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Some Problems of Theism

god, divine, attributes, personality, nature and theistic

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SOME PROBLEMS OF THEISM The Theistic view of the world is naturally impelled to articulate itself by considering the problems of the nature of God and His relations with the world. Some of the more important of these problems must now be briefly indicated.

Divine Personality.—Most Theists, if not all, would agree that God is, in some sense, personal, or at least not of a nature inferior to personality. The latter tenet seems to be implied in the Theistic hypothesis, for otherwise God could not be thought of as the Supreme Value. It is important however, to distinguish between the two propositions, "God is personal" and "God is a person." Though the second of these propositions has been held by many Theists, it is not an essential point. Orthodox Christianity cannot be cited on behalf of the belief that God is a person, for the doctrine of the Trinity would suggest that the Godhead is a Unity of Persons. No one, of course, would maintain that God is a person in precisely the same sense as human beings are per sons, and in view of this some would prefer to speak of the Divine Nature as Supra-Personal, others, on the contrary, as for example Lotze, would hold that God alone is the perfect person and that finite selves are "pale shadows" of His personality. No very vital principle is involved in this difference, so long as those who prefer the term "supra-personal" are clear that it is not a polite phrase for "impersonal." Theistic religion is profoundly concerned to maintain that God is a being with whom personal relations are possible; if that be abandoned we shall be com pelled to dismiss that religious experience, which Theists take to be the highest and most significant, as illusion. The main the oretical ground for accepting Divine Personality is the contention that personality is the highest type of existence known to us, the "bearer," the discerner, and the creator of values, and also that personal life is the most conspicuous instance of multiplicity in unity, it is, as Plotinus called it, a rXijeor gv : the category of personality would appear, in its ideal form, to suggest an ultimate solution of the problem of the One and the Many. A difficulty has

been raised concerning the attribution of personality to God on account of the alleged necessity of a "not-self" distinguishable from the self in all cases of self-consciousness. The discussion of this problem by Lotze in his Microcosmus (Bk. IX., Chap. IV.), remains the classical authority. It is noteworthy however, that this special difficulty does not press with such force upon the Trinitarian form of Theism. On any Theistic view it would appear that the created order must be in some sense a "not-self" with respect to God, since the identification of the created order with the Being of God would be Pantheism.

Divine Attributes.

The Theistic doctrine of God has usually included an account of the Divine Nature under the title of "attributes," but the error. must be carefully guarded against of conceiving the Divine Nature as the sum of the Divine Attributes. They are rather different aspects from which the Divine Being may be viewed by us. The traditional division is into Meta physical and Moral. The Scholastic Theology considered the Metaphysical Attributes to be those which refer to God as He is in Himself and the Moral Attributes those which refer to Him in relation with the world. It may be questioned however, whether the human mind is capable of having knowledge of God of that absolute character suggested by this definition of the Metaphysical Attributes. If the division be retained it is perhaps better to say simply that by Metaphysical Attributes we mean those which have a primarily intellectual importance, such as Unity and Infinity, while by Moral we mean those which have a directly practical bearing, such as Righteousness and Love. The classification, how ever, is of doubtful value, since even the attributes which are most evidently "metaphysical" have profound religious results, and those which are "moral" have metaphysical import.

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