APPEAL. The right of appeal to superior tribunals has generally been considered an essential concomitant of inferior judicatories. When, from the paucity of the population or any other cause, the subjects of litigation are few, justice is usually administered by the first authority in the state, from whose award no appeal can lie. But when the multiplication of causes precludes the continu ance of this practice, and one or more inferior courts take cognizance of the less important matters, the right of appeal to the superior tribunal is allowed, with increasing restrictions as, in the course of time, subjects of litigation multiply, and as the people become weaned from the notion that the administration of justice is the proper function of the chief civil magistrate.
In the patriarchal times, as among the Bedouins, the patriarch or head of the tribe, that is to say, the Sheikh, administered justice ; and as there was no superior power, there could be no appeal from his decisions. The only case of procedure against a criminal which occurs during the patriarchal period is that in which Judah commanded the sup posed adulterous Tamar to be brought forth and burnt (Gen. xxxviii. 24). But here the woman was his daughter-in-law, and the power which Judah exercised was that which a man possessed over the females of his own immediate family. If the case had been between man and man, Judah could have given no decision, and the matter would, without doubt, have been referred to Jacob.
In the desert Moses at first judged all causes himself; and when, finding his time and strength unequal to this duty, he, at the suggestion of Jethro, established a series of judicatories in a numerically ascending scale (Exod. xviii. 13-26), he arranged that cases of difficulty should be referred from the inferior to the superior tribunals, and in the last instance to himself. Although not distinctly stated, it appears from various circum stances that the clients had a right of appeal, similar to that which the courts had of reference. When the prospective distribution into towns, of the population which had hitherto remained in one compact body, made other arrangements necessary, it was directed that there should be a similar reference of difficult cases to the metropolitan court or chief magistrate (` the judge that shall be in those days') for the time being (Deut. xvi. 18; xvii. 8-12). That there was a concurrent right of appeal, appears from the use Absalom made of the delay of justice, which arose from the great num ber of cases that came before the king his father (2 Sam. xv. 2-4). These were doubtless appeal cases, according to the above direction ; and M. Salvador (Institutions de Moire, ii. 53) is scarcely warranted in deducing from this instance that the clients had the power of bringing their cases directly to the supreme tribunal.
Of the later practice, before and after the time of Christ, we have some clearer knowledge from Josephus and the Talmudists. it seems that a man
could carry his case by appeal through all the inferior courts to the Grand Sanhedrim at Jerusalem, whose decision was in the highest degree absolute and final. The Jews themselves trace the origin of these later usages up to the time of Moses: they were at all events based on early principles, and therefore reflect back some light upon the intima tions respecting the right of appeal which we find in the sacred books (illishna, de Synedr. ch. x. ; Tabn. Hieros. ch. xviii. ; Talm. Bab. ch. iii. and x. ; Maimon. de Synedr. ch. x. ; Selden, de Synedr. b. iii. ch. so; Lewis, Origines Hebrav, b. i. c. 6; Pastoret, Le'gzIrlation des Hebreux, ch. x. ; Salva dor, Hist. des Institutions de Mare, liv. iv. ch. 2).
The most remarkable case of appeal in the New Testament belongs to another class. It is the cele brated appeal of St. Paul from the tribunal of the Roman procurator Festus to that of the emperor ; in consequence of which he was sent as a prisoner to Rome (Acts xxv. 10, I I). Such an appeal having been once lodged, the governor had nothing more to do with the case : he could not even dismiss it, although he might be satisfied that the matter was frivolous, and not worth forwarding to Rome. Accordingly, when Paul was again heard by Festus and king Agrippa (merely to obtain materials for a report to the emperor), it was admitted that the apostle might have been liberated if he had not appealed to Cwsar (Acts xxvi. 32). Paul might therefore seem to have taken a false step in the matter, did we not consider the impor tant consequences which resulted from his visit to Rome.
It may easily be seen that a right of appeal which, like this, involved a long and expensive journey, was by no means frequently resorted to. In lodging his appeal Paul exercised one of the high privileges of Roman citizenship which be longed to him by birth (Acts xxii. 28). How the rights of Roman citizenship might be acquired by a Jewish native of Cilicia will be explained elsewhere [CurizENsHIP]. The right of appeal connected with that privilege originated in the Valerian, Porcian, and Sempronian laws, by which it was 1 enacted that if any magistrate should order flagella tion or death to be inflicted upon a Roman citizen, the accused person might appeal to the judgment of the people, and that meanwhile he should suffer nothing at the hands of the magistrate until the people had judged his cause. But what was originally the prerogative of the people had in Paul's time become that of the emperor, and appeal therefore was made to him. Hence Pliny (Ep. x. 97) mentions that he had sent to Rome some Christians, who were Roman citizens, and had appealed unto Cxsar. This privilege could not be disallowed by any magistrate to any person whom the law entitled to it. Indeed, very heavy penalties were attached to any refusal to grant it, or to furnish the party with facilities for going to Rome. —I. K.