THE ORIGINS AND OUTBREAK OF THE WAR The 1866 campaign was a definite and carefully planned stage in the unification of Germany under the Hohenzollern dynasty, of which Bismarck was the principal agent. The issue was clear-cut: Prussia deliberately challenged Austria for the leadership of the Germanic Confederation. And, however unscrupulous the Prussian Government may have been in its methods of designedly provok ing a war at its chosen time, Prussia did represent progress and en lightenment in comparison with Austria's intolerance and ineffi ciency. Prussia had thrown down the glove in 185o, but the complete failure of her mobilization in that year compelled the postponement of the conflict and the acceptance at Olmiitz of the somewhat humiliating terms of Austria. Since then Prussia, with Bismarck as statesman, von Moltke as strategist, and von Roon as army organizer, had prepared methodically for a fresh challenge. The actual pretext found by Bismarck in 1866 was a dispute over the administration of Schleswig and Holstein, which Austria and Prussia had seized from Denmark in 1864, and had since held jointly. Diplomatic exchanges began in January and military preparations a little later, but hostilities did not actually break out till the middle of June. By the alliance with Bismarck contrived to divert part of the Austrian forces to the South. Not only did the majority of the other German States join Austria, but also the war was far from popular with the people of Prussia itself, who did not understand the policy underlying it, and could see no good cause of quarrel with Austria.
Von Moltke, trusting to lack of co-operation between the Ger man States hostile to Prussia, and aware of the comparative in efficiency of their armies, detached a force of under 5o,000 to deal with them. Thus in the decisive theatre there was virtually
numerical equality; some 270,000 Prussians (if a Reserve Corps of 25,00o be included) opposed 245,000 Austrians and 25,000 Saxons.
Contemporary military opinion held that the Austrian army, with its longer period of active service (seven years against the Prussian three or four) and its recent experience of war, would prove greatly superior to the Prussian army, which had not been engaged in battle for over so years. Contemporary military opin ion was quite wrong. The Prussians proved to be better trained, better organized, and better led. They had, besides, a great advantage in the possession of a breech-loading rifle. The Austrian muzzle-loading rifle, though a longer-ranging and more accurate weapon, not only had a much slower rate of fire but also could not be re-loaded without exposure of the firer. The superiority conferred by the breech-loader was not, however, recognized at the outbreak of war; and the newer and rather better pattern of gun, with which the Austrian artillery was armed, was fully expected to counterbalance the Prussian advantage of a breech loading rifle. The Austrian cavalry was considered to be greatly superior in manoeuvre and horsemanship. Though a proportion of the cavalry on both sides was armed with a carbine, little use was made of dismounted action; shock action was held to be the principal, if not the only, role of cavalry on the battlefield. The Austrian infantry, also, relied on shock action rather than on fire effect : the Prussians, in spite of their lack of war experience, had arrived at appreciation of the power of the rifle and the possibilities of rapid fire. Both forces were organized into army corps of 25,00o to 30,00o men, comprising four brigades of in fantry. But whereas the Prussian corps was subdivided into two divisions each of two brigades, the Austrians had no divisional link, the four brigades working directly under the corps head quarters.