For Spinoza, reality means activity, and the reality of anything expresses itself in a tendency to self preservation—to exist is to persist. In the lowest kinds of things, in so-called inanimate matter, this tendency shows itself as inertia; in living organisms, it shows itself as a "will to live." Regarded physiologically this effort is called appetite; when we are conscious of it, it is called desire. The moral categories, good and evil, are intimately connected with desire, though not in the way commonly supposed. Man does not desire a thing because he thinks it is good, or shun it because he considers it bad ; rather he considers anything good if he desires it, and regards it as bad if he has an aversion for it. Now whatever is felt to heighten vital activity gives pleasure; whatever is felt to lower such activity causes pain. Pleasure coupled with a consciousness of its external cause is called, love, and pain coupled with a con sciousness of its external cause is called hate—"love" and "hate" being used in the wide sense of "like" and "dislike." All human feelings are derived from pleasure, pain and desire. Their great variety is due to the differences in the kinds of external objects which give rise to them, and to the differences in the inner con ditions of the individual experiencing them. Spinoza gives a de tailed analysis of the whole gamut of human feelings, and his account is one of the classics of psychology. For the present purpose the most important distinction is that between "active" feelings and "passive" feelings (or "passions"). Man, according to Spinoza, is active or free in so far as any experience is the outcome solely of his own nature ; he is passive, or a bondsman, in so far as any experience is due to other causes besides his own nature. The active feelings are all of them forms of self-realiza tion, of heightened activity, of strength of mind, and are therefore always pleasurable. It is the passive feelings (or "passions") which are responsible for all the ills of life, for they are induced largely by things outside us and frequently cause that lowered vitality which means pain. Spinoza next links up his ethics with his theory of knowledge, and correlates the moral progress of man with his intellectual progress. At the lowest stage of knowl edge, that of "opinion," man is under the dominant influence of things outside himself, and so is in the bondage of the passions. At the next stage, the stage of "reason," the characteristic feature of the human mind, its intelligence, asserts itself, and helps to emancipate him from his bondage to the senses and external allurements. The insight gained into the nature of the passions helps to free man from their domination. A better understanding of his own place in the cosmic system and of the place of all the objects of his likes and dislikes, and his insight into the neces sity which rules all things, tend to cure him of his resentments, regrets and disappointments. He grows reconciled to things, and wins peace of mind. In this way reason teaches acquiescence in the universal order, and elevates the mind above the turmoil of passion. At the highest stage of knowledge, that of "intuitive knowledge," the mind apprehends all things as expressions of the eternal cosmos. It sees all things in God, and God in all things. It feels itself as part of the eternal order, identifying its thoughts with cosmic thought and its interests with cosmic interests. Thereby it becomes eternal as one of the eternal ideas in which the Attribute Thought expresses itself, and attains to that "blessedness" which "is not the reward of virtue, but virtue itself," that is, the perfect joy which characterises perfect self-activity. This is not an easy or a common achievement. "But," says Spinoza, "everything excellent is as difficult as it is rare." Two things at least must be added to prevent a misunderstand ing of this slight sketch of Spinoza's ethics. The first is that he did not teach asceticism. Circumstances compelled him to be extremely frugal and live on a few pence a day; but he affected no contempt for the joys of life. On the contrary, he urged that "it is the part of a wise man to use the world and delight him self in it as best he may, though not to satiety, for that is no delight." The second point is that Spinoza, though compelled by circumstances to live the life of a recluse more or less, laid great stress on the social character of the moral life. "Men," he says, "will find that their needs are best satisfied by mutual help, and that only by uniting their strength can they escape the dangers that beset them everywhere." He insists further that the good pursued by reasonable men is a good that may be enjoyed by all, and that the virtuous man wants no special priv ileges, but desires also for his fellow men whatever he desires for himself. The third point is that Spinoza's contention that the conception of goodness, like that of purpose, is inapplicable to the cosmic system as a whole does not mean that he denied the validity of the distinction between good and evil in the realm of human conduct. The notions "good" and "evil" involve the con ception of an ideal that is desired but not yet realized, and the realization of which is' helped by some things, hindered by others. Now the cosmic system, or God, is completely real or perfect, and therefore "beyond good and evil." But with finite modes like men it is quite different. Much can be done that really heightens or lowers human life. Whatever enriches it really is good; whatever impoverishes it really is bad, even if its badness is something negative, a defect, rather than something positive. Political Philosophy.—Spinoza agreed with Hobbes that if each man had to fend for himself, with nothing but his own right arm to rely upon, then the life of man would be "nasty, brutish and short." The truly human life is only possible in an organized community, that is, a state or commonwealth. The state ensures security of life, limb and property ; it brings within reach of every individual many necessaries of life which he could not produce by himself ; and it sets free sufficient time and energy for the higher development of human powers. Now the existence of a state depends upon a kind of implicit agreement on the part of its members or citizens to obey the sovereign authority which governs it. In a state no one can be allowed to do just as he
pleases. Every citizen is obliged to obey its laws ; and he is not free even to interpret the laws in a special manner. This looks at first like a loss of freedom on the part of the individuals, and the establishment of an absolute power over them. Yet that is not really so. In the first place, without the advantages of an organized state the average individual would be so subject to dangers and hardships of all kinds and to his own passions that he could not be called free in any real sense of the term, least of all in the sense in which Spinoza used it. Man needs the state not only to save him from others but also from his own lower impulses and to enable him to live a life of reason, which alone is truly human. In the second place, state sovereignty is never really absolute. It is true that almost any kind of government is better than none, so that it is worth while bearing much that is irksome rather than disturb the peace. But a reasonably wise government will even in its own interests endeavour to secure the good will and co-operation of its citizens by refraining from unreasonable measures, and will permit or even encourage its citizens to advocate reforms, provided they employ peaceable means. In this way the state really rests, in the last resort, on the united will of the citizens, on what Rousseau, who read Spinoza, subsequently called the "general will." Spinoza some times writes as if he upheld absolute sovereignty. But that is due mainly to his determined opposition to every kind of ecclesiastical control over the state. Though he is prepared to support what may be called a state religion, as a kind of spiritual cement, yet his account of this religion is such as to make it acceptable to the adherents of any one of the historic creeds, to deists, pantheists and all others, provided they are not fanatical believers or un believers. It is really in the interests of freedom of thought and speech that Spinoza would entrust the civil government with something approaching absolute sovereignty in order to effec tively resist the tyranny of the militant churches.
One of the most striking features in Spinoza's political theory is his basic principle that Right is Might. This principle he applied systematically to the whole problem of government, and seemed rather pleased with his achievement, inasmuch as it enabled him to treat political theory in a scientific spirit, as if he were dealing with applied mathematics. The identification or correlation of right with power has caused much misunderstanding. People sup posed that Spinoza reduced justice to brute force. But Spinoza was very far from approving Realpolitik. In the philosophy of Spinoza the term "power" (as should be clear from the above account of his moral philosophy) means a great deal more than physical force. In a passage near the end of his Political Treatise he states explicitly that "human power chiefly consists in strength of mind and intellect"—it consists in fact, of all the human capaci ties and aptitudes, especially the highest of them. Conceived cor rectly, Spinoza's whole philosophy leaves ample scope for ideal motives in the life of the individual and of the community.
Spinoza discusses the principal kinds of states, or the main types of government, namely, Monarchy, Aristocracy and Democ racy. Each has its own peculiarities and needs special safeguards, if it is to realize the primary function of a state. Monarchy may degenerate into Tyranny unless it is subjected to various con stitutional checks which will prevent any attempt at autocracy. Similarly, Aristocracy may degenerate into Oligarchy, and needs analogous checks. On the whole, Spinoza favours Democracy, by which he meant any kind of representative government. In the case of Democracy the community and the government are more nearly identical than in the case of Monarchy or Aristoc racy; consequently a democracy is least likely to experience fre quent collisions between the people and the government, and so is best adapted to secure and maintain that peace which it is the business of the state to secure.
Spinoza was not only the real father of modern metaphysics and moral and political philosophy, but also of the so-called higher criticism of the Bible. This part of his work was incidental to his plea for freedom of thought and speech. His Tractatus Theologico-Politicus undertook to show that the Scriptures properly understood gave no authority for the militant intolerance of the clergy who sought to stifle all dissent by the use of force. To achieve his object, Spinoza had to show what is meant by a proper understanding of the Bible. And this gave him occasion to apply criticism to the Bible. To appreciate his services in this connection it must be remembered that his age was remarkably lacking in historical sense, especially in matters relating to religion. Saintly contemporaries like John Bunyan and Manasseh ben Israel made the most fantastic use of Scripture texts; while militant clerics, relying on the ignorant bibliolatry of the masses, misapplied Bible texts to gain their ends. Spinoza, who permitted no supernatural rival to Nature and no rival authority to the civil government of the state, rejected also all claims that Biblical literature should be treated in a manner entirely different from that in which any other document is treated that claims to be historical. His contention that the Bible "is in parts imperfect, corrupt, erroneous, and inconsistent with itself, and that we possess but fragments of it" roused a great storm at the time, and was mainly responsible for his evil repute for a century at least. Nevertheless, the intelligent world has gradually come round to his views, and has learned to agree with him that the real "word of God," or true religion, is not something written in books but "inscribed on the heart and mind of man." And many ministers of religion now praise Spinoza's services in the correct interpretation of Scripture as a document of first rate importance in the progressive development of human thought and conduct.