Campaign in South-West Africa

SOUTH-WEST AFRICA, .CAMPAIGN IN. For some time before the year 1914 the proximity of the German Protec torate of South-west Africa, sharing a common frontier on its southern and eastern borders with the Union of South Africa, had been recognized by the Government of the latter country as an important factor in its military arrangements.

On Aug. 6, 1914, the Union Government undertook to assume all obligations resting upon the British regular garrison in South Africa, and on Aug. 1o, to send a military expedition of its own against German South-west Africa. The British Government ac cepted both offers, and indicated the enemy seaports and the wire less installation in Windhoek as the first objectives. In September a mixed force under Brig.-Gen. Lukin was landed at Port Nol loth and disposed thence eastwards along the southern enemy border to Steinkopf, the line of observation being continued to Upington by another force under Lt.-Col. Maritz. The first Union troops to occupy enemy territory were those commanded by Col. Beves, which landed unopposed at Luderitz bay on Sept. 18. On Sept. 9 Maritz joined the Boer rebellion and deserted to the enemy. Though only Ii,000 rebels took the field, 30,000 loyal troops acted against them and offensive action against the enemy was delayed for four months. A Union detachment with two guns was captured at Zandfontein on Sept. 26, a reverse due to Maritz. It was thus only on Feb. 11, 1915 that Botha took com mand at Swakopmund.

Disposition of Forces.--The

position then was that the northern force (Gen. Botha) held Walvis bay and Swakopmund, facing the troops of the enemy chief command (Lt.-Col. Franke). The central force (Brig.-Gen. Sir D. McKenzie) occupied Luder itz bay with its forward troops at .Tshaukaib, 4om. inland, in touch with the enemy on the railway line to Keetmanshoop. The southern force (Brig.-Gen. Van Deventer) watched the German force (Maj. Ritter) on the southern enemy border. The eastern force (Col. Berrange), considerably smaller than the rest, was mobilizing for an advance along the Kuruman and Molopo rivers against the eastern border of the enemy, whose detachments here lay at Rietfontein and Hasuur. The Royal Navy conveyed, escorted and disembarked the whole of the forces and their sup plies from the base at Cape Town.

The theatre of the campaign, 322,35osq.m. in area, is a plateau 3,500ft. above sea level. A waterless tract, 4o to mom. broad on the coast side and 200M. inland, intervenes between the first rise to the plateau and the border. Water is scarce every where, and the water holes were well known and far apart. The

railways were much damaged by the enemy, and the Union engineers repaired i,o4om. and laid 340m. of new line during the campaign. The enemy forces consisted of 2,000 soldiers and 14o officers, and in addition 7,00o male Europeans, many with mili tary training. Of military material and equipment the German commander had abundance; he enjoyed throughout a substantial advantage in respect of artillery.

Botha's Campaign.

On Feb. 23, Gen. Botha moved from Swakopmund and secured ROssing on the railway line and Husab on the Swakop river. The river route was selected for the main advance, and on March 18, after careful and tedious preparations, Gen. Botha again advanced and heavily defeated the enemy at Riet and Pforte in the Swakop valley, capturing two guns and 284 prisoners. Sixty miles of the river route were now secured, and, after another period of preparation, a third advance was made on April 26 and Karibib occupied on May 5, after a series of rapid turning movements by mounted troops. The enemy withdrew to the north, and Windhoek was occupied on May 12.

The Auxiliary Movements.

Gen. Botha's infantry (Skin ner) had meantime advanced along the railway and occupied Usakos. On March 30 the 'central force occupied Aus, and on April 26 at Gibeon, McKenzie's mounted troops, after rapid sus tained marching, overtook and heavily attacked the enemy retir ing from the south. The eastern force (Berrange) left Kuruman on March 6 and joined hands with the southern force on April 20 at Kabus. The southern force (Gen. Smuts) defeated the enemy at Nabas on March 8 and at Kabus on April 20. The capital occupied, the southern area was conquered.

A conference between the Union commander and Gov. Seitz at Giftkuppe on May 21 proved abortive, and the final stage of the campaign against the enemy, now concentrated in the north, ensued. Gen. Botha advanced from Karibib on June 18. The main body (mounted troops and infantry) moved in the centre with the commander-in-chief, while strong mounted forces operated to the east and west, commanded respectively by Myburgh and Brits. The enemy retired rapidly, and on June 27 Brits was or dered to move widely to the north-west and head the enemy off at Namutoni, while Myburgh was to swing in on Tsumeb from the east. These movements were carried out exactly, and the enemy, defeated on July i at Otavi by the leading mounted brigade of the centre, forestalled at Namutoni, and having lost Tsumeb, surrendered on July 9, 1915.