BALANCE OF POWER. The no tion upon which this phrase is fo'unded appears to be the following :—When a number of separate and sovereign states have grown up beside each other, the entire system which they constitute may be conceived to be evenly balanced, so long as no single state is in a condition to interfere with the independence of any of the rest.
But as in such a system of states there are generally a few which may be con sidered as leading powers, it is by these being made to counterpoise each other that the balance is principally maintained. It is in this way only that the safety of the smaller states can be secured. Thus, in the ancient world, after the destruction of Carthage, there was no power strong enough to cope with Rome ; and the con sequence was, that the countries that yet remained sovereign powers successively fell under her dominion.
The subjugation of nearly the whole of India by Great Britain, and the es tablishment of the late widely-extended empire of France on the continent of Europe, may be quoted as other examples of the effect that results from the de struction of what is termed the balance of power.
On the contrary, so long as the power of one great state (however far surpassing in extent of territory, or other resources of strength and influence, many of those in its neighbourhood) can be kept in check, or, in other words, balanced by that of another, the independence of the smaller states is secured against both. Neither will be disposed to allow its rival to add to its power by the con quest or absorption of any of these minor and otherwise defenceless members of the system. And in this way it happens that each state, whether great or small, has an interest and a motive to exert itself in the preservation of the balance.
This policy is so obvious, that it must have been acted upon in all ages, by every assemblage of states, so connected or situated as to influence one another. There may have been less or more of skill or wisdom in the manner of acting upon it, or the attempt to act upon it may have been more or less successful, in dif ferent cases ; but to suppose that its im portance had been overlooked by any states that ever existed in the circum stances described, would be to suppose such states to have been destitute of the instinct of self-preservation.
Mr. Hume (Essays, part ii. essay ith) has shown conclusively, in opposition to the opinion sometimes expressed, that ancient politicians were well acquainted with the principle of the balance of power, although, as far as appears, they did not designate it by that name. " In
all the politics of Greece," he observes. " the anxiety with regard to the balance of power is apparent, and is expressly pointed out to us even by the ancient historians. Thucydides (lib. i.) repre sents the league which was formed against Athens, and which produced the Peloponnesian war, as entirely owing to this principle ; and after the decline of Athens, when the Theban and Lacedre monians disputed for sovereignty, we find that the Athenians (as well as many other republics) always threw themselves into the lighter scale, and endeavoured to preserve the balance. They supported Thebes against Sparta, till the great vic tory gained by Epaminondas at Leuctra after which they immediately went over to the conquered—from generosity, as jealousy of the conquerors." "Whoever," he adds, "will read Demosthenes' oration for the Megalopolitan, may see the utmost refinements on this principle that ever entered into the head of a Venetian or English speculatist." He afterwards quotes a passage from Polybius (i. c. 83), in which that writer states that Ili ero, king of Syracuse, though the ally of Rome, yet sent assistance to the Car thaginians, during the war of the auxilia ries, " esteeming it requisite, both in order to retain his dominions in Sicily, and to preserve the Roman friendship, that Carthage should be safe; lest by its fall the remaining power should be able. without contest or opposition, to execute every purpose and undertaking. And here he acted with great wisdom and prudence ; for that is never on any ac count to be overlooked ; nor ought such a force ever to be thrown into one land as to incapacitate the neighbouring states from defending their rights against it." " Here," remarks Mr. flume, " is the aim of modern politics pointed out in express terms." It must be confessed, however, that the preservation of the balance of power was never so distinctly recognized and adopted as a principle of geioral policy in ancient as it has been in modern times. The systematic observance of the principle of the balance, subsequently to the subver sion of the Roman empire, may be first traced in the conduct of the several Italian republics. It appears clearly to have formed part of what may be called the public law of these rival states from about the commencement of the fifteenth century. From the commencement of the next century it became an active principle in the general policy of Europe.