If all this were to happen, and there is no reason why it should not, it would be enormously profitable not only to the Chinese themselves, but to foreigners. Other nations recognize this possibility. They also realize the abundant supplies of staple raw materials that can be pro cured in China and the vast market which she would furnish if once drawn into the paths of modern industrial and commercial development. Hence arises the main problem in the Far Eastern Question, namely, who shall control China and how? So far as mere volume of trade is concerned a partial answer to this question is found in the accompanying table. The first two columns show that between 1913 .and 1919 there was a relative decline in ,the Chinese imports from all the European countries and from Hongkong, which chiefly delivers British and other European goods to Chin There was a corresponding increase in the imports from the Unite States and Japan. The same was true of exports. Of course the w had much to do with this, but part of the change clue to the war wi probably be permanent. This is shown in the next table which giv the percentage of the total trade of the United States with vario countries of the Far East. There it appears that the percentage American imports from the Far East doubled during the war, while t percentage of American exports that goes to China, Japan, and Indi is steadily increasing.
All these figures indicate that Japan, the United States, and Great Britain have the greatest interest in Chinese trade. Those three coun tries played the chief part in a Conference which met in Washington in 1921, and framed new treaties dealing with the regions bordering the Pacific Ocean. The United States and Great Britain insisted upon what is known as the open-door policy, and Japan agreed to it. Accord ing to that policy all foreign countries have equal rights and privileges in China. At the same time China must be helped to preserve and maintain her own government and to quiet the internal quarrels which have distracted the country since it became a republic in 1912. ' The Relation of Japan to China and to World the pr lem of the Far East Japan is the main active factor just as China is the main passive factor. The foreign trade of Japan, as given below, shoves this very clearly.
Notice how little Japan exports in the way of food. The only really mportant raw material exported is silk. But manufactured goods ise to large proportions, especially yarn and textiles. Among the im )orts, on the contrary, food and manufactures play a fairly large part, yut the most important items are raw or semi-manufactured materials, .specially cotton, wool, iron and petroleum. Japan wants these things or her factories. Her trade has the same qualities as that of Great Iritain except that she does not yet import anywhere nearly so large a )roportion of food. But she is tending in that direction. She wants
ood, and the raw materials needed to maintain and enlarge her factories.
She wants great markets where she can sell the products of those fac tories. Chosen and Manchuria are not enough. China has just what she wants, and China is close at hand. It is not surprising that Chinese trade amounts to about 16 per cent of Japan's total, while the corre sponding figure for the United States is only 3, and for Great Britain 2. In other words China's trade is the largest single factor in the foreign relations of Japan. The Japanese feel that they are the natural people to develop China and provide the education, the sci ence, and t he leadership that China now lacks. The main problem of the Far Eastern question is how can Japan develop a program of rea sonable industrial, commercial, a n d financial exp a n sion, while China also has a free op portunity and the rest of the world has a fair chance. The only answer lies in close friendship and cooperation between the three great mari time nations, the United States, Great Britain, and Japan.
The Contrasted Character of the Chinese and Japanese.—The reason why Japan and China play such strongly contrasted parts in the Far Eastern Question, and thus in the business relations of the world, is found partly in certain deep-seated differences of character. The Jap anese, though small of stature, are an unusually alert, people. While not so inventive as the Nordics, they are very quick to recognize and adopt a good thing when they see it. One of the most' notable facts in world history has been the speed and thoroughness with which the Japanese, as soon as western ideas were brought to them, recognized their value and began to profit by them. This does not mean, as many people suppose, that the Japanese were barbarians before Commodore Perry induced them to make a treaty with the United States in 1854. Contrary to what is often stated, they were then, as now, by far the most progressive people of Asia. For centuries, they had been making gradual progress and when they saw that western science and industry were good, they quickly adopted them. Not all the Japanese, however, have this progressive spirit. There is a great contrast between the relatively conservative masses of the people, and the quick-minded, capable leaders belonging to the old nobility and the Samurai or warrior class. In other words, Japan has a large body of industrious, conservative peasants who make good sailors, factory operatives, and manual workers, and she has a relatively large number of progressive, competent leaders.