The one view is, that we have an instinct or intuition of the mind by which we are compelled to recognize this law, so that to us it is a necessary truth, which we cannot escape from if we would. Our experience of the outer world, doubtless, Shows us that things follow one another in an orderly and uniform manner, that the stone that sinks in water to-day does not float to morrow, but no experience could give us the sense of commanding necessity that we have of the law of C. and effect. "Causation is not the mere invariable association of antecedent and consequent; we feel that it implies something more than this." The philosophers who maintain this side give forth two different affirmations; the one, that we actually possess an intuitive belief of necessary causation; the other, that our possession of the belief is a sufficient proof that the law actually pervades the universe. Experience operates to confirm us in those instinctive tendencies, but no amount of experience would have been able to create them.
The latest modification of the theory that ascribes our belief in causation to an intui tion of the mind, is the doctrine promulgated by sir W. Hamilton, to the effect that " we are unable to think that the quantity of existence, of which the universe is the con ceived sum, can be either amplified or diminished. We are able to conceive, indeed, the creation of a world; this, in fact, as easily as the creation of an atom. But what is our thought of creation? It is not a thought of the mere springing of nothing into something. On the contrary, creation is conceived, and is by us conceivable, only as the evolution of existence from possibility into actuality, by the fiat of the Deity. And is true of our concept of creation, holds of our concept of annihilation. We can think no real annihilation—no absolute sinking of something into nothing."—Discas sions, p. 619. Thus, every effect must have a C., and every C. must have its effect, because, if it were not so, there would be either a pure creation or a pure annihilation, neither of which, according to sir \V. Hamilton, is thinkable or conceivable by the human mind. This doctrine, however, has not found acceptance even by those who, if not actual disciples of the author, are most disposed to receive his philosophy generally, as may be seen by referring to prof..Fraser's Essays in Philosophy, p. 170; M'Cosli On the Devine Government, p. 529, 4th edition; and Manse], art. metaphysics, Encyclopedia Britannica. So far from the creation or annihilation of matter or force being incon ceivable, it may be said with truth that until the end of last century it was not known as a fact that the materials of the globe are absolutely indestructible. The effects of combustion and evaporation could hardly suggest anything else than the annihilation of a certain portion of material. Combustion merely transformed the material con sinned into other shapes, nothing being absolutely lost. So much for ponderable matter. As regards force, or moving power, the demonstration that this is never absolutely lost, even on the many occasions when it is so to all appearance, is a still later result of labo rious scientific inquiries, being, in fact, one of the conclusions arrived at within the last few years. See FORCE. To represent, therefore, one of the latest achievements of experimental science as a primitive intuition of the human mind, is to violate, in the strongest manner, our sense of propriety and consistency.
As opposed to the intuitional doctrine of causation, we have a variety of views by Hume, Dr. Thomas Brown, and others, which need not be specified in detail. One may
be given as an example. It has been seen that there are two affirmations in the theory just discussed; that the mind possesses an intuitive belief of causation, and that the possession of this belief is evidence of the existence of the law. Now, one or both of these affirmations may be denied; and the denial of either, by even a small minority of the human race, is held to be fatal to the theory, because unanimity is essential to the establishment of a universal instinct. Now, many men may possess an instinctive belief in the necessity of a cause to all ,effects, and of an effect to all causes; sonic, it is affirmed, do not; it cannot, therefore, be a universal or essential part of human nature.
In like manner, the second affirmation—namely, that the possession of an instinctive belief is a proof of the truth of the thing believed—is denied, on the ground that our instincts often dispose us to believe things that experience shows to beIntrue. We have a strong natural tendency to believe in the universality and continuance of the exact order of things that we arc ourselves born into, and are only put right by seeing the contrary. "A mere disposition to believe, even if supposed instinctive, is no guarantee for the truth of the thing believed. If, indeed, the belief ever amounted to an irresistible necessity, there would be then no use in appealing from it, because there would be no possibility of altering it. But even then the truth of the belief would not follow: it would only follow that mankind were under a permanent necessity of believing what might possibly not be true; just as they were under a temporary necessity—quite as irresistible while it lasted—of believing that the heavens moved, and the earth stood still. But, in fact, there is no such permanent necessity. Many of the propositions of which this is most confidently stated, great numbers of human beings have disbelieved. The things which it has been supposed that nobody could possibly help believing, are innumer able; but no two generations would make out the same catalogue of them."—Mill's Logk, book iii. chap. 21. Mr. Mill and others hold that the proof of the law of causation rests exclusively on the uniform and growing experience of the human race. This, however, is not inconsistent with our possessing the natural instinct above alluded to, by which we are led to suppose that what is will continue, and what has been will be repeated; an instinct that coincides, to a certain extent, with the law of C. and effect, and is therefore a predisposition on our part to accept what experience teaches on this head. It is only maintained that the instinct is of itself no proof, although useful in so far as it prepares us for what there is real evidence for believing. By yielding, to the instinct in its crudest shape, the inhabitant of the tropics scouts the idea that water can ever be solid; the Afri can would deny the existence of white men; and even an intelligent European could not be persuaded that any metal would float. Experience must correct the instinctive tend encies, otherwise no reliance can ever be placed upon them; by which we acknowledge it as the sole test of truth, while intuitive dispositions are no test whatever Even those who maintain the instinctive necessity of the conviction we are discuss ing, admit two great exceptions—viz., the existence of a FIRST C., itself uncaused, and the liberty of the will, or the exemption of bunion actions from the rule that applies so strictly to physical nature.