VOTES. The decision of any ques tion by an assembly of persons, being in its own nature impracticable in the case of dissent by one or more of the indi viduals, it becomes an object of practical necessity to provide for that case, in moat , instances, by some expedient. In our English law, the determination of twelve men upon a jury is rendered unanimous by annexing the condition, that they shall not delay longer than it shall be possible for them to Subsist without the necessaries of life. Upon almost any other occasion it has been established, that the wish of the majority shall be taken as the sense of the whole.
This last rule is, however, capable of many modifications, one of the most strik ing is that which is used in all arrange, ments of delegation. In order to insure the possession of know ledge, fidelity,diligence and dispatch, it is usual in society to per form the business of the public by delegates, in successive order of power and re sponsibility.
Thus, a large and mixed multi tude, possessing very little political knowledge, liable for the most part to be misled by prejudices or corruption, incapable, on many accounts, of ing objects with steadiness, and from their number absolutely unable to deli berate or decide, with the smallest de gree of efficacy, may nevertheless be very capable of determining the single question, who shall be their delegate in a less numerous assembly of wise and vir. tuous men ; and this last assembly may give power to their chairman and their committees to perform many acts which could scarcely be effected by themselves in their entire mass.
These proceedings, however, are sup posed to have the determination of single questions in view at a time ; but there are questions of vote which in their owp nature possess a degree of complexity. Into these our limits will not allow us to enter, but there is one relating to per sonal elections, which Borda, in his Me- •' moirs of the French Academy, has point- .
ed out, and is entitled to our, notice. It ' relates to the choice of one out of a number of candidates, which is made simply by taking him who has the majo-' rity of voices, but which may not coin- tide with the wish of the electors, and may even be that which is the most oppo site to that wish.
The example is, suppose these candi dates, A, B, and C, had twenty-one electors ; then if A have eight votes, B seven, and C six, A will be elected. But the truth here manifested is, that eight voters out of twenty-one give the pre ference to A beyond B and C, and it is not known in what order of preference those voters place these two last. A like observation may be made as to the other sets who have voted in preference for B and C. So that if the seven voters for B had possessed the means of showing, and had declared their preference of C to A, C would have had thirteen votes, and prevailed against A ; and there is nothing in this cause of election which can show that this would not have been the result.
Mr. B. proposes that this should be re medied by each voter giving in a list of the order of merit in the candidates, and he shows at length, by mathematical rea soning, the true indication to be deduced from such lists. But as this practice might probably be too remote from vul gar apprehension to be much approved, it may be sufficient to refer the reader to the Memoir, and to remark that, in order to be certain that an election, made in the common way, is really the wish of the majority, it is necessary that the num ber of votes obtained by the successful candidate should be to the whole num ber of electors, in a greater ratio than the number of candidates by one to their total number.