Substance

SUBSTANCE. The concept of substance is that of a per manent substratum preserved through all changes. The term sub stance is Latin for the Greek "that which underlies," as the permanent "basis" of its "accidents" (crw.0€13nOra, e.g., Aristotle, Metaphysics IV., 3o, o25a).

Greek Philosophy.

To set forth this permanent Being which in all transformations remains identical, was conceived by Greek philosophy from first to last as one of its principal tasks. Greek Philosophy is essentially "ontology"; it aims at the determination of "Being as such" (en, rl Ov, Aristotle, Metaphysics, 1, 2). In the characterization of this Being lies the difference between the various schools of Greek thought. In the natural philosophy of the Ionians it is first conceived as material Being ; substance is the basic matter from which all other materials have issued. It desig nates, accordingly, the "beginning" of all becoming at large and, at the same time, an immutable unit, a uniform and constant "nature" (pla rcs which is neither subject to nor af fected by becoming.

But already in the next phase of Greek Philosophy, Heraclitus and the Pythagoreans replaced this material determination of substance by another type of determination. For them, the per manent consists not in an unchangeable material substratum, but in certain constant proportions which persist in all Becoming. The true substance, the "essence" (obala) of things is not sought in an individual thing, but, according to the Pythagoreans, in Num ber, this being the principle underlying all measured proportions ; according to Heraclitus in the immanent law, in the "Logos" that governs all events and retains them within definite limits.

Here substance does not lie outside Becoming, but designates a law which pervades all Becoming and gives it its "form." This view forms the transition from the "physical" explanation of things to their "ideal," i.e., mathematical and logical, explanation. The logical view of substance was developed by Parmenides and the Eleatic school. True "Being" can be grasped only in pure thought. Thinking and Being are one ; so, true Being is determina ble only by predicates of thought. It is eternal; it is subject to no change of place; it is one and admits of no partition.

This idea of logical identity becomes the determining motive in the further development of the concept of substance in Greek philosophy.

The systems of the "younger philosophy of nature" (Empedo cles, Anaxagoras, Democritus) attempt to connect and reconcile this motive with the physical explanation of the universe. They

seek to exhibit within nature itself certain elements which, although themselves incapable of change, produce, by their mutual relationships, the manifold of reality and their changes.

Atomism, especially, became of fundamental importance for the further development of the concept of Substance. The idea of the absolute oneness of Substance is here abandoned; true substantiality is attributed to atoms which are infinite in number, but simple and indestructible. From the differences of position, shape, arrangement and spatial motion of the atoms results the manifold of sensible phenomena, which accordingly possess only secondary Being; genuine Being is attributable only to the atoms and to empty space, which is required for their motion.

The classical systems of Greek philosophy, however, effect a decisive change. Instead of matter, pure form is made the basis of all substantiality. The form (Ethos, 1,&a) is the one persistent ele ment; unlike sensible phenomena which always "become" and never "are," it remains the same. Equal things can become un equal; the small, by growing, can become large; but the idea of the equal, etc., remains what it is and suffers no change (Plato, Phaidon 99 sqq.). Thus, the idea forms that which alone has genuine, constant, true Being (op-nos Ov), while empirical objects, in so far as they have Being owe this to their "participation" in ideas. In the system of Aristotle, too, this interpretation of the problem of substance is retained, although he rejects the substan tiality of pure ideas as taught by Plato. For him, substance is the individual Being composed of "matter" and "form." But the specific function of determination belongs to the form : Logi cally substance is the ultimate "subject" of all predication, but which cannot be predicated of anything else. All our judgments refer to a Something of which they claim to be true ; and this Something is that to which the judgment refers (Aristotle, Categ. V., Metaphysics, 18). From this "first substance" (n-pc:rro obata), Aristotle distinguishes the species and genera as "substances of the second degree" (bebrEpat obalat.). They do not subsist in themselves, but only in the individual beings, the first substances; but they express the most general determina tions without which individual beings could not be thought.