FOREKNOWLEDGE and FOREORDINATION. I. Foreknowledge, in theology, is God'sabsolute knowledge of all things before they come to pass. Such knowledge of any thing is impossible to man. The human mind, through the limitations of its nature, fails to comprehend how the foreknowledge of God can be harmonious with the free agency of man. Its efforts to escape the difficulties that it cannot solve have .producej various theories, among which are the following: 1. That God may choose, sometimcr., not to exercise his infinite capacity of knowledge, in like manner as he does not always pu's forth the full measure of his omnipotence. But to this two answers are given. (1) Thal; choice implies foreknowledge. God must know a thing in order to knoN whether he chooses not to know it. His knowledge of the thing must be perfect; if there were one point concerning which hewas ignorant, that one might contain ar element would render the choice' unwise and fatal; or which, if known, w•rild prevent ilia choice from being made. (2) Supposing. it possible for God to make such a choice, it would not meet the difficulty. Concerning the things that he chose to know, the ques tion would still have to be asked, How can God's foreknowledge of them be consistent with human liberty in doing them? 2. That foreknowledge of contingent events being impossible (because it implies a contradiction), there is no dishonor to God in 'affirming that of such events he has no foreknowledge. To this the answers are: (1) If the impossibility here asserted really existed, there could be no foreknowledge whatever; for every event is contingent on something and perhaps 911 many things. Especially if the impossibility existed with reference to the moral actions of men, would God's moral government over them be impossible. (2) Foreknowledge of contingent events is not impossible to an infinite being, for it requires only knowledge of all things on which the events are contingent. And, on the other hand, certain knowledge concerning a contingent event does not take away its contingent character; for contingency is the opposite not of cer tainty, but of necessity. God's perfect knowledge of all contingencies may render him perfectly certain that an event will happen without any agency on his part in constrain ing it to happen. 3. 2 hat since God's foreknowledge °lifers so much from everything among men to which the same name can be, in part, applied, and consequently from all ideas which they can form of it as belonging to God, argument concerning it must be groundless and controversy fruitless. To this the answer is, that the conclusion is correct so far as the divine foreknowledge differs in kind from the foreknowledge of men; but if the dif ference between them be, in part, a difference only of degree, then there may be ground for argument and advantage from discussions wisely carried on. And if the wisdom be shown in excluding from discussion all questions concerning the mode in which the foreknowledge of God is consistent with the free agency of men, the full measure of advantage may be gained in clearly establishing the consistency as a fact. Beyond this the human mind has never advanced, and it is probably safe to say that it never will. The consequences of denying that the foreknowledge of God extends to all events (how ever contingent some or all of them may be) have been well shown by president Edwards. " It would follow from this notion (namely, that the Almighty doth tot foreknow what will be the result of future contingencies) that as God is liable to be continually repenting what he has done, so heft ust be exposed to be constantly chang ing his, mind and intentions as to his future conduct, altering his measures, relinquish ing his old designs, and forming new schemes and projections. For his purposes, even as to the main parts of his scheme (namely, such as. belong to the state of his moral kingdom), must be always liable to be broken through want of foresight, and he must be continually putting his system to rights, as it gets out of order through the con tingence of the actions of moral agents: he must be a being who, instead of being absolutely immutable, must necessarily be the subject of infinitely the most numer ous acts of repentance and changes of intention of any being whatsoever; for this plain reason, that his vastly extensive charge comprehends an infinitely greater number of those things which are to him contingent and uncertain. In such a situation he must have little else to do but to mend broken links as well as he can, and be rectifying his disjointed frame and disordered movements in the best manner the case will allow. The supreme Lord of all things must needs be under-great and miserable disadvantages in governing the world which he has made and has the care of, through his being utterly unable to find out things of chief importance winch hereafter shall befall his system, winch if he did but know, he might make seasonable provision for. In many cases there may be very great necessity that he should make provision, in the manner of his ordering and disposing things, for some great events which are to happen of vast and extensive influence and endless consequence to the universe, which he may see afterwards, when it is too late, and may wish in vain that he had known before hand, that he might have ordered his affairs accordingly. And it is in the power of man, on these principles, by his devices, purposes, and actions thus to disappoint God, break his measures, make him continually to change his mind, subject him. to vexation, and bring him into confusion." II. Fore-ordination is included in what the Scriptures call the purpose of God with respect to the destiny of men. This in theology is presented as his purpose in eternity to do precisely those things, and only those, which he actually does in time. Since, therefore, it is admitted that all his actions are in accordance with infinite justice, wis doth, and love, it follows that his eternal purpose to perform precisely those actions was also infinitely just, wise. and good. The Scriptures teach that it was God's eternal pur
pose to create the world precisely as he did create it; to create men holy, yet liable to fall; to permit his fall, in view of all the circumstances attending it and of all the circumstances resulting from it; to provide a Savior suited to the wants of all, and able, as well as willing, to save all—" God so loved the world, that lie gave his Son, that whosoever believeth in him should not perish, but have everlasting life;" to commit the proclamation of redemption to men with sincerely uttered directions to spread it through all the world and to every creature; to address full and earnest invita tions to every man; to giv9 free salvation to every one who accepts these invitations, and to condemn every one who, refuses or neglects them—to condemn him for' his refusal or neglect, as well as for all his other sins. But-all this could not be unless actual provision had-been made for all and offered sincerely to all. This is harmonious with the Savior's own teaching7–" This is the will of him that sent me, that every one who sceth the Son and believeth on him may have everlasting life." The eternal purpose of God, therefore, is that all who accept the offer of salvation through the atonement of Christ shall be saved, but that all who finally reject that offer shall be lost. Here, if God had not been an omniscient being, he might have arrested his pur pose, thinking that he had made all the provision for the salvation of men that their character and condition required, and that it would certainly be gladly accepted by them. But he knew all that was in man. He foresaw that there would be an unwilling ness on their part to accept this offer, and that the unwillingness would be general and universal. If, therefore, his purpose had rested here, the purpose of salvation would have failed. But his eternal purpose went further. God resolved to secure all the saving results from the atonement and mediation of Christ which he could secure con sistently with his character and position as moral governor over the actual universe of free intelligences which he had seen it best to create. The development of this purpose may, by the light of Scripture and of facts, be traced, it is maintained, several steps further. God purposed 'to secure the salvation of a large part of mankind by taking them to himself and renewing their natures before they were able to accept the Savior personally for themselves, and consequently, before they were able to reject him. In this way, it is said, about one half of the race, being in infancy, are saved of every generation, of every country, and every form of religion. In regard to those who are continued in this life to years of accountability, God's purpose, it is main tained, is to secure the salvation of as many of them as he, in his infinite .wisdom, considers it right to save. This part of his purpose was rendered necessary, not by ally limitation in the efficacy of the atonement, not by his unwillingness to apply its efficacy to the whole number of mankind, but by the unwillingness of men to avail themselves of the Savior provided for them. Here, it is claimed, election comes in to secure the willingness of a part of those whose unwillingness, with all that it implies, is the one obstacle in the way of their being saved. This election is repre sented as made in the exercise of infinite knowledge concerning all that is right. It was prompted by the same infinite love to mankind that gave the Son of God to die for the whole,world. Therefore it included all whom infinite power, wisdom, justice, and love would enable God to snake willing in view of all the considerations that can and should enter into the question. The object of the election was to secure salvation, not to hinder or restrict it; and—the argument continues—as it was rendered necessary only by man's unwillingness to accept the provision made for him, if men suppose it certain or possible that any will of themselves accept the Savior, they are bound to sup pose that the election Illas not shut such persons out, has not diminished any pros pect or possibility of being saved which they may be thought to have irrespective of God's choice. The election was made not as an arbitrary intrusion into the divine gov ernmental order, but with a perfect view and recognition of all the principles which God has established for the administration of his government: of his promise to hear prayer, to give the Holy Spirit to those who ask, to pour out his influences on all flesh, to prosper the right use of appropriate means, and to bless all wise and faithful efforts of men for the salvation of their fellow-men.
The view above given is in general the Calvinistic view; though different schools of Calvinist theologians differ in their shading of certain points on this subject; and it is probably the fact that the presentation of the whole doctrine in preaching at the present day is with less emphasis and stress than formerly on the points•which are distinctive from Arminianism. Arminianism—at least as now held—equally with Calvinism, affirms the Divine foreknowledge and fore-ordination, and that neither precedes the oilier in time—both being eternal. But while Calvinism makes foreknowledge dependent in its nature on fore-ordination, Arminianism tends to make fore ordination dependent, in the order of nature, on foreknowledge. If the debate were strictly limited to this one issue, it may be doubted whether either side could be conclusively proved as against the other. There are, however, other points of philosophical divergence. See AnmIN ICS, CALVINISM, ELECTION, PREDESTINATION, ante.