BELIEF. This is a word sufficiently intelligible in common speech; but, neverthe less, various subtle problems and protracted controversies have been connected with it. A brief account of the chief of these may be here given.
1. It has been a matter of no small difficulty with mental philosophers, to give an exact rendering of the state of mind so denominated, or to specify the exact import, test, or criterion of the act of believing. It is easy enough to comprehend what is meant by an idea or a notion, as when we speak of the idea of a rose, its shape, color, odor, etc.; but when we make the further step of affirming our belief in the sweetness of the rose, it is not so easy to describe the exact change that has come over the mind in so doing. In all belief, there must be something intellectual, something thought of, or conceived by the mind; anc: lience there has been a disposition to recognize the believing function as on of the properties of our intelligence. We believe that the sun will rise and the tides flow to-morrow; here are undoubtedly implied intellectual conceptions of the sun, his rising, and of to-morrow; of the sea, its movements, and so on. But the question comes, what is the difference between conceptions believed in as these are, and conceptions quite as clear and intelligible that are not believed? as the notion that the fluctuation of the sea on the shores of Britain is the same as on the shores of Italy. It is not to the purpose to say, that in the one case we have knowledge and evidence, and not in the other; for what is wanted is to define the change that comes over us, when what is a mere notion or supposition passes into a conviction; when a day-dream or hypothesis comes to take rank as truth.
To answer this inquiry, we must bring in a refereti6e 4o ticfithi; for although belie connects itself with our intelligence, as now mentioned, it has action for its root lined ultimate criterion. Coming up to the edge of a frozen lake, And looking at illy thicknesd of the ice, we believe that it will bear to be trodden on, and accordingly Walk herbs§ it. The meaning or purport of the believing state here is, that we do not bPsilak le DIM our safety to the fact believed. The measure of our confidence is the measure of &if readiness to act upon our conviction. If the frozen lake lie between us and our destina tion, we feel elated by the certainty of arriving there, which we should not under a,.
weak or imperfect trust in the goodness of the ice. Belief, therefore, although emboaffe' in ideas, or intellectual conceptions, is in reality a moral power, operating, ea our con duct, and affecting our happiness or misery. Belief in coming gaud cheers las almost as much as if it were already come; a like strength of conviction of approaching cirri is to the same degree depressing; "the devils believe, and tremble." These two tests—readi ness to act according to what we believe, and influence on the mental tone—effectually separate the state in question from mere notions, fancies, or suppositions, unaccom panied with credence. We have firm confidence in the food we eat being able to nourish us; we exert ourselves to procure that food, and when we feel hungry, and see it before us, we have the mental elation arising from a near and certain prospect of relief and gratification. If there be anything that we work languidly to procure, and feel little elated by being near or possessing, our conviction is proved to be feeble as to the utility of that thing, or as to the pleasure we shall derive from it. So, in employing means to compass ends, as when we sow that we may reap, work that we may obtain abundance, study that we may be informed—we have a certain confidence in the connection between the means and the ends; in other words, we are energetically urged to use those means, and having done so, we have the feeling as if the end were already attained.
i Even in cases the furthest removed in appearance from any action of ours, there is no other criterion. We believe a great many truths respecting the world, in the shape of general propositions, scientific statements, affirmations on testimony, etc., which are so much beyond our own little sphere, that we can rarely have any occasion to involve them in our own.procedure, or to feel any hopeful elation on their account. We like wise give credit to innumerable events of past history, although the greater number of them have never any consequences as regards ourselves. "let, notwithstanding such remoteness of interest, the tests now mentioned must apply; otherwise, there is no real conviction in any one instance.