The German advance henceforth looked as though it was about to carry every thing before it. The attack had a Na poleonic unerringness and completion of plan, and only because the object aimed at required an almost superhuman strength to achieve had it fallen short of perfect success. It was preceded by an intense but not lengthy artillery fire made up chiefly of gas shells and high explosives. Simultaneously heavy bom bardments were directed on the front in the Champagne and other sectors with the evident intention of preventing re enforcements from being brought up. A touch of the marvelous was lent to it by the periodic bombardment of Paris from a gun emplaced in the forest of St. Gobain, a distance of something like seventy-five miles. The dropping of the mysterious shells in the streets of Paris long remained inexplainable and many were the sources to which they were first attributed. Meanwhile the battle line of the Germans from La Fere to the S. E. of Arras displayed enormous activity in the pushing of the offensive. The first attack broke the British lines of a six teen-mile front from near Gouzeaucourt to Lagnicourt. It drove the British from positions held by them from the battle of Cambrai toward the close of 1917. On the day following the first attack, namely March 22, the Germans first bombarded the British along the whole front and following the artillery fire up with an infantry attack smashed through the entire British position along the extent of the whole front. The Brit ish Fifth Army was thus completely iso lated from French support at La Fere, and the permanent British position at Arras and with unrelenting energy the Germans started to roll it up. The task was not a difficult one, for organization had deserted the British who henceforth formed but a fleeing and struggling mass of humanity. Meanwhile the German armies drove along the road to Peronne and Albert, and along the route from St. Quentin to Amiens, and through the Oise valley by paths which led to Paris and the S. of Amiens. The advance con tinued at what appeared an uninterrupt ed progression for four days and it look ed as though the Germans were destined to reach the sea and drive a permanent wedge between the French and the Brit ish. The defeats inflicted on the British on the 21st and 22d were repeated on the 23d at Money, St. Quentin, La Fere, and Cambrai. Meanwhile demoralization attacked other portions of the British front and the British second positions between Fontaine - les - Croiselles and Mceuvres were broken beneath the Ger man strokes. It was hoped to stern the German onrush on the banks of the Somme, but here as elsewhere the de fense put up fell before the German at tack. On the fourth day of their ad vance the Germans took Peronne, Chauny, and Ham and threw their forces over the Somme by hastily constructed pontoon bridges, which the demoralized British artillery fire was unable to de stroy. Maintaining their advance, the Germans on the 25th took Bapaume, Nesle, Estalon, Barleaux, Biaches and Guisrard. By this time the British armies opposing the Germans had suf fered a succession of defeats that put them almost wholly hors de combat and if Amiens had to be saved it was seen that the task would have to be undertaken by the French themselves. Accordingly on the 25th the French War Office an nounced that the British lines S. of St. Quentin and around Noyon had been taken over by the French. From that time onward there was a slowing up in the German advance. On the 26th the Germans had reached the battle line of 1916 at several points and succeeded in taking Roye, Noyon, and Lihon. But here the complexion of things began to change. Moving with a swiftness such as the desperate posture of affairs war ranted, the French came up along the southern front as far as the Ayre and succeeded in forming a junction with the ragged end of the British front at Mo reuil. French support succeeded in stiff ening the back of the British to some extent, and the line was further strength ened by recruits from the forces em ployed in various occupations behind the line. On the other hand the tremendous exertion of the Germans had reached the limit almost of human endurance and the carrying forward of the whole front with the enormous mas of material needed if the new front was to be made permanent was a second undertaking of great arduousness. The German troops that reached the line of Albert and Moreuil were as a consequence in the last stages of exhaustion and the slowing up process was as a result an almost natural operation. On the 27th the new army of British and French forces recognized the indications of spent forces, and with a new accession of cour age attacked the Germans and recap tured Morlancourt and Chipilly and ad vanced as far as Proyart. On that same day, however, the Germans captured Albert and crossed the Avell, compelling the French to fall back E. of Montdidier. On the 28th there was a similar dis tribution of loss and gain. Montdidier fell into German hands, but to offset this they were repulsed at Arras. It was now possible to estimate the progress made by the Germans and the extent of their gains. They had driven a thirty-five mile salient in the direction of Amiens, broad at the base but dangerously narrow at the neck. While the Allies had been
driven back to points near the coast the accidental positions in which they found themselves were on elevated ground from which they could overlook the Ger man lines and bombard them with ac curacy. The task before the Germans was to broaden the salient by a renewed advance, and this they attempted to do. The initial success, however, could not be repeated. Their positions were not so favorable, nor could a similar process of preparation be gone through. The at tacks and counter-attacks went on through April, but the Germans did not succeed in pushing their positions nearer the coast. Nevertheless, the battle of Picardy, while not achieving the evident purpose of driving a wedge as far as the coast, was a huge German success. The Germans took over 90,000 prisoners, 1, 300 guns, and 100 tanks. They retook all the ground they held previous to the first battle of the Somme and in addi tion something like 1,500 square miles. And from the point of view of the Allies the blow fell just short of disaster.
The battle of Picardy and the second battle of the Somme showed that there was something radically wrong in the organization of the Allied armies. The confidence that had hitherto inspired them was badly shaken, and all recog nized that they had been saved by a very narrow margin from events that might have changed the whole face of the war. In the face of the general demoralization and almost total eclipse into which they had fallen they were prepared to adopt measures which had formerly appeared distasteful, but which were now seen to be necessary. The most important step to be taken was to ap point a single commander-in-chief for all the Allied armies. The British General Staff was opposed to the move, but the British public appeared to be in favor of it. President Wilson had also argued for a unified command, and General Per shing had shown readiness to put the American forces in France at the dis posal of the Allies. In the end General Foch was named commander-in-chief of all the Allied forces in the field. Sub sequent events showed the move to be a wise one.
Meanwhile the Germans were seeking to follow up their success before Amiens with another advance which would re lieve the pressure on their attenuated forces in that region and help them fur ther in their effort to reach the coast. As a result of these calculations they suddenly began to attack between the elevated ground N. of Ypres and Arras. The intention in this case was to drive a wedge between the British forces at Ypres and the British forces at Arras, repeating the operation that had been attended with so much success farther S. Had there been an equally successful advance in this break through, it was clear that Calais and the other channel ports would have fallen, with incalcu lable results to the British. On April 9th the Germans captured Richebourg, St. Vaast and Laventie, creating a gap of about three miles in the British lines through which they drove in large num bers. On the following day they crossed the river Lys and attacked the base of Messines Ridge, capturing the village and forest of Ploegsteert, as well as Armentieres. Attacking from La Bassee to the Ypres-Comines canal they took Estaires and Steeuwerck. On the 12th they were within five miles of Haze brouck and it looked again as if the British line was to be smashed to pieces. It was on this occasion that General Haig issued the appeal to his troops: "With our backs to the wall and believ ing in the justice of our cause, each of us must fight to the end." General Haig's statement appeared on the 12th, but the German attack went forward and on the 17th they captured Poelcap pelle, Langemarck, and Passchendaele, long held by the British. The reorgan ized British made an attempt to retake Messines Ridge on the 17th, but the only result was that they were driven back in hopeless confusion, so that their posi tions on the 18th were almost cotermi nous with those held by them before the battle of Ypres in 1914. The blow to British self-confidence and pride was felt keenly, for the terrible succession of failures and flights appeared to show that the Germans could strike at will on any part of the British front in the certainty of victory. On the 19th, how ever, French reserves were brought up and their support put new courage and strength into the British lines.
The German blows were far from spent, however, and on the 27th, Mount Kemrnel, the remaining key to the Ypres salient, fell to them after bloody fight ing in which the British, supported by the French, were driven beyond the vil lages of Kemmel and Dranoutre. French gallantry showed up conspicuously in this battle, in which hundreds of poilus refused to budge and preferred death at their posts to retreat. The fighting in the region continued to the middle of May, in its last phases resulting in gain and loss of territory to both sides. The second great German thrust resulted in the occupation of about 800 square miles of territory held by the British and some Portuguese. However, the coast was not reached and from that point of view the Allies might be considered as, being saved from complete disaster.