The real object then of the duel is, in most cases, to satisfy the person who pro vokes it, or who sends the challenge, that the world does not suspect him of a want of courage ; and it will be useful to ob serve, in passing, that the duel furnishes this sort of satisfaction as well to the man who gave the affront, as to him who was affronted. Its object also, in certain cases, is doubtless to gratify the ven geance of the man who has received an affront. But in all cases the object which is professed, or generally understood to be professed, of satisfaction in the sense of reparation for the affront, is no more than a pretence.
But though the practice of duelling cannot effect the good of repairing an injury, it may very possibly effect other sorts of good. The advantage of the practice of duelling is generally said to consist in its tendency to increase courtesy and refinement of manners ; as it will be a reason for a man to abstain from giving an affront, that he will be subjected in consequence to the fire of a pistol.
Now it is clear, in the first place, that all the affronts which are constituted rea sons or grounds of duels by fashion, or the law of honour or public opinion, are so constituted because they are judged by public opinion deserving of disapproba tion. If then the practice of duelling did not exist, public opinion, which now con stitutes these affronts grounds of a duel, as being deserving of disapprobation, would still condemn them, and, condemning them, provide men with a reason to ab stain from them. Thus there would still exist a reason to abstain, in all cases in which the practice of duelling now pro vides a reason. But, in the second place, the practice of duelling itself depends on public opinion alone. A man fights be cause public opinion judges that he who in certain cases refuses to challenge or to accept a challenge is deserving of disap probation : he fights from fear of public opinion. If he abstain from giving an affront on account of the existence of the practice of duelling, it is because the fear of public opinion would oblige him to fight; he abstains then from fear of public opinion. Now we have seen that there would be the fear of public opinion to deter him from the affronts which now lead to duels, if the practice of duelling did not exist. Thus the practice of duel ling does not in any case provide a reason to abstain, which public opinion would not provide without its aid. As a means
then of increasing courtesy and refine ment of manners, the practice of duelling is unnecessary ; and inasmuch as its ten dency to polish manners is the only ad vantage which can, with any show of pro bability, be ascribed to it, there will be no good effects whatever to set against the evil effects which we now proceed to enumerate. There will be no difficulty in striking the balance between good and evil.
First, the practice of duelling is disad vantageous, inasmuch as it often dimi nishes the motives to abstain from an af front. We have seen that the existence of this practice leads public opinion to employ itself concerning the courage of the two persons, who (the one having affronted and the other having been affronted) are in a situation in which, according to custom or fashion, a duel takes place. Public opinion then is di verted by the practice of duelling from the affront to the extraneous considera tion of the courage of the two parties. It censures the man who has given the affront only if he shrinks from a duel ; and even goes so far as to censure the man who has received the affront for the same reason. Thus in a case where a man, reckless of exposing his life, is dis posed to give affronts, he is certain that he can avert censure for an affront by being ready to fight a duel ; and in a case where a bold or reckless man is disposed to affront one who is timid, or a man ex pert with the pistol one who is a bad shot, he can reckon on the man whom he affronts refusing to fight, and on censure being thus diverted from himself who has given an affront to him who has shown want of courage. It is well observed in a very ingenious article on this subject in the ' Westminster Review It is difficult to conceive how the character of a bully, in all its shades and degrees, would be an object of ambition to any one, in a country where the law is too strong to suffer actual assaults to be com mitted with impunity, where public opi nion is powerful, and duelling not per mitted ; but where duelling is in full vigour, it is very easy to understand that the bully may not only enjoy the delight of vulgar applause, but the advantages of real power" (vol. iv. p. 28).