FORM, in philosophy, or IDEA, the term which Plato used to express the reality of a thing; "nit which makes it what it is, and which continues always the same; in con trast with appearances and objects of sensation that pass away and are altered as they pass. The standard to which these are referred in the mind is a "form" or spe• cies, simple and uniform, always the same for each thing, and springing originally from the supreme mind, the Creator of all things, who has made each and every thing accord ing to the idea or fond of it pre-existing in his mind. Aristotle also used the,word form. as expressing the essence of a thing. Lord Bacon said: " When we speak of forms, we understand the laws and modes of action which regulate and constitute any simple nature, such as heat, light, weight, in all kinds of matter susceptible of them; so that the form of heat and the law of ,heat, or the form of light and the law of light, are the same thing." " The form of a thing is the very thing itself; and the thing no otherwise differs from the form than as the apparent differs from the existent, the out ward from the inward, or that which ,is considered in relation to man from that which is considered in relation to the universe."• Sir William Hamilton called the theory of
substantial forms theory of qualities viewed as entities conjoined with matter, and not as mere dispositions or modifications of it." Dr. MeCosh says that " the distinction between matter and form was first drawn by Aristotle, who represented every thing as havingin itself both matter and form; but that a new meaning was attached to it by Kant, who supposed that the mind supplies from its own furniture a form for the mat ter presented to it from without. But this doctrine, if carried out, would sap the foun dations of all knowledge; for if the mind may contribute from its own stores one ele ment, why not another? Why not all elements? In fact, Kant did by this distinction open the way to all those later speculations which represent the whole universe as being an ideal construction. The truth is, that the mind does not of itself impdse the form on the object, but is simply so constituted as to know what is in the object."