The World War Eastern Theatres

This organization is based on the premise that an army operat ing in the field must be able to be maintained wholly by resources sent up to it from behind. The extent to which the theatre of operations can contribute to those resources cannot be a known factor. In proportion as they may be able thus to help contribute are the mobility and striking power of the army enhanced. Such extraneous assistance cannot, however, be counted upon. It is, too, obvious that for armies of the size of those engaged in France and Flanders between 1914 and 1918 no areas, however rich, could provide more than a fraction of the foodstuffs or other commodities required. Again, the advent of automatic weapons and the enormous advance in the power and use of artillery have made the problem of the supply of munitions one that can only be solved by speedier and more flexible transport establishments.

The progress made in mechanical traction and automobile engineering has rendered possible a recasting and extension of mechanical transport formations. Except in certain minor in stances, mechanical transport was not, prior to the World War, included in any formation lower than the Army Corps. From some few traction engines working chiefly at the bases in South Africa in 190o to 1902, mechanical transport steadily made its way forward from the lines of communication until it had reached, in 1914, the larger fighting formations. Post-war organization brought it into the division and it has now been introduced as an integral part of the actual fighting units throughout the whole of the army. The maintenance of such a mass of mechanical vehicles requires in its turn a comprehensive and closely developed organization composed of highly trained technical personnel. No loose or casual methods can suffice in fixing a system, which has necessarily such wide ramifications throughout the military organism ; which system furnishes in fact the motive power by which the life of that organism is generated. Only by the sound ness of its supply and transport methods can an army be endowed with mobility, and by mobility is meant not only the power to move rapidly, but the power to move anywhere and to continue moving.

Organization of the Supply Service in War.

The basic organization of the supply service, as far as food, forage and fuel, including petrol, are concerned, in any theatre of war consists of the establishment of a chain of depots into which flow those sup plies which are received from overseas or obtained by purchase or requisition within the theatre itself. These depots are classified under four headings : Base or main supply depots are located at or near the base ports or bases of operations as the case may be. Advanced supply depots are established when the lines of corn munications ate unduly long, and these may be required to pro vide the daily supply for the troops based on them or may hold a reserve of supplies for use in the event of communication with base supply depots being interrupted. Field supply depots are, when required, established in forward areas to be used primarily as a reserve to meet sudden unforeseen demands for supplies by field formations. These depots are often located at or near supply

railheads (i.e., the point on the railway where supplies and stores are detrained and sent forward in road transport), especially dur ing a rapid advance, when it is necessary to push reserves of sup plies continually forward. Finally, there are the intermediate supply depots, which are situated on the lines of communication for the purpose of the subsistence and maintenance of troops on those lines, whether permanently located there or passing through. In conjunction with all these supply depots there may be field butcheries and bakeries.

Ammunition Supply.

The essential difference between sup ply in the sense of food, forage and fuel on the one hand, and the supply of ammunition on the other, lies in the fact that the former is to all intents constant and regular and therefore must be main tained at a comparatively even flow, whereas the latter entirely depends on the intensity of the actual operations taking place, and is therefore spasmodic. The problem of ammunition supply is in itself the prime limiting factor in the development of the arma ment of the fighting troops, as it obviously serves little purpose to provide them with weapons that cannot be used to the maximum extent of their capacity.

Two main principles govern it : first, that ammunition must be passed systematically from rear to front and that therefore troops in action should never have to turn their backs on the enemy to fetch further supplies. Second, that the control of ammunition should remain in the hands of higher formations as long as possible, thus enabling the higher commanders to keep control of the fighting. Ammunition depots are formed at the bases, on the lines of communication, and in forward zones. Special ammunition "dumps" are located in areas where they are likely to be needed in proximity to the artillery positions, but as a general rule it is pref erable when possible to maintain ammunition "on wheels." Transport of Field Units.—This is divided into three classes: I. First line transport, which is an integral part of the war organization of fighting units, without which they cannot perform their tactical functions, and by which they must at all times be accompanied. Provision, therefore, must be made for the carriage of certain stores, supplies and equipment, for ammunition, and for water and medical service. Whether this transport is on a carrier pack, animal, wheeled, or mechanical basis must depend on the nature of the terrain ; and according to where units are operating so must they be equipped. For the purposes of a "major" war, modern tendencies are towards a mechanization of first line trans port, not only because of its lesser vulnerability to air and other hostile action, but also because of the possibilities it offers towards a general speeding up of movement and increased radius of activity.