The Rival Commanders.—Since the leadership and strategical handling of the armies in this campaign have been much, even hotly, debated, it is worth while to devote some attention to the personality of the principal commanders on either side. The illustrious von Moltke, who as chief of the general staff to King William, was the virtual leader of the Prussian armies, came later to war than any other of the great captains of history. He was 66 years of age at the beginning of this, his first campaign.
He had held the position of C.G.S. since 1857, and had been working at the problem of a war against Austria in the closest detail since 186o (the date of No. 1 of the famous "Projects").
He was a student of war rather than a battlefield general ; the soldiers who won victories under his direction can rarely have set eyes on this quiet, professor-like man, who was calm and inflexible in a crisis. But, though his reputation as a commander in the field has been much and vehemently assailed (the French have never tired of pointing out to their conquerors of 187o what would have happened had they met the real Napoleon), no more nor greater mistakes have been proved against him than must be made by every leader of large bodies in this blindfold game of war. And, whatever the verdict on his generalship, his fame in military history is secure as the originator of scientific education for war. He was the first to insist on close study of the principles of their profession by all grades of commander.
King William, though he wisely deferred to von Moltke's views on matters of strategy, was no mere figurehead. He was a good judge of men and could make his influence felt. The two royal princes who commanded the I. and II. Prussian armies, Frederick Charles and the Crown Prince, were not great generals, but were both brave soldiers, well grounded in the profession of arms. The Prussian corps commanders and their principal staff officers had all been carefully selected.
The Austrian commander-in-chief, Benedek, was a complete contrast to von Moltke. He had fought with distinction in sev eral campaigns, but had little military education. A Protestant in an almost fanatically Catholic country_ of humble origin in an army where birth was almost the first qualification for high com mand, he had risen by his personal valour and bold, energetic leadership on the battlefield. He was, in fact, an excellent Corps
Commander, but he was no strategist, knew little of the theory of his profession, and had no military imagination. He was only too well aware of his limitations, knew himself unfitted for the handling of large forces, and accepted the command of the Austrian Army of the North with great reluctance, out of loyalty to his emperor. His own wish had been for the command against Italy, a smaller and less responsible task in a theatre of war which he knew well. To trust the 'fate of an empire to one who so mistrusted himself was obvious folly. Yet Benedek's appoint ment was very popular with the great mass of the Austrian army, though his relations with his aristocratic corps commanders were never cordial. He needed a really able and tactful chief of staff to supply the necessary technical knowledge and to give him the confidence he lacked.
His nominal chief of the staff was von Henikstein, amicable and rich—civil rather than military virtues—personally brave, but without any real qualification for his important post. He could bring to Benedek neither military knowledge, for he had little, nor confidence, for he was himself of a pessimistic turn of mind. In the actual conduct of operations von Henikstein seems to have been a cipher, and the virtual arbiter of Austrian strategy was Krismani6, head of the operations branch of the general staff. He had been a professor at the staff college and had made a special study of the topography of Bohemia. He was a clever, plausible man, full of self-confidence, and oozed theory of war from every finger-tip. Unfortunately his studies had led him to a conviction of the superiority of the defensive. He based the strategy of this campaign on the successful defensive cam paign of the Austrians against Frederick the Great in Bohemia in 1757. He was an arm-chair strategist, a maker of war by rote and by diagram, rather than a practical soldier. The Austrian corps commanders were great nobles, who treated war as a sport and usually troubled themselves little about the theoretical or scientific side of their profession. To sum up, the Austrian army was led by amateurs, the Prussian by professionals.