TACTICS, NAVAL, the art of ma noeuvring ships and fleets for the pur pose of battle. Naval strategy, on the other hand, is the science of combining and employing fleets or single ships in order to carry out defined operations at sea or against an enemy's coast, for ob taining command of the sea or certain portions of it. Though fleets had existed and battles at sea been fought from the earliest periods, it was not till toward the close of the 16th century, in the reign of Queen Elizabeth, that naval war began to assume definite form. War at sea at this time does not appear to have been carried on by any definite plan, and consisted principally, if we except the attempt of the Great Armada, of raids on the enemy's commerce and coast towns. Perhaps the first organized at tempt to obtain command of the sea as a distinct aim of the operations carried on are to be found in the three wars between the Dutch and English of 1652, 1665, and 1672. Both parties made desperate attempts to destroy the trade of the other, but in the second war Holland, considering the command of the sea the more important object, temporarily gave up her commerce, Dutch merchant ships being forbidden to put to sea. The net result of the three wars was to leave the honors pretty evenly divided between the two combatants. Several efforts were made by the French, between 1690 and their crushing defeat at Trafalgar, to ob tain the command of the sea in order to effect the invasion of England. The first of these attempts, affording one of the best examples of the value of a thorough grasp of strategical principles, was foiled by the Earl of Torrington. An expe rienced seaman and profound strategist, the earl was forced against his better judgment, by direct orders from the queen and council, to attack the vastly superior forces under Tourville, and ac cordingly he gave battle (June 30, 1690) off Beachy Head. He was defeated, but skillfully drew off and fell back under the shelter of the Gunfleet Shoals at the mouth of the Thames. Here, though "beaten, inferior, and shut up behind sandbanks," yet from the strategic posi tion it now held this fleet still remained such a "power in observation" as to paralyze the action of the victorious and superior force; and the French admiral, after some ineffective attempts at land ing, returned to Brest. During the Napoleonic wars, the English fleets hav ing more or less complete command of the sea, the strategy of the commanders seems to have resolved itself into blockade of the enemy where possible, or a close observation of his movements with a view to prevent any junction of his scattered forces; and if he ventured to put to sea, into efforts to bring him to action as soon as possible.
The line of battle consisted in a fleet of ships being extended in a straight line either ahead or abreast one ship of another, keeping as close together as weather permitted, so that at all times every ship should be ready to sustain and relieve one another. It was directed that
each ship in the line should keep within half a cable's length (about 50 fathoms) of one another. It was introduced into the English navy by Sir William Penn. At the battle of the Nile (1798) Nelson doubled on the van of the French line and attacked it on both sides, while the other ships of the line, the whole fleet being at anchor, could afford no assis tance; but at Trafalgar, where his bril liant career terminated with a decisive victory, he broke the enemy's line in two places, bearing down on it in two columns.
Steam may be said to have revolution ized naval strategy and tactics; whereas the best-laid schemes were often frus trated by foul winds and gales, now the great steam power of battleships and cruisers renders them independent of wind and to a great extent of bad weather. As a set-off, however, to this, the coal endurance of ships and the re plenishing of their supplies of fuel be come important factors in deciding on their movements. The value of a block ade was demonstrated in the World War (1914-1918). The British were unable to effect a complete blockade of Ger many, but it was effective to the extent of so reducing the amount of supplies entering the Empire that the German masses suffered great hardships, and thus were sown the seeds of the subse quent revolution.
The first real test of the ironclad as developed by modern naval science was given during the war between Japan and China, in 1894. Each of the contending nations had navies, which, while small, included a couple of the best battleships and cruisers of the world. The only fault with such a test is that the Japanese were so superior to the Chinese in the skill with which they manoeuvred their ships that the battle cannot be taken as a wholly fair test. One thing sufficiently established was the effectiveness of the modern vessel of war and its death dealing power. The battle lasted six hours. The Japanese lost no ships, while they destroyed seven of the Chinese fleet of 10 and put others to flight. The Japan ese loss was 200 men and that of the Chinese six times as great. See CHINA: JAPAN.
The Japanese-Chinese War, however, did not settle many of the great problems of marine warfare, and really proved nothing but the superior skill and prow ess of the Mikado's subjects. Since then have been fought the most remarkable naval battles in history. See MANILA BAY: SANTIAGO DE CUBA: JUTLAND BANK, BATTLE OF: FALKLAND ISLANDS, BATTLE OF: SUBMARINES: NAVY: NAVY, UNITED STATES.