The actions prohibited by law are obviously such as could not be allowed without the entire subversion of human society. If murder and theft were to go unpunished, the principal end for which men associate together in communities—that is, protection and security—would not be attained. It is impossible that we should not disappove of all such actions, and approve of the contrary.
2. There are some actions that are accounted virtuous, while their opposites are not punished, as in the case of those now mentioned. Doing good to persons that have no claim upon us—in other words, benevolence or philanthropy—is considered highly praiseworthy; but the neglecting of this is not usually visited with any punishment or censure; so that if it be a duty to perform acts of benevolence, it is a duty generically different from paying our debts, and respecting the person and property of our neigh bor. The motives brought to bear on the two cases are widely contrasted: in the one, we punish for doing the action forbidden; in the other, we reward for doing the thing enjoined, and inflict no punishment if that is neglected. Here lies the difference between duty, strictly so called, and merit. In the bare performance of duty there is no merit; a man would not even be commended for the punctual payment of his just debts, if it were not that many people are deficient in this respect, and in the comparison with these the correct person excites in our minds a feeling of satisfaction. Disapprobation is the sentiment properly concerned with duty, or rather, with breach of duty; approbation is bestowed on all who do something over and above their duty. This distinction is known in every department of practical life; while speculative moralists habitually lose sight of it.
3. The virtues included under prudence are in a different position from either of the foregoing classes. Bearing the common names, virtue and duty, by which they are recog nized as worthy of approbation or commendation, they are nevertheless unaccompanied with the sanctions either of punishment or of reward. The imprudent man is subject to no !coal penalty, unless he clearly involves other persons in his imprudence; and the prudent man is not rewarded with the praise, esteem, or other benefits conferred upon the benevolent man. It is true that the young. are punished by parents or teachers for
imprudences; and some governments take such a paternal care of their subjects, as to punish them for sins against themselves. .lien have been sent to prison, because of their endangering their own salvation by embracing heresy; but at the present day, such a i proceeding is considered beyond the function of government. Men and women, arrived at maturity, are expected to take care of their own interests; even if they do not, no one punishes them; if they do, no one rewards them. We have, it is true, a certain feeling of disesteem in the one case, and of esteem or commendation in the other; neither of which, however, attains any considerable strength until more than the individual's self is involved. In short, although we cannot divest ourselves of all sentiment as lookers on, when men behave prudently or imprudently, our rule is non-interferenee; and this constitutes a marked distinction between the self-regarding and the social vices and virtues.
Accordingly, when ethical writers are to probe the foundations of tho moral sense in man, they ought to consider separately those three different species of conduct, for the sentiment excited by each is marked by strong peculiarities. To class social' duties enforced by punishment, social virtues stimulated by rewards, and pru dence, which is accompanied by neither, under one common designation, and discuss them as if they were essentially the same, is to confuse, instead of clearing up, the first principles of morality.
In Roman Catholic systems of theology, there are declared to be four cardinal virtue., —"prudence, fortitude, temperance, and justice"—from which all other "moral "vir tues are represented as flowing. But there is a prior division of virtues Into tho two classes of theological and moral; the theological virtues being faith, hope, and charity., The distinction between these two classes is represented as consisting in this, that the theological virtues " immediately regard God ;" and the moral virtues do not immediately regard God, but are commanded and rewarded by God, and are beneficial to ourselves.