Moltke's bold gambit had gone un punished and had given him a winning strategical position. Let us turn to the Austrian side of the board, consider Benedek's handling of the pieces during these last ten days of June, and enquire whether (as most critics hold) he missed an opportunity of defeating his enemies in detail, and if so, by what false moves. In the first place, he was probably correct in his decision to advance into northern Bohemia rather than to invade Silesia, and his march of some 200,000 men from Olmutz to Josef stadt was well enough ordered. But he had already lost time—the most precious element of war, as of chess—and was always at least one move in the game behind his opponent. Thus while the Prus sian armies were widely separated in a lateral direction, the Aus trian army as it approached the critical point of Josef stadt was also widely dispersed—from front to rear. If Benedek was to use his central position to strike to right and left alternately, he must first gain time to close up his army. He could gain this time only by his own efforts, by so using detachments from his main force as to impose delay on the forward march of the divided armies of his opponents. This fact he never grasped, he seems hardly to have realised any especial need for haste, but to have assumed that he would be given time to assemble, and even to rest his forces before having to make up his mind and to assume the offensive. Certainly his instructions to his detach ments show no sense either of a definite plan or of the impor' tance of keeping elbow-room for manoeuvre. His western de tachment (I. Corps and Saxons) properly handled, should have been able seriously to delay the Prussian I. Army in the moun tains and on the line of the Iser. But Benedek's instructions were
vague, and the Commander of the I. Corps, Clam Gallas, was incompetent, so that the Prussians were able to advance to Git schin with hardly a check. On the other wing, the opportunity to delay or destroy the Crown Prince's army at the exits from the mountains was also lost through want of clear orders and energetic action.
Military writers who have commented on the campaign have satisfied themselves that Benedek should have delayed the I. Prussian Army and Army of the Elbe and have thrown his whole weight in the first instance against the Crown Prince, before the latter could extricate himself from the mountains. Benedek's own conception, so far as he had any definite plan, seems to have been the opposite—to delay the Crown Prince and to attack the armies of Prince Frederick Charles. But he never formulated a clear-cut scheme either for holding up the one enemy or for offensive action against the other. And under their relentless pressure he presently abandoned his own plans, took up a posi tion and passively awaited attack. Much of Benedek's irresolu tion can probably be traced to the influence of Krismanies defen sive theories, but it was rooted in his sense of having to perform a task beyond his powers. The result of his half measures had been disastrous. In the engagements between June 26 and June 3o, six of the eight Austrian Corps had met defeat and had suf fered severely in their massed formations against the fire of the breech-loader. The Austrian losses had been well over 30,000, while those of the Prussians were less than a quarter of that total. It was a disillusioned army that retired on Koniggratz, under a leader who was not far from being demoralized.