TILE ADVANCE TO BONIGGRATZ The Prussian I. Army.—The danger threatening two sepa rated forces which seek to unite within range of an active enemy is obvious. The one may be delayed and held fast by a detach ment whilst the other is overwhelmed by the enemy's main mass. It appeared to von Moltke that the II. Army was the more exposed and had the harder task to win a passage through the mountains; he therefore enjoined on the Commander of the I. Army a rapid advance on Gitschin in order "to shorten the crisis." Prince Frederick Charles with the I. and Elbe Armies had an unexpectedly easy task at first, since he was allowed to pass the defiles of the Erz Gebirge without opposition. The Austrian detachment on this wing (Saxon Corps, I. Corps, 1st Light Cav alry Division) had been ordered by Benedek to hold the line of the Iser. In the advanced guard combats of Hiihnerwasser and Podol on June 26 the Prussians secured crossings over this river, and the Austrians had their first experiences of the deadli ness of the breech-loader. Prince Frederick Charles spent the whole of the 27th in manoeuvring his forces into position for an enveloping battle at Miinchengratz, where he supposed the main body of the Austrian detachment to be, and practically the whole of the 28th in manoeuvring them back into line of march, when he found that the enemy had retired on Gitschin without await ing his blow. In the battle of Gitschin on the 29th the ground favoured the Austrians, who had an opportunity of crushing the head of one of the Prussian columns before the other could reach the field of battle. But the superior weapon and skilful handling of the Prussian infantry won the day and in the end the Austrians and Saxons suffered a severe defeat. Thus by the 3oth the I. and Elbe Armies had reached their original rendezvous. Their corn mander had, however, been guilty of several errors. Of these the most flagrant was the placing of his cavalry in the rear, with the result that he was always in ignorance of his enemy's disposi tions and moves. His unjustified halt of the I. Army on June 25 before it was clear of the mountains, and his faulty dispositions at Gitschin might have been severely punished had the Austrian high command been less inept.
through Trautenau; on the left the V. Corps was directed on Nachod in the centre the Guard Corps was given Eipel as its destination, with the task of supporting the Corps on its right or left at need. The advanced guard of the I. Corps drove back a part of the Austrian X. Corps, and early in the afternoon secured the exits from the defile at Parschnitz. But the Prussian Com mander, Bonin, thinking the action was over, neglected to hasten the deployment of the remainder of his Corps and refused the proffered assistance of a division of the Guard. Later in the after noon the remainder of the Austrian X. Corps reached the battle field, and counterattacked vigorously. They drove in the Prussian advanced troops and caused the I. Corps to retreat in complete disorder across the frontier. On the same day the Prussian V. Corps won an important success at Nachod against the Austrian VI. Corps. Here, as at Trautenau, the Prussian advanced guard was attacked by a greatly superior force before the main body was clear of the defile behind. But von Steinmetz, commander of the V. Corps, a veteran who had fought in the Napoleonic wars, was of more resolute mettle than Bonin, and after a hard strug gle won clear of the defile and drove back his enemy. On the following day, the 28th, the Prussians continued their advance and won two successes. The Guard Corps at Soor defeated the Aus trian X. Corps, the victors of Trautenau, while Steinmetz's V. Corps at Skalitz drove back the Austrian VIII. Corps, which had relieved the VI. Corps in front of him. The success of the Guard Corps opened the Trautenau defile and enabled the rallied I. Corps to resume its advance. On the 29th Steinmetz won a third success, at Schweinschadel, this time over the Austrian IV. Corps. By the evening of June 3o, the II. Army had disposed of the ir resolute and unco-ordinated opposition of its enemies and had established itself on the line of the upper Elbe, with its centre about Koniginhof. The I. Army and Army of the Elbe, which had received orders to continue their advance beyond Gitschin in the direction of Koniggratz, were now within a day's march of the II. Army. Moltke's first strategical aim, the junction of the Prussian forces, had practically been accomplished. On the same date, the 3oth, Benedek gave orders for a retreat of the Austrian Army on Koniggratz, and thus acknowledged that he had forfeited the advantage which a central position between two separated hostile forces might have given him.