With both the French and the American systems, evacuation and hospitalization of casualties were purely "Q" services; in the British army they were under the adjutant-general, assisted by the quartermaster-general. Some other differences came from geographical conditions. The Americans had to have their real supply base in France (for the British, the United Kingdom, and for the French, France was the ultimate supply base) ; so they held great stocks in depots, 15 days of supplies in advance depots, 30 days of supplies in intermediate depots, 45 days of supplies in base depots. The American army relied more largely on local purchases (from the Allied armies and from European civilian sources) than did the armies with their home bases nearer at hand. Gen. Pershing founded a general purchasing agency to control these purchases. In 1918, of 17,600,00o ship tons used by the American army, only 7,600,000 tons came from the United States, and 1 o,000,000 tons were purchased locally, and to the end of the campaign the American army drew largely upon British and French supplies.
Relations with Navy.—The British administrative machine in one point was inferior to the American machine in 1918. Under
the British system the navy had control of all supplies by ship until discharged from the transport. The navy could put a supply ship into any port it pleased and naturally was mainly guided by shipping considerations. The American system put the supply ships under army direction when they came within the three-mile limit from shore, and shipping could then be directed to the port of supply which was most convenient from the army point of view. The French and the Americans used the railway regulating stations as depots, the British used them as sorting stations only.
Among the lessons of administration of the World War one principle seems to be generally accepted—that it is wise to centralize all administration of supply and transport under one head over the whole war area, trusting to him to devolve and co-ordinate. Another conclusion is that if civilization has ever to face another great war it will be, even more than the contest of 1914-18, a war of material, a struggle in which supply and transport will be the governing factors. (T. C.)