RESERVATION, MENTAL (Lat. rescrratio or restrictio mentalis), the act of reserving or holding back some word or clause which is necessary to convey fully the meaning really intended by the speaker. It differs from equivocation (Lat. equivocatio or amplabo!ia) in this, that in the latter the words employed, although doubtful. and perhaps not fitted naturally to convey the real meaning of the speaker, are yet, absolutely speaking, and without the addition of any further word or clause, susceptible of that meaning. Thus, an example of equivocation would he: "I did not write this libel," meaning "I did not perform the mechanical operation of wilting it with a pen," although I had really com- . posed and issued it. A mental reservation might be involved in the same words, if one were to say: " I. did not write this libel," mentally withholding the word "to-day," although he had written it "yesterday," or on some earlier day. Few questions in casuistry have excited more controversy, or have been the subject of fiercer recrimina tion, than that of the lawfulness of equivocation and mental reservation. In the cel ebrated Letters of Pascal (q.v.) against the Jesuits it was one of the most prominent, and, used as he employed it, the most effective topics; and Pascal's charges against the Jesuit casuistry of that day have been repeated in almost every populer controversy on the subject which has since arisen. There are several varieties of mental reservation, differing from each other, and all differing from equivocation under its several forms. But as regards the morality of the subject, all the forms of language calculated to deceive may be classed together, and may be treated according to the same common principles. Mental reservation is of two kinds, purely mental and not purely mental. By the former designation is meant a mental reservation which cannot be detected. whether in the words themselves or in the circumstances in which they are spoken. Of this kind would be the mental reservation implied if a person, on being asked if he had seen A. B. (whom he really bad just seen walking by), were to reply: "I have not seen him," meaning "riding on horseback." A "not purely mental" reservation is that which, although not naturally implied or contained in the wOrds, may, nevertheless, be inferred or sitspected, either from them or the circumstances in which they are used. Of this kind would be the mental reservation of a servant, in giving the'ordinary answer to a visitor's inquiry for his master: "Not at home," although his master were really in the house; or that of a confessor, who, in a country where the privileges of the secret of the confessional are known and admitted, on being asked whether a certain person had committed a crime, which the confessor knew from his confession that he had committed, should answer: " I do not know," meaning " outside of the confessional." And. in general, all such doubtful forms, whether of mental reservation or of equivocation, may be divided into discoverable and undiscoverable. Much, although certainly not all the odium which has been excited against the casuists for their teaching on this head, has arisen from the confusion of their views as to these two classes of mental reservation; and the witty ingenuity with which Pascal mixed tip examples of both, and applied to one what was really said of the other, did far more to damage the theological reputation of his adversaries, as a school, than any of the genuine really objectionable decisions which he cited from the writings of individual divines. Mental reservation has formed a subject of discussion for Protestant as Yell as Catholic divines; without entering into a detailed history of this curious branch of casuistry, we shall content ourselves with stating briefly the chief principles on which the decisions of the most approved writers, especially of the Roman Catholic school, are founded.
First, " purely mental" reservations, and "absolutely u n discoverable" equivocations are held to be in all eases unlawful, such forms of speech being, in truth, lies: inasmuch as they have but one real sense, which is not the sense intended by the person who uses them, and hence can only serve to deceive. This doctrine is held by all sound Catholic casuists, and the contradictory doctrine is expressly condemned by pope Innocent XI. (Propp. 26, 27). On the contrary, mental reservations "not purely mental," and " dis coverable" equivocations, are held to be not inconsistent with truth, and, in certain circumstances, when there is necessity or weighty reason for resorting to them, allow able. For the absolute admissibility of the expedient of mental reservation and of equivocation in such circumstances, casuists allege scriptural precedent from Genesis xx. 12, Matt. xi. 14, Acts xxiii. 6, and other passages; and the principles on which their 'use, in such case, is defended, are (1) that there is supposed to be in the circumstances justification, and even necessity, for not making known the whole truth; and (2) that the mental reservation in the case supposed does not amount to more than a mere with lidding the entire truth, inasmuch as what is stated is absolutely true, and the real mean ing of the speaker is absolutely contained in it, and discoverable from it; and the litho construction put upon it by the hearer, although permitted through necessity or grave reason by the speaker, is not positively put forward by him. A historical example of such equivocation or reservation is in the well-known answer of St. Athanasius to the question of the party who were in pursuit of him, and who, overtaking him, but not knowing his person, asked what way Athanasius had gone. is not far off;" replied Athanasms, and the party passed on in pursuit. A less easily discoverable equivocation is ascribed to St. Francis of Assisi, who, when a gang of robbers in pursuit of a traveler asked him whether he had seen the traveler pass by, put his hand up the sleeve of his habit, and replied: "He did not pass this way," meaning "up his sleeve." And an ordinary example of discoverable mental reservation is that of a person who, on being asked by one to whom he could not with safety give a refusal, whether he has any money, should reply: "No," meaning "none to lend you." In order, however, to jns-, tifv the use of these devices of speech, casuists require that there shall be some grave and urgent reason on the speaker's part; as, for example, the necessity of keeping a state secret, or a secret of the confessional, or of a professional character, or even the confidence intrusted by a friend, or the ordinary and fitting privacy which is required for the comfort and security of domestic life, and of the peaceful intercourse of society; and that the concealed sense of the form of speech employed, although it be actually undiscovered, and even unlikely to lie discovered, may yet he, in all the circumstances, really discoverable. On these two leading theoretical principles the majority of casuists are agreed. But a wide field for practical discussion lies between them, in the variety of senses which may be attached to the phrases " not purely mental" and " discover able;" and it is in the practical interpretation of these terms that some of the casuists have found scope for the introduction of the lax decisions which have brought odium upon casuistry. Much of this odium has fallen upon the society of the Jesuits to such a degree that their name has been popularly associated with the.worst forms of the practice of mental reservation. See JESUITS and PASCAL.—See Scavini, Theologia Moralis, n. 23; Murray, Theological Essays, iv. 274, and foil.
••