Testimony. which is properly reckoned one of the sources of belief, is, in its operation, partly founded on an intuitive tendency, and partly on experience. We at first believe whatever we are told; the primitive phase of our nature is credulity: the experience that we soon attain to of untrue statements puts us on our guard, and we learn to receive testimony under some circumstances, and from some persons, and not in all cases indiscriminately.
3. Responsibility for Belief—A. lengthened controversy arose some time ago, on the saying of Lord Brougham, that "man is no longer accountable to man for his belief. over 1.vInch he has himself no control." Reduced to precise terms, the meaning of this assertion is: a man's belief being involuntary, he is not punishable for it. The question therefore arises, how far is belief a voluntary function? for it is known that the will does to some extent influence it.
What a man shall see when he opens his eyes is not in his own power; but the open ing of the eyes is a voluntary act. So, after listening to a train of arguments on a cer tain dispute, we might be irresistibly inclined to one side; but, supposing us to live in a country where the adhesion to that side is criminal, and punished severely, we should very likely be deterred from hearing or reading anything in its favor. To this extent, Cie adoption of a belief is voluntary. The application of strong motives of the nature of reward or punishment is sufficient to cause one creed to prevail rather than another, as we see in those countries and in those ages where there has been no toleration of dissent from the established religion. The mass of the people have been in this way so fenced in from knowing any other opinions, that they have become conscientiously attached to the creed of their education.
When the question is asked, therefore, whether punishment can control men's beliefs, and not their professions merely, all history answers in the affirmative, ns religious and political creeds, on which the majority of mankind, being insufficient jndgcs of themselves, are led by tradition and by education. But in matters of daily practice, where the simplest can judge as well as the wisest, the case is altered. No severity of threat could bring a man into the state of believing that his night's rest was hurtful to him; he might be overawed into saying that it was so, but he would never act out his forced affirmation, and therefore he would show that lie did not believe it.
If the sentence of Lord Brougham is held to imply that all beliefs are beyond the power of external motives, and therefore that rewards and punishments can go no further than making outward conformity, we must pronounce it erroneous. For granting that motives cannot have a direct efficacy on the state of a man's convictions—which cannot be conceded in all cases—yet the indirect influence is so great as to produce the unanim ity of whole nations for centuries in some one creed. But if it is only meant, that such indirect means ought not to be applied to sway men's convictions, this is merely a way of affirming the right of free thought and inquiry to all mankind, and the iniquity of employing force on such a matter.—On the subject of belief generally, see Bain on the Emotions and the Will.