TACTICS, MILITARY, the science which enables one of two opposing bodies of troops to be stronger than the other at every crisis of an engagement. STRATEGY (q. v.), which has precisely the same objects, merges into tactics as the enemy comes within striking distance, and the latter science is therefore some times defined as the strategy of the bat tlefield. Modern writers use different terms for the various branches of tacti cal science; grand tactics and manoeuvre tactics, for the marshaling of large masses (30,000 and upward) of men on the battlefield; minor tactics, for the con duct of small bodies, such as advanced and rear guards, outposts, patrols, etc.; fighting tactics, for the combat whatever the numbers of the force; fire tactics, for the best use of guns and rifles, the mass ing of their fire, and the selection of the target; and the special tactics of cav alry, artillery, or infantry, combined tac tics, siege tactics, and mining tactics.
In Judges xx. we read of a favorite and dangerous manoeuvre, the Israelites feigning to retreat before the Benja mites, so as to draw them on till their flanks and rear were exposed to the "liers in wait." Hannibal at Canna? and William the Conqueror at Hastings were among the many successful imitators of these tactics. Others, like the Duke of Burgundy in 1476 at Granson, lost their armies through attempting it with un steady troops. Frederick the Great owed his victory at Mollwitz to the rapid fire and steady discipline of his men, and the former was chiefly due to the introduc tion of iron ramrods. His later battles give us good examples of manoeuvre tac tics. At Leuthen he engaged the Aus trians, immovable in their chosen posi tion, with his advanced guard, while his main body under cover of some hills and foggy weather marched in open column of companies round their flank, wheeled into line and rolled up their army. At Waterloo Napoleon showed an example of combined tactics on a large scale. By cavalry charges he obliged the British infantry to form squares, which then became targets for his massed artillery. When under stress of this "hard pound ing" they opened out into line, a re newed charge of cavalry obliged them to take the denser formation again. At Gravelotte the German armies (some 240,000 men) showed an unparalleled in stance of grand tactics by marching to their positions across country in seven large masses, each consisting of ono com plete army corps. Fighting tactics must depend chiefly on the arms in use. The mail-clad horsemen of the 15th century never succeeded in defeating the solid phalanx of pikemen opposed to them by the Swiss Confederation till the employ ment of artillery prevented the latter retaining such a massive formation. The English archer, protected in front by palisades and on the flanks by spear men, destroyed the chivalry of France at Cressy and Poitiers, but at Bannockburn was ridden down by the Scotch cavalry, because the flanking spearmen had been omitted. Gustavus Adolphus, by employ
ing cartridges, enabled his infantry to fire more quickly than his opponent and so to form on a wider front. The inven tion of the bayonet, doing away with the necessity for pikemen to protect the mus keteers, still further increased the fire power of infantry. The British two-deep line overthrew, by its enveloping fire and charge, the column formation of the French in the Peninsula and of the Rus sians at the Alma, though in this battle its defects are shown in the confusion caused by moving to the attack over broken ground. In the battles of the Franco-German War of 1870-1871 it was found impossible to advance against the fire of modern breech-loading rifles ex cept by rushes of comparatively thin lines of skirmishers, constantly re-en forced by supports and reserves in rear. The magazine rifle and smokeless pow der of to-day still further complicate the problem, presented to the assailant, of how to get to within 500 yards of the enemy without being destroyed.
In warfare against savages large num bers, fanatical courage, and rapid move ments have to be met by special tactics. Thus the crescent-shaped enveloping at tack of the Zulus and the rapid attacks of the Sudanese Arabs were received by the British in the impenetrable-square formation or by forming "laagers"; op posing a material obstacle to the on slaught of an enemy unprovided with artillery. Thus, too, the Indians of the Western plains were met by a style of fighting resembling their own, and which the American troops also found service able in encounters with the Filipinos.
Cavalry tactics, apart from the excep tional use of dismounted men, are much the same as in the time of the Byzan tine empire. Cavalry fight by shock action only, and the power of man and horse has not altered. Artillery tactics consist in massing the fire of every gun as soon as possible on important points, and overwhelming the enemy's guns and infantry with projectiles at ranges of 2 miles or more, not shunning closer quar ters if the necessity arises.
Siege tactics belong to fortification, but follow the same general course as other combined tactics. Thus in defense the guns oblige early deployment and co-operate with the infantry in repelling the advance, while in the attack they destroy the material defenses and keep down the fire of the place so as to en able the assault to be delivered. During the siege mining tactics will be made use of on both sides. The functions of the cavalry are first to try to drive off the enemy's cavalry and effect reconnois sances on both sides; then on the at tacker's side to complete the investment, and afterward secure the besieging troops against surprise. For instruction of tactics in the World War, see WAR, and related articles.