66. Our original bodily structure, and the impressionsand associations which af fect us in passing through life, are so much alike, and yet not the same, that there must be both a great general re. semblance among mankind in respect of their mental pleasures and pains, and al so many particular differences.
67. Some degree of spirituality (that is, that state of mind in which the pleasures and pains are not sensible), is the neces sary consequence of passsing through life. The sensible pleasures and pains must be transferred by association more and more every day, upon things which of themselves afford neither pleasure nor pain.
68. Let the letters a, b, c, d, e, &c. re present the sensible pleasures, and x, y, and z, the sensible pains, supposing them to be only,three in number ; and let us suppose all these, both pleasures and pains, to be equal to each in degree. If now the ideas of these sensible pleasures and pains be associated together, accord ing to all the possible varieties, in order to form intellectual pleasures and pains, it is plain, that pleasure must prevail in all the combinations of seven or more let ters; and also, that when the several parts of these complex pleasures are suf ficiently blended by association, the pains which enter into their composition will no longer be distinguished separately, but the resulting mixed and complex pleasures will appear to be pure and sim ple ones, equal in quantity to the excess of pleasure above pain, in each combina tion. Thus association would convert a state in which pleasure and pain are both perceived by turns, into one in which pure pleasure would alone be perceived ; at least would cause the beings who were tinder its influence to any indefinite de gree, to approach to this last state near er than by any definite distance. Now, though the circumstances of mankind are not the same with those here supposed, yet they bear a great resemblance to them, during that part of our existence which is exposed to our observation ; for our sensible pleasures are far more nu merous than our sensible pains ; and though the pains are in general greater than the pleasures, yet the sum total of the latter is probably greater than that of the former ; whence the remainder, after the destruction of the pains by the oppos site and equal pleasure, will be pure pleasure.
69. The intellectual pleasures and pains are as real as the sensible ones, be ing, in fact, nothing but the sensible plea sures and pains variously mixed and blended together: They are also all equally of a factitious and acquired na ture ; and we must therefbre estimate all of the pleasures equally, by their magni tude, permanency, and tendency to pro duce others ; and the pains in like man ner.
Of the .1ffections and Passions.
70. Affections, passions, and emotions, may be considered as the re-action of the mind towards those objects which directly, or indirectly, produce pleasure or pain. Supposing that by association a very com plex, pleasurable feeling has been so con nected with any object, as to be excited by the sensation or idea of that object; by degrees the object is considered as the source of that feeling, and the plea surable feeling blended with the idea of the object, being the indirect or immedi ate source of it, is called love ; the con trary feeling, produced by contrary asso ciations, is called hatred. (We do not
here speak of the particular modifications of these feelings, or of their restrictions, but of the general feelings excited in our minds by objects causing, or supposed to cause, pleasurable or painful feeling). When either of them, (the love, for in stance,) is habitually connected with any object, it is called an anction for that object ; and all its various modifications, however, and in whatever degree pro duced, if they are more than the ebulli tions of the moment, being permanent feelings ready to be excited by the ap propriate object in appropriate situations, are also termed affections. If from any strength in the exciting cause, or pecu liar sensibility of the frame, or peculiarly vivid associations, connected with objects of a specific cast, that cause or produce it vivid excitement of feeling, which (though it may last perhaps for a consi derable time, if not excessive in degree), gradually loses its vividness, and altoge . ther ceases, or settles down into a more permanent, but less active feeling,, that vivid, vigorous feeling is denominated a passion. The mind may have such a pre disposition to a certain set of passsions, that these may be easily excited, and by every such excitement increase the pre disposition to future excitement, and add to the strength and vividness of the more permanent corresponding affections, but the excitement itself, and its effect, the passion, cannot, from the nature of the Hind, last long. From this account it may appear, that the passions and affec tions differ from each other principally in their degree and duration. There is a third class of feelings, which may more properly be called emotions, than either passions or affections ; where the pleasui. able or painful feelings are not explicitly referred to the exciting cause, and have not that vividness and strength which is essential to a passion, they are states of pleasure or of pain, following the excite ment of some affection, and generally ac companied or blended with trains of con ceptions and thoughts. We are aware that we do not use this term in the sense in which Dr. Cogan professes to employ it; but we doubt, whether in this instance the usual penetration and accuracy of that philosopher have accompanied him ; and as it appears to us, his own use of it is essentially different from that given in his definition, in which lie confines it " to the external marks or visible changes produced by the impetus of the passions upon the corporeal system." A tenden cy to the exercise of affections, and to the excitement of emotions or passions, is called a disposition : in those cases in which the disposition is habitual, and re gulates a considerable proportion of the affections or passions, it seems appropri ately termed the temper.