INSTINCT. It has been common to describe the actions of the lower animals as guided by principles different from what obtains in the human constitution. The power of self-preservation is considered as reason in man, and as instinct in the brutes; but this contrast does not contain a real opposition. There is much that is common in the impulses of men and animals. When an animal, having found a morsel agreeable to its taste, masticates and swallows it, and takes up another of the same, the mental operation is not essentially different from what a human being would go through in the like circumstances. In both instances we have an example of the exercise of will, or volition, which operates to promote the pleasures and ward off the pains of the sentient being.
The most important meaning connected with the term instinct is what contrasts with experience, education and acquired knowledge. The original or innate tendencies and powers of the mind are to be distinguished from the powers that grow up in the course of the animal's experience of the world, and its companionship with other living creatures. There has been a disposition to underrate the acquired aptitudes of the inferior animals, and to refer their capability of af-preservation purely to their natural or primitive endowMents. But in point of fact men and animals alike possess both instincts and acquisitions; for although in man the preponderance is greatly in favor of the acquired, he, too, must start from the basis of the other.
In the first place, there are certain actions of importanceto the safety and Welhbeing of the individual that are termed reflex, or automatic. They seem to be almost out of the sphere of mind proper, as they are performed even unconsciously. Among these are the propulsion of the food along the alimentary canal, sneezing, respiration, etc. In all these we have important activities, which are inherent in the constitution, and are performed as effectually at the beginning of life as at the full maturity of the being.
In the second place, there is a certain original provision for rhythmical and combined movements among the active organs, more especially those concerned in locomotion. Thus, there is a natural tendency to alternate the limbs, although the human infant cannot turn this to account at once for the ends of walking, as some of the quadrupeds can. From this alternation the two eyes and the two sides of the face are specially
exempted, and brought under another arrangement equally primitive—namely, con currence. But all these cases alike illustrate the presence of an original mechanism of the frame, by which the movements are grouped up to a certain point.
In the third place, it may be safely maintained that there is an inborn tendency in all animals to act somehow, or to put forth the energies that they possess, without wait ing for the stimulus of their sensations. This spontaneous activity is shown more or less in every creature after rest and nutrition (see SPONTANEITY). Destitute of any special direction at the outset, it yet prompts to a great many experiments or trials upon things, in the course of which the animal discriminates the suitable from the unsuitable by means of its sensations, and thereby learns to follow up the one and eschew the other.
Fourthly, in connection with our emotions there are certain primitive links of mental state with bodily manifestation, which constitute a natural language of the feel Ings understood by the whole human race. The meaning of the smile, the frown, the sob, the contortion of pain, is uniform, and therefore instinctive. See EMOTION.
Fifthly, the power of will or volition, although it can be shown to be a growth, must have some primitive and instinctive elements in the constitution to start from. See WILL.
Sixthly, there must be certain primordial powers of the hmnan intellect. What these are has been much disputed. Every one must concede the existence of some iiiellectual forces or faculties, as, for example, discrimination, the basis of all knowl edge; retentiveness, the faculty of acquiring everything that is acquired ; and agree ment, or similarity (see INTELLECT); but it is contended by one school that we possess not merely powers of receiving knowledge by our contact with the world, and our con sciousness of our minds, but actual notions or ideas that cannot be traced to our experience of the material or mental phenomena that we encounter. This is the doctrine of innate ideas, intuitive conceptions, .1priori, cognitions and judgments, first truths, etc. See COMMON SENSE.