THE WORLD WAR: EASTERN THEATRES Outside the main theatre in France and Flanders very different and varied conditions had to be encountered. In East Africa there was bush; in West Africa, tropical jungle; in Macedonia, and to a lesser degree in Italy, mountainous regions; in Palestine, Damaraland and Mesopotamia, deserts where sand or mud had to be overcome; in Gallipoli, amphibious operations on a vaster scale than had ever been attempted in modern times; while, in conditions, north Russia was entirely different from all these. It speaks volumes for the efficiency of the British transport organ ization and its adaptability that so kaleidoscopic a field was covered successfully, for the armies in the field were maintained in every instance except that of Gallipoli until complete victory was won.
Failures there were, and such failures arrest the attention, because of their very fewness.
The campaign in Mesopotamia presented circumstances which as late as 1917 were not adequately appreciated. Scarcity of water tied the army to a line of advance either by the Tigris or Euphrates, rivers which in themselves provided admirable lines of communication had sufficient inland water transport been made available. To the paucity in this respect, added to a similar dearth of land transport, may be attributed directly the failure, ending in the surrender, of the Kut garrison and of the gallant efforts made towards its relief. Troops at Basrah could not be moved, and if they had been moved means did not exist for their maintenance. Moreover the army, tied as it was to the river, was not endowed with the power to manoeuvre.
It is true that in the rainy season in lower Mesopotamia, move ment is difficult or impossible, as the country becomes a vast sea of mud and no roads exist. Nor is any stone available in the country for road construction. The fact, however, remains that, had the army engaged in the operations for the relief of Kut been furnished with any appreciable amount of light mechanical transport, it would, through its increased radius of action, have been able to obtain its object. After the arrival of Gen. Maude, who from the first devoted himself to putting transport matters in order, the advance was resumed and maintained without any real pause until the occupation of Baghdad.
Like every other component part of the military machine, the sy stem of supply and transport for the maintenance of an army in the field underwent development as a result of the World War.
The experiences gained therein had naturally served to quicken experimental work, and consequently the decade following the close of hostilities was one of intensive research in the field of road and cross-country transport. In these activities British authorities and experts, military and civil, have played a prom inent part. The aim and end has been to produce a vehicle which, while answering all essential military requirements, would yet serve commercial needs. These interests are by no means easy to reconcile in thickly populated and highly civilized countries possessing complete road systems, but in the partially or alto gether undeveloped portions of the British dominions or colonies there is and will remain a wide scope for transport of a cross country nature. Such possibilities gave special encouragement to British experiment and production, so that by 1928 certain satisfactory types had been evolved, notably the "subsidy-type" six-wheeler with a chassis designed by the War Department, which it was found possible to produce at an economic cost.
To apply the results obtained to the army is the stage which is now being entered upon. But such application can be but a gradual process, not only on account of the dictation of finance, but still more from the fact that no finality can be reached in the fields of scientific and mechanical research and automobile engi neering—the output of which is, therefore, continually subject to modification and improvement. It is axiomatic to British mili tary organization to provide for the major problems that the army is capable of encountering and to modify or scale down such organization to meet minor or unusual circumstances as they arise. For the British army there can be no normal circum stances, for it has to be prepared to operate not only in Europe but in the deserts, mountains and bush of Asia or Africa ; and no one system of transport has yet been devised that can cover all these various conditions. Certain general principles are thus laid down in the training manuals and a definite organization drawn up to fit the case of war in a civilized country where the enemy to be met is equal in armament and training.