Struggle for National Government

STRUGGLE FOR NATIONAL GOVERNMENT, The long struggle to secure the ratification of the Articles of Confederation had given time for careful consideration of the new scheme of government. Maryland's persistent criticism had prepared men to find defects in them. Conventions of New Eng land States, pamphlets, and private correspondence had found flaws in the new plan ; but a public trial of it was a necessary preliminary to getting rid of it. The efforts of the individual States to maintain the war, the disposition of each State to mag nify its own share in the result, the popular jealousy of a superior power, transferred now from parliament to the central govern ment, were enough to ensure the articles some lease of life.

Territorial Cessions.

Congress and its committees had al ready begun to declare that it was impossible to carry on a gov ernment efficiently under the articles. Its expostulations were to be continued for several years before they were heard. In the meantime it did not neglect the great subject which concerned the essence of nationality—the western territory. Virginia had made a first offer to cede her claims, but it was not accepted. A committee of Congress now made a report (1782) maintaining the validity of the rights which New York had transferred to Congress; and in the next year Virginia made an acceptable offer. Her deed was accepted (March 1, 1784) ; the other claimant States followed ; and Congress, which was not authorized by the articles to hold or govern territory, became the sovereign of a tract of some 430,000 square miles.

In this territory Congress had now on its hands the same ques tion of colonial government in which the British Parliament had so signally failed. The manner in which Congress dealt with it has made the United States the country that it is. The leading feature of its plan was the erection, as rapidly as possible, of States, similar in powers to the original States. The power of Congress over the territories was to be theoretically absolute, but it was to be exerted in encouraging the development of thorough self-government, and in granting it as fast as the settlers should become capable of exercising it. Copied in succeeding acts for the organization of territories, and still controlling the spirit of such acts, the ordinance of 1787 (July 13, 1787) is the foundation of almost everything which makes the modern Ameri can system peculiar.

Difficulties of the Confederation.

In the interval of the settlement of the territorial question the affairs of the "league of friendship," known as the United States, had been going from bad to worse, reaching a crisis in 1786. The public debt amounted in 1783 to about $42,000,000, of which $8,000,000 was owed abroad—in Holland, France and Spain. Congress had no power to levy taxes for the payment of interest or principal ; it could only make requisitions on the States. In the four years ending in 1786 requisitions had been made for $io,000,000 and the receipts from them had amounted to but one-fourth of what had been called for. Even the interest on the debt was falling into arrears, and the first instalment of the principal fell due in 1787. To pay this, and subsequent annual instalments of $1,000,000, was quite impossible. Robert Morris, the financier of the War of Independence, resigned in 1783 rather than "be the minister of injustice," hoping thus to force upon the States the necessity of granting taxing powers to Congress. Washington, on retiring from the command-in-chief, wrote a circular letter to the governors of all the States, urging the necessity of granting to Congress some power to provide a national revenue. Congress (April 18, 1783) appealed to the States for power to levy specific duties on cer tain enumerated articles, and 5% on others. It was believed that

with these duties and the requisitions, which were now to be met by internal taxation, $2,500,000 per annum could be raised. The proposal never received the necessary ratification of all the States. The obedience to the requisitions grew more lax. In 1786 a com mittee of Congress reported that any further reliance on requisi tions would be "dishonourable to the understandings of those who entertain such confidence." The States and Congress,--In the States the case was even worse. Some of them had been seduced into issuing paper cur rency in such profusion that they were almost bankrupt. Great Britain, in the treaty of peace, had recognized the independence of the individual States, naming them in order; and her Govern ment followed the same system in all its intercourse with its late Colonies. Its restrictive system was maintained, and the States, competing with each other for more commerce, could adopt no system of counteracting measures. Every possible burden was thus shifted to American commerce; and Congress could do nothing, for, though it asked for the power to regulate commerce for 15 years, the States refused it. Several States, towards the end of this period, began to prepare or adopt systems of protection of domestic productions or manufactures, aimed at preventing corn petition by neighbouring States. The Tennessee settlers were in insurrection against the authority of North Carolina; the Ken tucky settlers were disposed to cut loose from Virginia. Poverty, with the rigid execution of process for debt, drove the farmers of western Massachusetts into an insurrection (Shays's Insurrec tion) which the State had much difficulty in suppressing; and Congress was so incompetent to aid Massachusetts that it was driven to the expedient of imagining an Indian war in that direction, in order to transfer troops thither. Congress itself was in danger of disappearance from the scene. The necessity for the votes of nine of the 13 States for the passage of important measures made the absence of a State's delegation.quite as effec tive as a negative vote. Congress even had to make repeated appeals to obtain a quorum for the ratification of the treaty of peace with Great Britain. In 1784 Congress broke up in disgust, and the French minister reported to his government—"There is now in America no general government—neither Congress, nor president, nor head of any one administrative department." Congress was evidently incompetent to frame a new plan of national government ; its members were too dependent on their States, and would be recalled if they took part in framing any thing stronger than the articles. The idea of a convention of the States, independent of Congress, was in the minds and mouths of many ; Thomas Paine had suggested it as long ago as his Common Sense pamphlet : "Let a continental conference be held . . . to frame a continental charter." Convention of 1786.—The country drifted into a convention by a roundabout way. The navigation of Chesapeake Bay and the Potomac needed regulation ; and the states of Maryland and Virginia, having plenary power in the matter, appointed delegates to arrange such rules. The delegates met (1785) at Alexandria (Va.), and at Washington's house, Mount Vernon (Va.), in adopting their report, proposed that Pennsylvania and Delaware be asked to nominate commissioners. Virginia went further and proposed a meeting of commissioners from all the States to frame commercial regulations for the whole. The convention met (1786) at Annapolis (Md.), but only five States were represented, and their delegates adjourned, after recommending another conven tion at Philadelphia in May 1787.