THE SUPERNATURAL Here the functional view is put to its acid test. What can be the function of primitive belief and superstition, of animism con sidered as valueless, crude and mistaken, of magic, regarded as spurious and fallacious pseudo-science, of totemism, of barbarous burial ceremonies and of cruel initiation rites? Yet the method here set forth stands or falls with the possibility of defining the whole of the supernatural. It is bound to show in what way belief and ritual work for social integration, technical and economic efficiency, for culture as a whole—indirectly therefore for the biological and social welfare of each individual member.
The great majority of modern theories in fact come near to the posing of this problem and to its solution. It is implied in the whole structure of Frazer's Golden Bough, in the contri butions of Westermarck to the moral side of religion, in Durk heim's analysis of the integrative function of public ceremonial, in the additions of Hubert and Mauss to his theories, in Marett's analysis of magic, in Crawley's vitalistic view of religion, above all, in the analysis of Andaman belief and ceremonial by A. Rad cliffe-Brown. But too often the functional view is still smothered by evolutionary or historical discussions—as to whether magic preceded religion, as to what was the primitive form of religion, and so on.
Magic (q.v.).—The majority of theories dealing with magic range between two views that are apparently opposed, which label magic as primitive science or primitive stupidity (Urdumm /ieit) respectively. We must reject the implication of the first theory, that magic preceded science, and that once it fulfilled that function. It must be placed to the credit of this theory, how ever, that it does full justice to the practical context of magic. The second theory emphasising the central conception of imper sonal ubiquitous force mama, orenda, wakan—rightly appreciates the difference between belief and knowledge; and brings out the mystical character of magic (Marett, Hubert and Mauss, Preuss).
The functional theory reconciles the two points of view. Let us start from the close association of magic with practical activi ties. First, every practical pursuit amongst savages is always primarily based upon knowledge and is never exclusively con trolled by magic. There are in all savage cultures certain activi ties in which technical ability, guided by knowledge, completely suffices. In others, the help of magic is also invoked. What are the respective contributions of knowledge and of magic to such a mixed activity? In its essentials the division of function between the two is very simple; as far as his knowledge goes, as far as he can safely rely on experience, reason and technical ability, the native—whether in his gardening or fishing, the building of craft, in warfare or sailing—does not use magic. No savage has ever been observed to select the tree for his dug-out by divination, to bring forth seedings by formulae without having planted them.
Only where, in spite of knowledge and effort, the results still turn unaccountably against him, only when forces completely beyond his mental grasp and practical control baffle him—in dealing with garden pests, with the supply of fish and animals, in securing favourable wind or weather, in preventing disaster at sea or in war, above all in dealing with bodily decay, disease or personal accidents—does the savage resort to supernatural means of filling the lacunae in his practical power.
The type of belief met in magic is always an affirmation of man's power to deal with the situation by a rite or spell. This belief simply repeats in a standardised manner, what hope all the time has whispered within the individual's own mind. Again. the rite repeats in a fixed, definite form what the natural expres sion of emotions already contains, only, as a rite, it is carried out with a purpose and with the conviction that it is a means to an end.