Germany also experienced serious difficulties in regard to the supreme direction of the war owing to the fact that the Kaiser was the nominal commander-in-chief of the army and as such took the field. The result of this was that the machinery for the cen tral control of the war became situated at general headquarters on the western front where it could not work effectively in co operation with the government, whilst it necessitated headquar ters themselves being placed too far from the front to be able to control operations. The growth of armies had long rendered the government of a state, whether vested in a sovereign or exercised through other channels, incapable of direct command and even of formulating a military policy; hence the necessity for a pro fessional head of the military executive who could function for the government in adapting the military to the national policy. So long as war was confined to a single theatre and small armies, the professional head might also exercise command in the field, as did von Moltke in practice in i866 and 187o. When, however, war is waged simultaneously in more than one theatre and by nations in arms, a further expansion in organization is essential.
The study of the broad aspects of the German staff organiza tion and its functions during the World War leads to the fol lowing conclusions. The central government must have in im mediate touch with it a professional military executive respon sible for controlling military policy both as regards plans and the provision of means in men and material to execute those plans. This military executive must implement a policy formu lated on the advice of a single individual, whether he be called chief of staff or commander-in-chief. But in each theatre of war there must be a separate commander-in-chief who is in executive control of such forces as are placed at his disposal, and who regulates his action in accordance with the instructions he re ceives from the central authority. The staff of the commander-in chief in each theatre of war must be organized in branches corre sponding to those of the central staff organization and in direct touch with them in so far as this does not militate against the control exercised by the commander.
That the organization of the British staff in the field during the World War was sound in principle is shown by the fact that it was not necessary to make any material changes in spite of the enormous expansion of the army and the imposition of new duties through the remarkable progress of modern science as ap plied to war. This organization consisted at general headquarters
of a staff divided into three branches, the general staff branch under a chief of the general staff dealing with operations, intelli gence and training, the Adjutant-General's branch dealing with personnel, discipline and the medical service and the Quarter master-General's branch dealing with supply and transport. Each of these principal staff officers had the right of direct access to the commander-in-chief in all matters appertaining to his branch, whilst the chief of the general staff was responsible for co-ordinat ing the work of the three branches in accordance with the policy laid down by the commander-in-chief. The same system was ap plied in lower formations except that the functions of the Adju tant-General and the Quartermaster-General were combined in one staff officer.
The alternative to this system is that adopted in other armies including those of the United States of America, France, Ger many and Japan, namely a chief of staff responsible not only for co-ordination of the work of the various branches of the staff, but also for its execution. The objections to this system are that the chief of staff becomes a "bottle-neck" prejudicing the right of access to the commander of branches and departments and forced to devote a great deal of his time and attention to ad ministration at the expense of operations and training. The ad vantages claimed for it are that the commander-in-chief has only one staff officer with whom he deals direct, instead of three or four, as in the British system; and, since the army cannot fight without supplies, that the chief of staff is responsible for both operations and maintenance; in practice, however, there is an inevitable tendency for him to become overloaded with detail. It will be seen therefore that there is a fundamental difference between the British staff system and that of other armies; in the former, operations and administration are dealt with separately, whereas in the latter they are combined under a chief of staff. Judged by experience, the British system by which the senior staff officer in each branch has direct access to the commander and the senior general staff officer is responsible only for co ordination of the work and not for its execution, is the one best suited to British requirements and temperament ; and that it can be applied successfully was amply proved in the World War; where failures occurred, as in Mesopotamia and Gallipoli, they were due to non-observance of the principles of staff organization rather than to any fault in the scheme of organization itself.