Military Operations.—The beginning of 1918 opened with numerous opti mistic predictions from Germany, heart ened by the collapse of Russia, to the effect that the spring would witness on the western front a series of blows that would scatter the armies of France and Britain before the full strength of the United States could be summoned to their aid. There was no question what ever that the defection of Russia had relieved a tremendous burden from the Central Powers and had made the task of the Allies immeasurably more diffi cult. It was realized that vast quan tities of material due for expenditure on the eastern front, could now be trans ferred to the western front, and the railways of Germany henceforth groaned under the weight of men and ma terial being transferred from one end of the country to the other. Meanwhile victories were not all on the side of the Central Powers and their allies. British forces in the Near East had re covered some of their prestige, but re turning to the Turkish front with new men and new material, were making some notable advances. The United States also had succeeded in rushing help to France with greater speed than was anticipated.
Careful preparation had been made by the government of the Central Pow ers for the blow that was to be delivered on the western front. Among men and materials careful selection was made of what Russia had left at their disposal, and men in the prime of physical life, none of them over 35, were chosen to form the core of the regiments that were to take part in the culminating advance. The older men and the very young were left to hold the occupied parts of Russia under the Brest-Litovsk treaty, but it was calculated that out of the eastern material it would be possible to build up almost 60 divisions number ing 12,000 men each, thus adding to the strength of the western front to the extent of about 700,000 men. Already in the several months of the new year it was estimated that the German front in the west was being held by 2,100,000 men and that the increase that had yet to come would swell the figure to a total of 2,340,000, which would approximate the figures on the Franca-British side. It was, however, realized that with the coming of the Americans the forces of the Allies would augment continually so that at the end of a few months the numerical superiority would be very considerable. On the other hand the German military leaders considered that numerical superiority, when not too great, would be discounted by the su perior German system of railways and the advantages that followed from the fact that the Germans were fighting on interior lines and that the Allies were fighting on exterior lines.
During the winter months fighting on any large scale was impossible on the western front and the early period of the year saw little more than a succes sion of trench attacks and raids for pur poses of reconnoitering. These recipro cal raids went on along the entire front, sometimes preceded by bombardment, but more often made as surprise attacks in the course of the night or early morning. The Germans usually showed the initiative and it was evidently the intention to try the weak points of the Allied line in preparation for the great spring drive that was to follow. On the other hand the Allied forces were not active. They knew that strong con centrations were being made behind the German front, and their raids and at tacks were in the main directed to the purpose of discovering the points at which the concentrations were being made. Aviators were active on both sides supplementing the reconnoitering activities of the forces on the ground.
Early in the year also trained Amer ican troops were in condition that per mitted them to take over a section of the front. They had received their fin ishing drill in camps near Nancy and Toul, and it was decided that when the time came they could do their best work at the St. Mihiel salient, which had re mained substantially unchanged since the Germans took up their position in the vicinity in 1914. The line taken up by the United States forces ran along Apremont and Flirey and Remeneauville. Their baptism of fire came very readily as soon as one or two raids had shown the Germans whom they had opposite them.
On March 21 the Germans let loose the powerful blow on the western front to which such deliberate preparation had been given. Its success shows that it was inspired by principles of sound strategy, which aims at the weakest point in the opposing forces. The blow fell in the main on the British and par ticularly at the point where the French and British forces were in contact and the aim was to strike suddenly with ir resistible power, break through, isolate the British from the French, roll the former armies up against the Channel ports and, if possible, give them the al ternative of surrender or of being driven into the sea. It was then intended to turn southward and attack the French and so make a second onslaught on Paris. The blow almost succeeded. Had it been possible for the Germans to put their complete plan into operation they might have succeeded in offsetting even the great superiority in numbers with which the United States was already ginning to endow the Allies. But for complete success even in its preliminary stage a passage so pronounced had to be cut that German forces might be able to reach Amiens and the coast. This is where the German blow fell short. A broad gap was hewn through the British forces at the point of junction with the French forces and day succeeded day while the news went round the world that British regiments were being hilated and the Germans were marching to the sea almost without further position. The line selected for attack was between Marcoing, near Cambrai, and the Oise river, and was defended by the British Fifth Army, under General Gough, having been a portion of the line formerly held by the French. It was powerfully fortified and might have been held under ordinary circumstances by forces inferior to those attacking. Its defensive positions consisted of an post line, a resistance line, and behind these the battle line proper where the most powerful resistance could be put up. The arrangement of the outposts made it possible to pour a strong ing fire on the Germans as soon as they had passed the outpost line. The advance began a short time before five o'clock in the morning when the fog hung over the battlefield. The British had had forewarning of the advance and had made preparations to meet it, but the impetuosity of the attack upset the plans of defense. The outpost line was in German hands almost before the ish knew that the attack had been launched. The resistance line went most as easily as the first line of fense, and the only real fight occurred at the third or battle system of defense. The British divisions manning the tem were ultimately scattered by the rushing Germans who drove forward through the tremendous gap cut into the British Fifth Army, and with a gigantic plunge directed their advance along the road to Amiens.