorizing as to the scope of the State, determines the limits of its intervention and control. For practical purposes these considerations lead us to the conception of a minimum. The organized efforts of society should be directed at securing the minimum conditions requisite for the realization of the good. The duty of the social authority is accordingly: (a) To utilize the collective resources for the promotion of the good of the associated members in the sense of secur ing to each individual the minimum facilities for the ful filment of his capacities for good.
(b) To control such differences in power and possessions as arise in a society with the object of preventing those who have acquired excess of power from abusing it and forc ing others into conditions incompatible with the require ments of the good life.
The principle of equality is clearly in harmony with the con ception of a minimum here outlined, but may also sanction differ ential claims above the minimum should their satisfaction be shown to be necessary for the realization of the good on a maxi mum scale. The free working out of the implications of this prin ciple would require, among other things, a knowledge of the extent to which individuals differ among themselves in respect of capacity for the attainment of objects having intrinsic value.
regard to objects of the greatest value in life (such as apprecia tion of beauty, truth, personal affection) large scale organization, and especially the State as an organ of compulsion and coercion, can do very little. When we are told that the State exists for the sake of the good life, it should be pointed out that it can only be effective if it confines itself to laying down general conditions to which individuals and associations of individuals under a common rule must conform if the good is to be realized. It can operate only with general rules and is utterly incompetent to enter into the finer questions that come from the need of balancing or grading values against one another. In a sense the sphere of the State is wider than that of other associations within it, since it must lay down certain general conditions to which they must conform, and has further the duty of adjustment and co-ordination. In this sense the State is an organ for the maintenance of justice or the rule of equality. But the complexities of human life and the nature of the ends to which we ascribe value make it practically impos sible for the State to intervene effectively except to secure the barest and crudest conditions of general welfare. To maintain that the State alone "reaches like wisdom from end to end" (J. H. Muirhead, Mind, 33, P. 364) is not very convincing. The purposes of the State are more embracive than those of other institutions, but the embrace is not tender nor very moving and may evoke but a half-hearted response. It touches all things it is true, but only superficially. The deeper purposes of life are utterly beyond its grasp and its power of arbitrament and adjustment in matters of external action, though necessary, afford no solution of the deeper conflicts of the mind in its struggles towards comprehen sive values. There are also many purposes and interests, religious, artistic and intellectual, which cut across State 'boundaries and either have, or ought to have, organs of expression, just as entitled to our allegiance and loyalty as political organizations. When it is said that the State is the whole complex or system of institutions it should be remembered that some institutions transcend political boundaries and it is questionable whether the State has, or ought to have, "the last word" in cases of conflict or divergence among themselves, or between them and the State. This applies even with greater force to disputes between States. They cannot each have supreme authority. That can only lie in a world organization. In dealing with the problems of conflicting allegiance and loyalties that thus arise the individual must be guided by a devotion to the best, and in this arduous task of interpretation and evaluation he may find that "Sittlichkeit," like patriotism, is not enough.