Upon the declaration of war against Great Britain in 1812, on account of war measures affecting trade and shipping, the squad ron at New York put to sea without waiting for orders from Washington and covered the return of American shipping, besides operating successfully against hostile commerce. It was well done, though the administration could claim no credit. There were several frigate actions which brought much prestige to the navy, but soon the overwhelming might of the British navy drove Ameri can commerce from the seas, blockaded American ports, destroyed American towns and paralyzed American industries. The impor tant victories of the navy were on lakes Erie and Champlain. The first cut the lines of communication of the British army in Michigan and obliged it to flee to Canada, thus giving America permanent possession of the Ohio Valley, and the second turned back the British army advancing into New York. The country was mortified and depressed by the failure of the army to occupy Canada and by the coastal raids, but the naval victories together with Jackson's defeat at New Orleans of the veterans of Wel lington's Peninsular army gave full compensation in the exaltation of the national spirit. As the campaigns in the Mediterranean in 1803-5 had knit the navy, so the naval victories of 1812-14 established the self-confidence of the people. Thenceforward, the nation was independent, not only politically, but in spirit.
The lack of departmental organization made itself evident during the war and the Secretary of the Navy resigned under pressure. The new secretary, William Jones, proposed a complete organization based on that of the British Admiralty, yet avoiding its defects on the civil side. Congress amended his proposal, and in 1815 provided for a board of three naval commissioners. The terms of the act gave the board control of the civil and military branches of the navy under the secretary. But President Monroe decided that the material side should have technical supervision by the board and the military side, the "employment" of the navy, was something to be cared for by the civil secretary and his clerk without naval advice. Thus Jones' effort to provide a "General Staff" to direct strategic operations and training was postponed for a century. The Board of Navy commissioners set to work to centralize naval administration, to draw up regula tions and to limit the vagaries of captains by requiring them to answer to the department. But the board did not give entire satisfaction and in 1842 Congress substituted for it a group of civil bureaus for the supply and maintenance of the navy.
As in 1815, so in 1842 the original bill provided for an office of operations, but Congress saw only the need of creating an organi zation to spend the money it appropriated. It did not see that it was equally needful to organize for the purely executive work of managing the fleet. Between the close of the war in 1815 and
the Civil War in 1861 the navy was chiefly occupied in assisting commerce. Exploring and surveying expeditions went out over the world. A commercial treaty with Turkey was initiated and Japan was brought into the circle of western nations. A squadron was maintained on the coast of Africa for the suppression of the slave trade. After 1815 the navy shrunk to under 4,000 men and then increased to over 12,000 (with marines), at the time of the Mexican War in 1846-7. This war made no great demands on the navy although it took possession of California, administered the government, and escorted and landed the army at Vera Cruz for the march to Mexico City.
When the Civil War came in 1861 the navy took a great part. It expanded from about 10,00o men to 6o,000 and from 133,00o tons of shipping to over 500,000 at the close in 1865. Its prin cipal task was to cut off the Confederacy and its field armies from sources of supply across the ocean. This it did by a very effective blockade of the coasts and by seizing the control of the Mississippi river in conjunction with Grant's army so that little from the south-western area got to the field armies. The work was com parable to that of the British navy in isolating Germany in the World War. For this administrative task the Navy Department added new bureaus, but the principal change in organization was the appointment of an assistant secretary to direct operations and practically to assume the duties of a chief-of-staff. When the war was finished the office of assistant secretary was abolished and the duties of operation of the navy were taken as a side-line of work by one of the maintenance bureaus.
For nearly 20 years of ter the war public interest lay in the political reconstruction of the South and the economic develop ment of the West. The navy was neglected and it grew rather stale. Numbers fell to io,000 and efficiency was not high. But in the early eighties, public interest revived and by the time of the Spanish-American War in 1898, the navy had some fine ships and was gaining efficiency. The two battles of Manila and Santi ago, in which two hostile squadrons were destroyed with only one American killed, made it impossible for Spain to continue the war. The policy of the United States and the development of the navy were greatly modified by the war, for the country now began to realize that it was a world power with trade interests extending everywhere. But for the moment sea-pOwer was not imperative and the navy turned to contemplate the possibility of a war with Germany and to prepare itself if called upon. The navy now grew rapidly and the fleet developed its organization and administration for handling large bodies of combatant ships.