Submarine Campaign

The favourable results of this campaign, limited though it was, strengthened the case for the advocates of unrestricted warfare. They argued that if all restrictions were removed the rate of de struction would be doubled, and Britain would be brought to her knees before America would have time to intervene effectively. Their arguments carried the day.

The Second "Unrestricted" Campaign.

On Feb. s, 1917, unrestricted warfare was recommenced, Germany declaring the areas enclosing the British Isles and France to be war zones, also the Mediterranean. The Portuguese Atlantic islands and the area around Archangel were added later. Vessels of any nationality or character found in the war zones were to be destroyed, and con sideration for the safety of the lives of the seamen on board these vessels was not to be allowed to hinder the submarines at their work. To carry on this campaign Germany had III sea going submarines of the "U," "U.B." and "U.C." classes. Though the "U.C." class were still primarily minelayers, they now carried guns and a few torpedoes, and were capable of any form of attack. Even with the reduction of traffic resulting from the natural reluctance of neutrals to enter the war zones the losses increased rapidly.

From this great increase in the rate of destruction it appeared that the submarines would win the war for Germany. They were being built faster than they were being destroyed ; from III on Feb. so they increased to 127 on April so, and it was clear the existing methods of dealing with them were insufficient. On April 19, the worst day for Britain of that worst month, British merchant vessels and eight fishing vessels were sunk by them. One out of every four vessels that left the British Isles in that month never returned.

Convoy System

(see CoNvoY).—It was obvious that unless some new and effective form of defence could be devised the defeat of the Allies was in sight. The convoy system which had been used in the old wars seemed to present such great diffi culties that it was at first considered impracticable except for the export of coal to France. This latter traffic was maintained very successfully in small slow ships escorted by trawlers. Owing to their enormous losses Scandinavian vessels at length had to be collected into convoys and guarded by such armed vessels as could be spared. These convoys also proved successful, and the system was introduced on other routes as escorting craft became available. Experience proving that the difficulties, though great, had been overestimated, the convoy system became universal. In May

1917 submarines sank 303 vessels of all nationalities, totalling 550,000 tons; by November the losses had fallen to 116 ships, totalling 259,000 tons. As the losses in shipping decreased the de struction of submarines increased; in April, May and June of 1917 12 boats were destroyed; in the next three months 20, and in the last quarter twenty-four. One of those destroyed was "U 88," sunk by the "Q" ship "Stonecrop," and commanded by the notorious Schwieger who had sunk the "Lusitania." The re sumption of the unrestricted war on commerce brought the United States into the war in April 1917, and by the end of the year they had sent 3 7 destroyers to assist in convoy work.

The Attack Defeated.—As 1917 progressed it became in creasingly clear that the submarine attack on commerce had been countered. The number of "U" boats in commission reached its maximum of 14o in October and then slowly diminished. They failed to impede either the transport of British troops to France or of American troops to Europe. Four of the best "U" boats were sent across the Atlantic especially to attack troop trans ports. Between them they destroyed 6o ships, but not one which carried troops. One of them, "U 156," was lost in the great minefield laid across the North sea. During April 1917 submarines sunk 840,000 tons of British and Allied merchant ships and fish ing vessels. Merchant ship-building in Great Britain had been practically suspended in order to provide for the requirements of the navy and army. Her skilled engineers and shipwrights were mostly at the front and could neither be recalled nor replaced. Her total output for the month was only 67,536 tons gross, and continuance of these conditions would soon have brought about Allied defeat ; but from that date, due to the introduction of the convoy system, the sinkings decreased, and the efforts of the Ministry of Shipping increased output to such an extent that by Oct. 1918 it had overtaken the rate of Allied losses. The Flanders bases had to be evacuated and the submarines in them blown up —all except "U.B. 116," whose commander, Lieut. Emsmann, made one last effort. He reached the entrance to Scapa Flow on October 28, but the boat was picked up by a searchlight and sunk. At the armistice 138 boats were surrendered and brought to Harwich. (See also BLOCKADE and CONVOY.) IX. 1V. 1.1/4../