In politics Tirpitz seldom played an active part. He knew nothing of the British offer of an alliance at the close of the 19th century. Although he offered his advice to the chancellor von Bethmann Hollweg he was not consulted when important political measures were taken ; for example, when a cruiser was sent to Agadir in 1911. At the end of 1911, he could have become chan cellor of the Reich, but he never desired this office. During the critical time of Lord Haldane's visit in 1912, Tirpitz stated that he would have given up his supplementary naval estimate com pletely for a real neutrality agreement with Britain. He did not entirely approve of the measures taken by the German Govern ment after the murder in Sarajevo (1914) and was for avoiding the threatened war at all costs. Tirpitz did not share the opinion that Britain would stand out of the war, and foresaw that the sympathies of America would be on the side of Britain. He was in favour of a short war, and for putting the German fleet to a decisive battle. He believed that the intervention of America would in any case prevent a complete victory, but thought that if Germany exercised all her forces, the German Reich could remain a really great power, and at the worst acknowledge defeat whilst her forces were still unexhausted. He was also against any form of annexation but was only anxious lest the Belgian coast should pass into the possession of Britain. In general, he saw the War as the last struggle of freedom against the world capitalism of the Anglo-Saxons.
At the beginning of the War Tirpitz offered to take over the entire control of the navy, including the military control, but this was refused. His advice was hardly listened to by the politicians
and hardly ever taken. The naval battle for which he wished Nvas not fought. He early recognised the importance of the new U-boats for the issue of the War, but was against employing U-boats too early in the commercial War, and named the spring of 1916 as the right moment. He disapproved of the attitude of the German Government during the exchange of Notes with America on the occasion of the sinking of the "Lusitania" and the "Sussex," regarding it as weak. Tirpitz was not implicated in the declaration of the U-boat warfare in 1917, and later stated that had he guessed Russia's coming collapse and known of President Wilson's efforts for peace, he would probably have used his influence against U-boat warfare in 1917.
See article in Nov. 1925 issue of Sad-deutsche Monatshefte on attempts at a naval agreement with Great Britain, and Ulrich von Hassel, Admiral von Tirpitz. For his own statement of the case see his Erinnerungen (1918) and Politische Dokumente; der Aufbau der deutschen Weltmacht (1924) • (C. HoL.; X.)