SOME PROBLEMS OF THEISM The Theistic view of the world is naturally impelled to articulate itself by considering the problems of the nature of God and His relations with the world. Some of the more important of these problems must now be briefly indicated.
Divine Personality.—Most Theists, if not all, would agree that God is, in some sense, personal, or at least not of a nature inferior to personality. The latter tenet seems to be implied in the Theistic hypothesis, for otherwise God could not be thought of as the Supreme Value. It is important however, to distinguish between the two propositions, "God is personal" and "God is a person." Though the second of these propositions has been held by many Theists, it is not an essential point. Orthodox Christianity cannot be cited on behalf of the belief that God is a person, for the doctrine of the Trinity would suggest that the Godhead is a Unity of Persons. No one, of course, would maintain that God is a person in precisely the same sense as human beings are per sons, and in view of this some would prefer to speak of the Divine Nature as Supra-Personal, others, on the contrary, as for example Lotze, would hold that God alone is the perfect person and that finite selves are "pale shadows" of His personality. No very vital principle is involved in this difference, so long as those who prefer the term "supra-personal" are clear that it is not a polite phrase for "impersonal." Theistic religion is profoundly concerned to maintain that God is a being with whom personal relations are possible; if that be abandoned we shall be com pelled to dismiss that religious experience, which Theists take to be the highest and most significant, as illusion. The main the oretical ground for accepting Divine Personality is the contention that personality is the highest type of existence known to us, the "bearer," the discerner, and the creator of values, and also that personal life is the most conspicuous instance of multiplicity in unity, it is, as Plotinus called it, a rXijeor gv : the category of personality would appear, in its ideal form, to suggest an ultimate solution of the problem of the One and the Many. A difficulty has
been raised concerning the attribution of personality to God on account of the alleged necessity of a "not-self" distinguishable from the self in all cases of self-consciousness. The discussion of this problem by Lotze in his Microcosmus (Bk. IX., Chap. IV.), remains the classical authority. It is noteworthy however, that this special difficulty does not press with such force upon the Trinitarian form of Theism. On any Theistic view it would appear that the created order must be in some sense a "not-self" with respect to God, since the identification of the created order with the Being of God would be Pantheism.