CONSTITUTIONS The Constitution was regarded from an early date as law of a superior order and of a more permanent character than legisla tive acts. Under the first State Constitutions legislatures were the dominant organs of Government. They abused their wide powers, and helped develop a feeling that legislative authority should in some measure be curbed. In New Jersey in i 780 a statute was declared invalid as violative of the State Constitution. Other decisions of this character gradually accumulated. Ap parently the framers of the Federal Constitution were in 1787 of the opinion that it would be the function of the Federal Courts to preserve the powers of State and Nation under the Federal Con stitution. Such a power in the Federal Courts carries with it authority, in a case involving the issue, to declare either a Federal or a State law invalid as violative of the Constitution of the United States. Since Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in 1803, in Marbury v. Madison, the principle of judicial power to declare laws unconstitutional has been established in the Federal system. The authority of State Courts to declare State laws invalid as violative of State Constitutions is equally well established. Except for a few provisions which are regarded as committed to the political organs of Government, it may therefore be said that placing language in a written Constitution makes such language judicially enforceable as against the legislative bodies. Whereas
Parliament is the supreme lawmaker under the English system of government, in the United States the written Constitution as finally construed by the courts is supreme. Where constitutional provisions are clear and precise this supremacy of the Constitu tion as judicially construed makes little difficulty. But where language is used that is not capable of precise definition, as that of the Fourteenth Amendment that no State shall "deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law," the court may in fact determine not only the constitutionality but also the wisdom of legislative action.
The exercise of broad judicial power in such a manner as to control legislative policy has, however, largely ceased; the "due process of law" clause, the principle of the separation of powers, and the broad language of the Constitution with respect to Federal powers are now construed not only in such a manner as to enlarge National authority but also in such a manner as to leave larger powers in the hands of the political departments of Government —the President and the Congress in the National system.