CAUSE. The words " Cause," " Causality," and "Causation," although familiar and intelligible in ordinary speech, have given rise to some of the most subtle questions in philosophy and theology. We shall here advert briefly to the chief meanings of these terms, and in so doing, we shall indicate the disputes that have arisen in connection with them.
In common language, we are accustomed to describe as the C. of an event, the one event immediately preceding it, and but for which it would not have happened. A man slips his foot on a ladder, falls, and is killed: we give the slipping of the foot as the C. of the fatality. A legislative assembly decides a question of great moment by the casting vote of the president, who is then not unfrequently spoken of as the C. of all the good or evil that followed on the decision. Now, a slight examination shows that this mode of speaking is defective, as not expressing the whole fact, or, in other words, presumes a great deal that is not stated. In the supposed death from a fall, there are many con ditions necessary to the result besides the slipping of the foot: the weight of the body, the height of the position, the hardness of the ground, the fragility of the human frame, all enter into the C. strictly represented; but for practical purposes, we leave out of account all those elements that are not at the moment under our control, and allude to the one that is so. And when we speak of the decision of an assembly being the effect of the president's vote, we mean that his share in the responsibility is peculiarly great, or that, in order to turn the vote in one way, all that is necessary is to secure his indi vidual opinion. If we do not enumerate all the conditions of the event, it is because some of them will, in most cases, be understood without being expressed, or because, for the purpose in view, they may without detriment be overlooked When, however, we aim at strict accuracy, as in the investigations of science, we must not be content with singling out the one turning event, but must enumerate every thing that is necessary to the result. A scientific C is the full assemblage of conditions, failing any one of which, the effect would not happen. In a full explanation of the
phenomenon of the tides, we must enumerate all the circumstances connected with their production—the attraction of the sun and moon, the motions of the earth and the moon in their orbits, the globular form and rotation of the earth, the liquidity of the sea, the mode of distribution of the sea over the earth—every one of which facts is an essential in the full causation. The effect cannot be adequately accounted for without adverting to every one of those conditions, and it is therefore the sum-total of them that is rightly described as the C. of the tides. Taking this complete view of causation, it is found that every event that happens is the sequel to some previous event, in whose absence it would not have been, but which being present it is sure to occur. Between the phe nomena existing at any instant, and the phenomena existing at the succeeding instant, there is an invariable order of succession; to certain facts, certain facts always do, and, as we believe, will continue to succeed. The invariable antecedent is termed the C.; the invariable consequent, the effect. What is termed the law of universal causation, consists in this, " that every consequent is connected in the manner now described with some particular antecedent, or set of antecedents."—Mill's Logic, book iii. chap. 5.
The physical philosopher—the chemist or physiologist—trusts to the uniformity with which the same C. yields the same effect; and if lie can find out the true succession in one instance, he is satisfied that the same succession will always hold, In the physical sciences, therefore, there is no dispute as to the law of causation itself; the controver sies on that head occur only in metaphysics. It is made a serious problem by mental philosophers, and also by theologians, to determine how we come by the irresistible belief that we are said to possess. that every event has and must have a cause. There are many answers to this question: eight are enumerated by sir William Hamilton (Dis cussions on Philosophy, p. 611, 2d edit.). It is only necessary, however, to advert to the two radically opposite points of view from which the subject is now surveyed.