The Russian campaign of 1812 is the natural climax to the tendencies already seen to be growing in Napoleon's strategy— that of relying more on mass than on mobility, and on strategic formation rather than on surprise. The geographical conditions merely serve to accentuate its weaknesses.
The disastrous results of the subsequent retreat from Moscow were due less to the severe weather—the frost was actually late —than to the demoralization of the French army, which was the reaction from the frustration of its direct battle-aimed strategy.
Only in 1814 when he had dissipated his resources and his credit, did he resharpen his old tools and strive to re-establish an adjustment between end and means. Realizing that his means were too impoverished for military success, he aimed to dislocate the co-operation between the allied armies, and exploited mo bility to this end. Even so, astonishing as his success in retarding the enemy's end, it might perhaps have been more effective and enduring, if his ability to continue this strategy had not been diminished by his inherent tendency to consummate every stra tegic success by a tactical one.
The repulse of Lee's invasion at Gettysburg has commonly been acclaimed the turning point of the war, but the claim is only justified in a dramatic sense, and the sober verdict of historical opinion has more and more emphasized that the decisive effects came from the West. The first was achieved, on the central Mis sissippi on the same day, July 4, as Lee began his retreat from Gettysburg. This was the capture of Vicksburg (q.v.) by Grant, which gave the Federals complete control of this vital artery. Thereby the Confederacy was deprived permanently of the nourishment of reinforcements and supplies from the Trans Mississippi states. Grant took the calculated risk of cutting himself loose from his base and moving to place himself on the rear of Vicksburg and astride its communications with the main Eastern states of the Confederacy. It is worth while to note that while Napoleon had used the line of a river or range of hills as his strategic barrage, Grant's strategic barrage was constituted by the possession of a single point—a railway junc tion. This secured, he then turned about and moved on Vicks burg, which was now isolated long enough to ensure its capitula tion seven weeks later. The strategic sequel was the opening of the Chattanooga gateway into Georgia, the granary of the Con federacy, and thence into the Eastern states as a whole.
Defeat was now hardly avoidable by the Confederacy. Yet the Federals almost forfeited the victory already ensured. For in 1864 with the North growing weary under the strain, the moral element became preponderant. The peace party was gathering weight, and unless Lincoln was to be supplanted by a president pledged to seek a compromise peace, a solid guarantee of early victory must be forthcoming. To this end Grant was summoned from the West to take over the supreme command.
But he decided on the old direct overland approach southward from the Rappahannock towards Richmond. In justice, it should
be noted that if his approach was direct in the broad sense, it was in no sense a mere frontal push. Indeed, he continuously sought to turn his enemy's flanks by manoeuvre, if of a narrow radius.
Yet by the end of the summer of 1864 the ripe fruit of victory had withered in the hands of the North. The Federals had almost reached the end of their endurance, and Lincoln despaired of re election—a sorry repayment for the blank cheque he had given his military executant. It is an ironical reflection that the deter mination with which Grant had wielded his superior weight, now fearfully shrunk after the fierce battles of the Wilderness and Cold Harbour, had utterly failed to crush the enemy's army, while the chief result—the geographical advantage of having worked round close to the rear of Richmond—was gained by the bloodless ma noeuvres which had punctuated his advance. He had thus the modified satisfaction of being back, after immense loss, in the position which McClellan had occupied in 1862. But when the sky looked blackest it suddenly lightened. At the November elec tions Lincoln was returned to power. The relief came not from Grant's campaign, which made little progress after July, and flickered out with a costly double failure in mid-October. Sher man's capture of Atlanta in September was the instrument of sal vation. Atlanta, the base of the enemy army guarding the back door of the Confederacy, was not only an important junction and source of supplies but a moral symbol. And in gaining it Sherman's economy of force by manoeuvre is the more notable because, com pared to Grant in Virginia, he was practically tied to one line of railway for his supplies. Yet, rather than commit his troops to a direct attack he cut loose temporarily even from this, and he manoeuvred so skilfully as to lure the Confederates time after time into vain attacks. Thus to force an opponent acting on the strategic defensive into a succession of costly tactical offensives was a triumph of strategic artistry. Atlanta gained, Sherman took a risk greater than ever before, and one for which he has been much criticized by military commentators. He was convinced that if he could ruin the railway system of Georgia and the Caro linas and so prevent supplies going north to Richmond and Lee's army, the resistance of the Confederates would collapse. Hence, ignoring Hood's army, which he had forced to evacuate Atlanta, he began his famous "march to the sea" through Georgia, living on the country while he destroyed the railways. On November 15, 1864 he left Atlanta; on December ro he reached the outskirts of Savannah and there reopened his communications, this time by sea, as well as depriving the South of its chief remaining ports. Then he moved northwards through the Carolinas towards Lee's rear. Not until over three months later, the beginning of April, did Grant resume his advance. This obtained a dramatic success, and the surrender of Richmond was followed within a week by the surrender of Lee's army. Superficially it was a triumphant vin dication for Grant's direct pressure. But for a serious judgment the time factor is all important. The collapse of the Confederate resistance was due to the emptiness of its stomach reacting on its morale.