Even after the outbreak of the World War, Tirpitz did not change his opinion that, taking all in all, the rapprochement be tween Germany and Britain was advanced rather than hindered by the construction of the fleet, and that only the outbreak of the War, which was most unwelcome to him, had prevented the last maturing of his political aims. His naval programme always aimed at leaving Britain a sufficient superiority. He considered that the formula of the respective strengths of three to two sug gested by Lloyd George, which Churchill later, although with reservations, altered to 16 to io or eight squadrons to five, gave Britain sufficient protection against aggressive German intentions.
In organising the construction of the German fleet, Tirpitz thought out each step to its last con sequences. He refused flatly to construct the greater cruiser fleet which the Emperor was anxious to have when he was appointed secretary of state, in view of the experience of the past with cruiser warfare and the lack of German foreign bases. His aim was and remained the formation of a battle fleet. His naval estimates carefully avoided votes for new constructions of ships which depended on the momentary humour of the deputies. He aimed at securing legal authority for the number of ships of the fleet to be built, for their regular replacement and maintenance. Inevitably a certain stiffness thus came into the naval programme, which was at times a little inconvenient during the critical years. Tirpitz feared that his successor would abandon important prin ciples of his programme. He believed that the diplomats did not grasp the real idea of his programme The squadron of eight ships as a tactical unit was the base of his naval programme. The first law of 1898 approved a double squadron of ships of the line with the necessary cruisers. The law of 1900 doubled the battle fleet. Supplementary laws of 1904, 1906 and 1908 reduced the maximum age of ships and thereby altered the plan of new construction. The foreign cruiser fleet and the torpedo-boat forces were in creased, and account was taken of the British dreadnought pro gramme. The Kiel Canal was widened to take battleships. The supplementary bill which Tirpitz introduced of ter Agadir in 1912 only increased the number of ships to be constructed by a little, but increased the strength of the active fleet. The supplementary law of 1912 was to be the last bill of the naval programme. The fleet of 1920 was to consist of one flagship of the fleet, five squad rons of battleships of eight ships each, 12 cruisers for home serv ice, eight large cruisers for foreign service and 4o small cruisers, including Io for foreign service. Three squadrons of ships of the line with the necessary cruisers were to be always ready as a bat tle fleet. His construction programme was reduced after the
negotiations with Haldane in 1912, and only provided for three new ships to be distributed over several years. Taking 61 great battleships and a life of 20 years, three large ships would be launched regularly every year on this plan.
If Britain had really recognised German sea-power, Tirpitz would probably have agreed to some arrangement on the lines of the later Washington agreement of 1922, dealing with the pro portionate strength of the two Powers. Tirpitz only became deeply interested in the construction of submarines after the Diesel engines were perfected for service in 1908. The ultimate strength of submarines was then fixed at 72. There was never any idea of mercantile submarine warfare. Tirpitz considered the battle fleet to be the best protection for the extensive German coast line, and spent little money on its fortification. But he mod ernised Heligoland, and expanded it into a fortified harbour. Parallel with the construction of the fleet, the state wharves were systematically expanded and grew to be industrial implements of the first order.
Tirpitz's relations with the Emperor were peculiar. The Emperor could not do without him to organise the expansion of the fleet, although not really liking his rather stiff manner. Tirpitz energetically opposed fantastic plans of naval construction. He often was hampered by William II.'s political ways, but so long as he controlled the construction of the fleet he held firmly to his real aim. Tirpitz was a convinced Monarchist and remained so after the War. Up to the outbreak of the World War, Tirpitz enjoyed a steadily increasing popu larity. The circle of his real co-workers and colleagues was, how ever, always small. The number of his personal friends was even smaller. He was a good judge of men and exploited the special talents of his subordinates ruthlessly. He himself always retained his wide general view and never lost himself in details. In the corps of naval officers his aims were not always fully understood. He probably never revealed his ultimate aims to any of his friends, and, like all great men, was often compelled to stand alone. He was careful to keep up relations with deputies and with the press. He recognised very early the importance of publicity. Before the War Tirpitz exercised but little influence on the Admiralty staff. But he controlled the construction of the ships. The orders to the fleet and army at the outbreak of War were not known to him. Before the War he purposely paid little attention to the mobilization plans of the fleet.