In 1909 Secretary Meyer attempted to perfect the depart mental organization. He grouped the material and personnel bu reaus under two aides ; established an inspection system under another; and most important, he established an Office of Opera tions under a fourth aide to manage the training and employment of the fleet. The change was a distinct betterment.
As it became apparent to the Administration after the opening of the World War that it was necessary at least to be able to make a show of force, Congress in 1915 completed the organization of the department by establishing an office of naval operations for the direction of the fleet after the bureaus of maintenance had supplied the ships and men. The following year, 1916, Congress authorized 16 capital ships of the largest size, and for the former method of promoting officers by seniority, it substituted selection by merit, a measure of far-reaching efficiency. After the United States entered the war in 1917, the navy personnel was increased from some 7.5,000 (including marines) to eight times as many. No major naval action occurred after American entry to the war, but the American navy added a squadron to the British Grand Fleet, laid a huge system of mines in the North Sea, escorted convoys, and transported army stores and about i,000,000 sol diers to France.
Soon after the entrance of America into the World War, the shipbuilding programme of 1916 was at the request of Great Britain temporarily laid aside to build torpedo boat destroyers. merchant ships and other types of craft which the allies lacked. The building programme of 1916 was resumed after the armistice. When the new Administration took office in 1921 it invited Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan to a conference on the reduction of naval armaments to meet at Washington in November 1921. The American delegation proposed to reduce the battleship ton nage of this country and Great Britain to 525,000 tons and Japan's to 315,000 tons, with corresponding limitations in all other classes of combatant ships. Great Britain agreed as to battleships
but would not cut her cruisers. France would not abolish sub marines, and Japan limited fortifications of other powers in the western Pacific, thus altering the value of the 5-5-3 ratio pro posed by the United States. No new ships were authorized for several years. Later attempts to limit naval armaments failed un til 1930, when a new Five-Power Treaty was signed by which the United States, Great Britain and Japan reduced the number of their capital ships and limited the size, armament and total ton nage of cruisers and submarines (see table below) and placed no limit on the number of ships in certain small or auxiliary types. An "escalator" clause permitted increases to match the shipbuilding pro gram of any non-signatory power. A new convention was called in 1935. Italy did not attend, and Japan withdrew. Early in 1936 the United States, Great Britain and France signed a treaty good until the end of 1942 in which, owing to the absence of the other Powers, it was impracticable to limit types or numbers of ships. The maximum calibre of guns was placed at i4in.; the maximum size of future air craft carriers was reduced, and building large cruisers was forbidden for six years. The repetition of an "escalator" clause and the addition of "escape" clauses deprive this treaty of real substance. In 1936 Great Britain and Japan invoked these clauses, allowing the United States to imitate them. The U.S. invoked this clause in 1939. The permanent enlisted strength of the active list of the regular navy is 131,484, and the President is authorized, whenever in his judgment a sufficient emergency exists, to increase the authorized enlisted strength of the navy to 191,00o. The authorized enlisted strength of the Marine Corps is 26,297.