In the Prussian army, on the other hand, marked progress was made towards the realization of a modern staff system, following the defeat by Napoleon at Jena and the Treaty of Tilsit. Scharn horst in his reorganization of Prussia's military forces was faced by a new problem; the total strength of these forces had been limited by Napoleon to 42,000 men and to circumvent this re striction it was necessary to resort to a short service system which provided large reserves of trained men for the expansion of the army in war. This new idea of a national militia required a highly trained staff to organize and train the man-power of the nation in peace and to mobilize it in war : with what success the de mand was met is shown in the victories of 1864, 1866 and 187o. The Congress of Vienna in 1815 ended a period of 20 years of war and was followed by 4o years of peace in Europe, an era of military stagnation. In England no development resulted from the experience gained in continental campaigns and the country was glad to be quit of things military ; in fact Wellington only preserved the nucleus of an army by keeping it abroad and out of sight as far as possible.
The Crimean War of 1854 found the British army, in conse quence, unprepared and ill-organized. In 1857 a Council of Military Education was set up under the presidency of the com mander-in-chief, the Duke of Cambridge ; one of its first tasks was to study and define the qualifications necessary for a staff officer. This was followed by the creation of a Staff College with competitive examination as a condition of entrance, the first ex amination being held in February 1858 and the first course start ing in April of that year.
In France on the other hand there had been a reaction after the Napoleonic wars similar to that which had taken place in England, and the lessons of those wars were neglected. In 1818 an "Ecole d'Etat-Major" was founded, but it provided instruc tion in the routine of staff duties only, combined with nothing of a higher nature. Officers entered it direct from St. Cyr and
the Polytechnique (corresponding to the British Royal Military College and Royal Military Academy) and passed thence to the Staff Corps with which they remained for the rest of their service, a narrow-minded corps apart and out of touch with the troops. Another factor drawing French military thought in a false direc tion was the conquest of Algeria begun in 1830, a small war against a savage enemy. This kind of fighting came to be considered as typical of all war and the mental outlook and training of the French commanders and staff officers were restricted accord ingly. Thus Napoleon had organized corps and grouped corps into an army, but in 187o the idea of an army did not exist. Napoleon before the battle of Jena in 18o6 had moved six corps by three roads at twenty miles a day, billeting in depth ; but in 187o the French corps marched as in savage warfare, closing up on the head at the end of the march, the rate of movement being reduced in consequence to eight miles a day. But fortunately for France there were young men of ability and foresight serving in the army of 187o and they determined to discover the real cause of the disaster. These men were Bonnal and Lanrezac serving as subalterns, Foch a private in the ranks, and Maillard, later fa mous for his tactical teaching. They studied deeply the cam paigns of Napoleon, and showed how he had applied the prin ciples of war. In 188o the "Corps d'Etat-Major" was abolished and the "Ecole de Guerre" or Staff College was founded, Mail lard being the first professor of strategy. It was recognized that the successes achieved by the Prussians in the wars of 1866 and 1870 had been largely due to their staff organization and train ing; this led to the adoption, during the last quarter of the nine teenth century, of similar systems by all the military powers except Great Britain and the United States of America.