CONSCIOUSNESS. This is perhaps the most comprehensive term employed in desig nating the mind. If it had been used only in its widest signification, there would have been little diffienity in defining it; but unfortunately there are some exceedingly impor tant meanings of a narrower range that are commonly expressed by it, rendering it an ambiguous or equivocal term, and, like all such terms, a source of fallacy and misap prehension.
In the widest meaning, C. is almost identical with mind in action. When we are mentally alive, or performing any of the recognized function of the mind, we are said to be conscious; while the total cessation of every mental energy is described by the term "unconsciousness," among other phrases. In dreamless sleep, in stupor, fainting, and under the influence of the anaesthetic drugs, we are unconscious; in waking, or rallying into renewed mental activity, we are said to become conscious.
As the mind in its waking or active condition may be more or less excited, or vary in the intensity of its manifestations, there are degrees of C.; and, in accordance with a very common usage, the name is apt to be applied to denote the higher degrees in oppo sition to the lower.
In first learning to write, to cast up sums, or to play on an instrument, our mind is put very much on the stretch; in other words, we are very. much excited or highly con scious. When years of incessant practice have consummated the process into a full formed habit, a very small amount of mental attention is involved; and we may then be said to perform the work all but unconsciously.
We must next advert to the special or restricted meanings of the term, which arc those that play the most important part in philosophical discussion. In the first place, we find it applied to denote the mind's cognizance of itself, as opposed to the cognizance or examination of the outer world. Hence, in studying our own minds, we are said to be using C. as the instrument; but in studying minerals or plants, we resort to external observation by the senses. A contrast is thus instituted between C. and observation, which contrast gives to the former word a peculiarly contracted meaning; for, in the wide sense above described, observation is truly an act of consciousness.
In the next place, C. is sometimes identified with belief. We often express a strong affirmation by saying. that we are quite conscious that such a thing is so. It is the strong instinctive of our nature to believe a number of things before we have gone through any large experience of matter of fact. The believing function is a prominent attribute of mentalactivity. We are scarcely able to feel or act without tho operation of belief, or without making assumptions in anticipation of the reality. We believe first, and prove and disprove afterwards. The more intensely we are made con scions, the more strongly we pass into these intuitive convictions. We unhesitatingly believe in the future persistence and universal prevalence of the order of things that we are born into, until such time as our experience gives us a check. Our emotions all produce beliefs in proportion to their strength. Fear makes us believe in coining evil; joy and elation give confidence in coming good. So that it is true, to a certain extent, that the state of belief is engendered along with C., and is stronger as that is stronger; but it does not follow, as is frequently maintained, that to be conscious of every affirma tion is to verify it, because our C. cannot be presumed to lie. See COMMON SENSE.
Correct usage, therefore, would dictate the employment of the term in question only, in the one sense, in which it is co-extensive with being mentally alive, as opposed to sleep, torpor, insensibility, etc. Anything that renders the mental activity more intense, that increases the whirl of the brain (such as strong pleasures and pains, great interest in anything that is going on, etc.) is designated by the positive term C.; the opposite condition, and also the feebler modes of excitement, are expressed by the negative— unconsciousness. All mere special and restricted applications should be forborne, as introducing confusion into thought, and error into philosophy. The study of our own mind may be expressed by such phrases as "self-consciousness," "introspective atten tion," and the like. As it is an entire fallacy to talk of C. in general as accrediting doc trines or matters of belief, any acceptation of the word implying this should be avoided.