DESCARTES, (Latinized into RENATUS CARTESIUS), the name of one of the reformers of philosophy, was b. Mar. 31,1596, at La Haye, in Touraine. He was sent at the age of 8 years to the Jesuit college at La Fleche, where he soon became distin guished for his keenness of intellect, and made great and rapid progress in languages, mathematics, and astronomy. It was not long, however, before lie became dissatisfied with the doctrines and method of scholasticism, and felt it impossible to acquiesce in what had hithero been regarded as knowledge. The first thing that he did after leaving college, as we are informed in his treatise on method, was to abandon hooks, and endea vor to efface from his mind all that he had hitherto been taught, that it might be free to receive the impressions of truth, whencesoever they should come. In pursuance of his plan, he resolved to travel, and soon entered the army as a volunteer, serving succes sively in Holland and Bavaria. As. however, the life of a soldier contributed little to his main object, lie quitted the army in 1621; and after making journeys in different direc tions, he at last retired to Holland, where lie prepared most of his works, attracted many disciples, and at the same time became involved in several learned controversies, espe cially with the theologians. Although he loved independence, yet, in 1649, he accepted an invitation to go to Sweden, addressed to him by queen Christina. who desired his learned intercourse and instruction. His willingness to leave Holland was partly occa sioned by his anxiety to escape from the hostility of his enemies. Only a few mouths after his arrival at the court of queen Christina, he died on Feb. 11,1650. Sixteen years later, his body was brought to Paris, and buried in the church of St. Genevieve-du-Mont.
The grand object towards which D. directed his endeavors, was the attainment of a firm philosophical conviction. The way whereby he sought to attain this end, is explained in the discourse on method (Discours de la Nelhode, published in 1637), to which we have already referred. This small, but extremely interesting and impor tant treatise, contains a history of the inner life of the author, tracing the progress of his mental development from its commencement in early years, to the point where it resulted in his resolution to hold nothing for true until he had ascertained the grounds of certitude. The author also, in the same treatise, explains the practical rules whereby
lie resolved to be guided while in this state of suspended belief, and by the observance of which lie hoped to arrive at absolute certainty, if, indeed, it were at all attainable. The results of his inquiries, so conducted, he exhibited more particularly in his Neditationcs de Prima Philosophi4 (Amst. 1641), and the Principia Philosophies (Amst. 1644). In the former of these treatises, the independence of his thinking is strikingly brought out by his commencing his Meditations with the expression of doubt with regard to all that had hitherto borne the name of knowledge. After examining thoroughly, as lie thought, the grounds of certitude in the various departments of knowledge. lie found one, and only one, proposition that seemed to liiin to stand the test, and of which the truth could not possibly be doubted: that proposition, was, that he existed, which he inferred from the fact of his possessing consciousness. He could not doubt that he felt and thought, and therefore he could not doubt that he, the feeler, the thinker, existed. This relation between consciousness and existence he expressed by the memorable words: Cogito, ergo sum. Instead, however, of making the above proposition the foundation of his philoso phy, by which he would have been led into a direction similar to that of Kant or Fichte, he employed it only so far as to ascertain from it the criterion • of certitude—viz., that whatever is clearly and distinctly thought, must be true. Amongst these clear and distinct thoughts, he soon recognized the idea of God as the absolutely perfect being. This idea, he reasoned, could not be formed in our minds by ourselves, for the imperfect can never originate the perfect; it must be connate, i.e., part of the original structure of our under standing, and implanted there by the perfect being himself. Hence, from the existence of the idea of perfection, D. inferred the existence of God as the originator of it; be inferred it also from the mere nature of the idea, because the idea of perfection involves existence. But if God exist, then we have a guarantee of the previously determined ground of certitude, for God the perfect being cannot deceive, and therefore whatever our consciousness clearly testifies, may be implicitly believed.