Before Russia had embarked on this drive to recover her lost territory, her armies elsewhere had shown considerable vitality. In Turkish Caucasia, where the Grand Duke Nicholas had been trans ferred as commander-in-chief, a success ful advance had been proceeding. The campaign in this region was related to that of the British in Mesopotamia, where the Turks had the advantage, and Russian activities were needed to relieve the pressure on the British at Kut-el Amara. The Grand Duke's offensive in diversion of troops and guns to the E. saved the situation; it brought about a stiffening of the Austro-German resist ance during the summer against the continued Russian drives on Kovel, Lem berg and Stanislau. The Russians met a number of reverses and were held up at the Carpathians. With the coming of the fall and winter, the fighting waned, Caucasia was undertaken with this aim and also with the object of reaching Constantinople on the W. He first set out to capture Erzerum, the Turkish fortress fifty miles W. on the Russian Caucasian frontier. His armies moved in that direction from three points in February, 1916, the design being to at tack Erzerum from three sides. The for tress had eighteen separate positions, which encircled the city in two rings and protected the inside defenses. The Turks had four army corps and Kurd, Persian and Arab auxiliaries to defend the place. It was on high ground (6,000 feet above sea-level), to which the Rus sians had to mount. The effect of the Russian movement was astonishing. After the first frontal attack by Siberian troops, lasting five days, nine of the out lying forts were carried, and the entire fortifications were evacuated without the need of the flanking operations planned. The Turkish command feared the bot tling up of some 200,000 of its first-line troops and decided to retreat before the Russian ring was formed. The retreat was a rout through broken country and was menaced by superior forces on both flanks, but the Turks made good their escape. With Erzerum as a center the Russian advance spread rapidly in all directions; on the west toward Erzigan and Sivas; to the S. toward Bagdad, Mush, Bitlis and the region of Lake Van; in the N. with the Black Sea port of Trebizond as an objective—a front in all of about 300 miles without a single railroad and with few highways that de served the name. In the advance on Trebizond the Russians were helped by their Black Sea fleet. Thy moved so rapidly on that port that the inhabitants fled well in advance, being specially terrorized by the presence of the Rus sian warships. By the middle of March the Russians were within twenty miles of Trebizond. The Turks in an effort to defend it, started strong counterattacks, but were repulsed with heavy losses. The Russian advance could not be halted and Trebizond's fate was sealed long be fore the Turks evacuated it. The Russians entered on April 18, 1916. In the W. the Russian center moved on Erzingan, one of the Turks' army head quarters, in the face of strengthened op position. The enemy had retreated from Trebizond in this direction, making for Baiburt along the Trebizond-Erzingan road. The Russians tried to cut off the fleeing Trebizond garrison, but did not succeed. In May Turkish resistance to their advance increased and there was constant hard fighting which, while un favorable to the enemy, retarded the Russian movements. At the close of that month the Turks assumed the offensive and forced the Russians back twenty-five miles. The latter did not resume their forward movements until the middle of July, by which time the Turkish opposi tion had weakened. Baiburt fell on July 15, and from then on the Russians steadily moved toward Erzingan, which they occupied ten days later. Its cap ture, added to that stretch of territory gained to the N. by the fall of Trebi zond and other points along the Black Sea, virtually put Turkish Armenia in Russian possession. In the S. the Rus sian advance, directed toward Bagdad and to the rear of the Turkish forces besieging the British at Kut, moved in two directions—one from Mush and Bit lis, and the other through Persia. Mush was occupied on February 19, Bitlis fell a fortnight later. The next point aimed at was Diarbekr, an important town on the Tigris at the crossroads of the country's communications. The critical British situation in Mesopotamia caused these Russian movements to be pushed with increased vigor in the hope of drawing off the Turkish strength from Kut. One column, striking from the N. E. through Persia, captured Kerman shah—less than 200 miles from Bagdad— on February 27. A further advance was made to the S. W., but the Russians could not sustain their advantage. With July came a revival of Turkish attacks, which forced the Russians to retreat from Kermanshah. Thereafter the Rus sians achieved no definite progress. They were unable to be of any service to the beleaguered British to the S. Trebizond and Erzingan marked the crest of their successes. The Turks became particu larly active against them in the Persian area, forcing them from a number of positions. Mush, Bitlis and Kermanshah were occupied by both sides alternately; once the Turks swept the Russians out of the Lake Van district; later the latter recovered their foothold there. Appar ently the campaign lost itself in loose ends and became ineffective, though fighting continued throughout the rest of the year.
Earlier in the year the British in Meso potamia under General Townshend had remained besieged by the Turks. A re lief force fought its way from the Per sian Gulf toward Kut, and came within seven miles of the place on March 8, 1916, this date marking the ninety-first day of the siege. The relieving column
faced the second Turkish line at Es-Sinn, which was attacked in a vain attempt to raise the siege. Floods increased the difficulties of rescue, and hopes of saving General Townshend and his 10,000 troops dwindled as the spring advanced. The Kut garrison was slowly but surely being starved out, thanks in part to the Tigris floods, which impeded rescue. The Turkish ring remained unbroken; no food could get through. The expected therefore happened on April 29, when General Townshend (who had wireless communication with the relief force) sent a message that he could hold out no longer without food, and that he had destroyed his guns and ammunition. A second message intimated that he had hoisted the white flag. On the 143d day of the siege 2970 British troops of all ranks and services and some 6,000 Hin dus and their followers surrendered to the Turks. After a lull the British force below Kut resumed their attacks on the Turkish positions without affecting the general situation, and the hot summer brought operations to a standstill. Mean time Great Britain organized another army to repair the defeats of the Nixon and Townshend expeditions, following her old precept that she lost battles but not wars. A new expedition toward out weak spots—without either side ap parently having any definite plan of operations, and without achieving any important result. Austria meantime be gan increasing her forces until in the middle of May she had sixteen divisions, or more than 300,000 men on the line between the Adige and the Brenta, as well as 2,000 guns of heavy caliber. On May 15 they attacked the Italians be tween the Adige and the Astico. The ensuing fighting was among mountains generally, the Trentino battle line (24 miles long) running for the most part along peaks and defiles, as the front did elsewhere from the Swiss border to the Adriatic. The Austrians had the higher mountains behind them. Hence the Italians had to make their advance Bagdad was undertaken in December, 1916, and was marked by consistent suc cesses as it advanced toward its ob jective.
The Austrian offensive against Italy in the Trentino before mentioned was designed to break through the Italian lines between the Adige and the Brenta, by way of reaching the Venetian plain and capturing Verona and Vicenza. The effect of such an achievement would be to compel the retreat of the Italian forces to the eastward along the Isonzo, and even result in their capture. At the least Austria by such a movement could carry her front well within the Italian boundary to the Po and the Adige. Dur ing the spring of 1916 there had been many engagements in the Trentino mainly reconnoitering movements to find or defense and build their trenches aud place their guns to resist an enemy gen erally situated high above them. They were going up; the Austrians were com ing down. That was the salient feature of the Austro-Italian campaign. The Italians had to climb, and the Austrians to descend from elevated points from which they could overlook the Italian lines. Laboring under this disadvantage the Italian Alpini regiments gave way before the strength of the initial at tack. The Austrians occupied a number of Italian positions and opened a breach in the narrow zone between the Adige and the Val Sugano. The next day the Austrians renewed the fight with five assaults and gained more positions. The Italian border was crossed in the Lago di Garda region, where the Italians were driven back four miles from positions they held on Austrian soil. Their line broke at other important points and the Austrian advance steadily progressed. The Italians' retreat was orderly but hurried. By the second week of the fighting they had lost over 30,000 as prisoners, 300 cannon and many machine i guns, while their total losses including casualties were put at 80,000. The gen eral direction of the Austrian advance, which had spread to a front of 31 miles, was now toward the Italian line running through Asiago, Arsiero and Schio, rep resenting the third and last fortified defenses, the strategic design of which was to prevent an invasion of the Vene tian plain. Finally the Austrians ap proached the latter about Vicenza, and Italian apprehension was great. By June 1 Italy faced a critical situation; then the tables were suddenly turned. The Austrian offensive lost its force. The Italians showed more resistance, and themselves began to attack the invaders. The great Russian drive on the south eastern front had reacted on Austria's Trentino campaign and changed the whole outlook for Italy. Austria was forced to abandon her movement on Venetia and to shift her reserves east ward to stem the Russian tide. The Trentino thrust was succeeding when it had to be given up, and all Austria's efforts, like Germany's before Verdun, were in vain. On June 9 Italy began her counterattacks in force to drive back the Austrians from the positions they had gained. The latter were now on the defensive and continually yielded ground, being as little able to withstand attacks as the Italians when the position of both foes were reversed. The fighting there after was generally marked by a series of successes by the Italians. The Aus trians not only failed to resist them, but could not sustain what counterattacks they made. They retreated and step by step the Italians fought their way back in the territory from which they had been ousted.