The World War Western Theatre

Re-organization of British System on Western Front.— From 1914 up to the date of the first battle of the Somme (July 1916) the British administrative services had had no very severe tests, but had developed their system almost completely. In munitions, the British army was now better supplied than any other force in the field. It had control of its own railway services, and supplementing the French broad-gauge railway system on its front—which it had taken over and increased—had a system of light railways, and a greatly increased scale of motor transport. But the Somme battles showed that supply had been increased beyond the scale that transport could cope with. There followed in Nov. 1916 a reorganization of the system. One feature of this reorganization was good. The division of authority which put the administrative services really under two heads, one for the battle area and one for lines of communication, was done away with. The military railways, which had been hitherto somewhat starved, were reorganized according to the plans of a civilian expert and were generously supplied with staff and material. But here, what proved in the result to be a mistake in organization was made: railways were separated from the control of the quartermaster general (who kept control of other forms of transport) and put under a director-general of transportation. Thus there were two separate transport authorities.

Errors of Dual Control.

Af ter the battle of the Somme the line was practically stable for a long time. Whilst this almost stationary trench warfare continued, the weakness of the division of authority and the mistake of allowing any but the military idea to rule in an essential part of an army organization were not apparent. When the Germans attacked in the spring of 1918 the mistake showed very clearly, and the railways were brought again under the control of the quartermaster-general, after an interval during which the traffic to be carried and its priority was regu lated by a committee composed of staff officers and officers of the transportation directorate. But the transport situation in the in terval was very critical. The German advance had brought the British front lateral railway—St. Just-Amiens-St. Pol-Hazebrouck —under shell fire at many points. The Germans, whose strategy under Gen. Ludendorff was dominated largely by transport consid erations, sought to paralyse completely the whole railway system by continuous air attack on the British rear lateral—Eu-Abbeville Etaples, especially at the points where it crossed the rivers Canche and Somme. Whole-hearted work in building "avoiding" lines and bridges and the efforts of the motor transport just kept the position in hand until a British advance in front of Amiens re lieved the front lateral. Fortunately, the building up of a G.H.Q.

reserve of motor vehicles had just been brought to completion.

Motor Transport System.

In the winter of 1917-18 the battles of Passchendaele had exposed a weakness in light rail ways—that they had to work along defined tracks which could be intensively shelled by the enemy—and therefore it was de cided to trust more to motor transport. There was effected a

complete reorganization of it, with the central idea of doing away as far as possible with the "earmarking" of motor vehicles for particular units or particular tasks and making its total strength completely mobile and elastic. Vehicles saved by this "pooling" were formed into a G.H.Q. motor reserve. In the spring of 1918 this G.H.Q. motor reserve was able to take up part of the traffic load and was largely responsible for saving the situation.

Transport Values.

One of the most interesting problems of supply and transport is that of the relative value of roads (motor and horse traction), light railways, and broad-gauge railways.

Light railways (q.v.) at one stage of the war were perhaps over estimated. There was an inclination to regard them as all-suf ficing. The British system ultimately gave to them what was considered their proper role, recognizing that they were most valuable when the fighting line was stabilized for some length of time, but tended to be less valuable as the war became one of movement. In the spring of 1918 the British army had 920 m. of light railways in operation; in the summer, 'co m. less. Its advance was planned on the principle of concentrating labour in pushing forward the broad-gauge railways and then the roads from them, trusting to motor transport and to horse transport to carry on the load from broad-gauge railhead. Earlier in 1918, controversy on the subject was keen and the French were in clined to take a differing view. The Germans were tied to light railways, for they had not the means to extend their motor traction.

Position in 1918.

The autumn of 1918 will be the most use ful date to compare the administrative machines of the Allied armies. Both French and American systems kept a dividing line as regards administration between base and the fighting line. The British system had abolished that in 1916. The French divided the zone of the armies into the zone of the advance and the zone of supply (with sometimes an intermediate zone). In the zone of the advance, administration was in charge of the aide major-general chargé de la direction de l'arriere at headquarters.

But his administration had no functions of procurement, only of distribution. In some points of administration the dividing line between the zone of advance and the zone of supply was abolished, e.g., all motor transport and all light railways, wherever operating, were controlled from headquarters. The French system of supply and distribution was fashioned for war in the home country or near to it ; when it was transplanted (for instance to Salonika) it was adapted nearer to the British system. The American system put administration on the fighting line under an assistant chief of staff (G. 4) at G.H.Q., and on lines of com munication under a general commanding service of supply (cor responding in some degree to the old British inspector-general of communications). Under the American system the chiefs of the supply service were not at G.H.Q. but at the headquarters of service of supply.