FRENCH REVOLUTIONARY WARS and CONSCRIPTION.) Their im petuous and undisciplined enthusiasm, instability of temper, and large infusion of new blood, made the old precise drill impossible. This difficulty, in compensation, gave birth to a simple yet vital change whereby the French marched and fought at a quick step of 120 paces to the minute, while their opponents adhered to the orthodox 7o paces. This elementary difference, in days before mechanical science endowed armies with means of movement swifter than the human leg, made possible the rapid transference and redistribution of force whereby the French could, in Napoleon's phrase, multiply "mass by velocity" both strategically and tactically.
The second condition was the organization of the army into permanent "divisions." Initiated by de Broglie, the emergency of the Revolution crystallized the reform. Then Carnot initiated and Bonaparte developed the idea that these divisions while op erating separately should co-operate to a common goal. This new condition enabled a far wider range of strategic combinations than had been possible before.
The third condition, linked with this, was that the chaotic sup ply system and the undisciplined nature of the Revolutionary armies compelled a reversion to the old practice of "living on the country." And the distribution of the army in divisions meant that this practice detracted less from the army's effective ness than in old days. Where, formerly, the fractions had to be collected before they could carry out an operation, now they could be serving a military purpose while feeding themselves.
Moreover, the effect of "moving light" was to accelerate their mobility, and to enable them to move freely in mountainous or forest country. Similarly, the very fact that they were unable to depend on magazines and supply trains for food and equipment lent impetus to hungry and ill-clad troops in descending upon the rear of an enemy who had, and depended on, such direct forms of supply.
Napoleon Bonaparte.—Bonaparte's development of these conditions into a new strategic method is to be traced in his Italian campaigns of 1796-97. The physical, or logistical, indirect approach formed its foundation and the dislocating surprise which it produced was the product of his astonishing mobility rather than of any research for pure surprise. His first great develop
ment of strategical methods was the disposition of his forces in a loose and wide-flung grouping which could be swung in any direc tion. Like a net weighted with heavy stones, when one of the en emy's columns came in contact with it, the pressure caused the net to tighten round it, and the stones crashed together on it. The self protective formation of the divisions thus became, on impact, a concentrated offensive formation. It evolved into the more highly developed bataillon carry, with army corps replacing divisions, of his later wars. His second was the idea of a strategic "barrage" created by gaining and using a "natural position," such as a river or mountain range across the enemy's rear. Such a posi tion, offering natural obstacles, afforded him a secure pivot from which to prepare a firm embrace for the enemy, whose "natural" tendency, when cut off from their line of retreat and supply, was to turn and flow back, usually in driblets, towards him. Its use is particularly well illustrated in his 180o and 1805 campaigns. (See FRENCH REVOLUTIONARY WARS and NAPOLEONIC CAM PAIGNS.) Strategical Degeneration.—But, from the time he became Emperor and had seemingly inexhaustible resources at his dis posal, this assured superiority of force had a growing influence on his strategy. From 1806 onwards Napoleon seems concerned mainly with the single end of bringing his enemy to battle, con fident that, when this happened, his machine would overpower the enemy. He still uses the manoeuvre onto their rear, but it is more as a means of gripping them firmly so that they can be drawn into his jaws, than as a means of liquefying their morale so that mastication may be easier. Moreover when hitches occur in the execution of these manoeuvres, his impatience leads him to gamble on a direct approach and battle. At Aspern–Essling (q.v.) he suffers in consequence his first great defeat.