Submarine Campaign

The Opening Phase.

The German naval authorities expected the Grand Fleet to appear in force in the Heligoland Bight imme diately on the declaration of war, and had their submarines ready waiting for them. As the Grand Fleet did not oblige them, ten "U" boats started on Aug. 6, 1914, to make a sweep in the North sea to try to locate it. One boat, "U 15," did so, being rammed and sunk by the "Birmingham." Eight of the others returned, and as no useful result had been obtained this plan was discon tinued. Their first submarine success of the war was scored by "U 21," who torpedoed the light cruiser "Pathfinder" off St. Abb's Head on Sept. 5; but the most important achievement of the opening phase was the torpedoing of the "Aboukir," "Cressy" and "Hogue," by "U 9," with the loss of over 1,200 men. Though the feat was an easy one, as the last two ships closed their con sorts and lowered boats in the attempt to save life, its effect was to raise the submarine in the estimation of both belligerents. After a credible report that periscopes had been seen in Scapa Flow the Grand Fleet withdrew from there until the harbour had been made secure with booms and nets. In actual fact no "U" boat had so far visited Scapa, German effort having been mainly directed against the troop transports going to France. "U 20" was sighted on her way to attack a convoy of Canadian troops and was hunted so hotly that she returned to Germany by the northern route in preference to the Strait of Dover again, thus demonstrating the practicability of this route for submarines.

The ,"Glitra," sunk by "U 17" off Stavanger, was the first merchant ship to suffer at their hands ; but losses in the channel, especially off Havre, soon led to troops being sent across only at night, in fast ships escorted by destroyers. The first shock to public sentiment was the sinking of a Belgian relief ship full of refugees in mistake for a troop transport. Though the "Hawke," "Formidable" and several smaller British men-of-war had been sunk by the end of the year, submarines had so far done little to affect the naval situation The Attack on Commerce.—The submarine possessed certain decided advantages over the surface vessel for commerce destruc tion. She could attack shipping in the congested waters around the British Isles and France without undue risk to herself and within reach of her own refuelling bases. She was comparatively cheap, and could be produced quickly in large numbers. On the other hand her use as a commerce destroyer involved total disregard for the accepted canons of naval warfare. She could neither spare men for prize crews nor send prizes into port, for to effect a capture in the legitimate way she must come to the surface and remain there long enough to incur enormous risk.

The sinking of half-a-dozen British merchant ships on Jan. 3o, 1915, gave an indication, but the first official intimation was a notice published on Feb. 2 warning all peaceful shipping against approaching the coasts of Great Britain. It was followed by

the celebrated memorandum of Feb. 4 proclaiming that after Feb. 18 the waters around Great Britain would be considered a military area ; that every hostile merchant ship found there would be sunk without regard to the safety of passengers or crew; and that even neutral ships in that area would be in danger. Ger many sought to obtain the advantages of a commercial blockade without rendering such a blockade effective according to inter national law.

The United States pointed out the illegality of this, but Ger many suggested that the American Government might provide a naval escort for their ships. Before Feb. 18, several merchant ships were attacked in the channel and North sea. The first neu tral to suffer was the Norwegian steamer "Belridge," bound from New Orleans to Amsterdam with a cargo of oil for the Dutch Government, torpedoed without warning off the Varne on Feb. 19.

Anti-submarine Measures.

Great Britain's reply to the Ger man memorandum was the Order in Council of March 11, known as the Retaliatory Order (see BLOCKADE). The State insurance scheme was just as effectual in preventing panic then as it had been at the outbreak of the war, and the flow of trade was main tained. Merchant ships were advised as to what precautions to take, the best procedure when attacked and the use of wireless telegraphy. The auxiliary patrol was strengthened, till by April 3o there were, on their stations or fitting out, some 6o yachts and over 500 trawlers and drifters in addition to 400 trawlers and drifters of the mine-sweeping service. Behind the Dover mine field a line of drifters with indicator nets was maintained across the straits, supported by destroyers and armed trawlers; and the Gull Stream, the northern entrance to the Downs, was closed with a boom.

For the protection of the North Channel into the Irish sea, all shipping was restricted to the passage between Rathlin island and the mainland of Ireland. the area between Rathlin island and the Mull of Cantire being closed by nets. Lines of nets and patrol flotillas protected the southern end of the Irish sea, while im portant harbours and anchorages were also provided with net defences. In spite of all precautions the tale of losses continued and the range of attack increased. During March casualties were reported from all parts and every week saw two or three vessels sunk in the channel. On March 27 and 28 alone "U 28" sank four vessels in the neighbourhood of Lundy island and the Smalls, and submarines were passing down the west coast of Ireland to at tack vessels in the approaches to the Channel. Nevertheless, there was little diminution in the flow of trade and the officers and men of the merchant service who ran the personal risk regarded it with superb indifference. When opportunity offered they were not slow to retaliate, as witness the ramming of "U 6" by the "Thordis" off Beachy Head.